The Journal for General Philosophy of Science is a forum for discussion concerning the philosophy of science. Its subject matter encompasses the philosophical, especially methodological, ontological, epistemological, anthropological, and ethical foundations of the individual sciences. The coverage brings the natural, cultural, and technical sciences into a philosophical context, including discussion of historical presuppositions and conditions of the current problems of the philosophy of science. The Journal bridges gaps between the different sciences, especially the natural, cultural, and social sciences. Its discussion exposes the common as well as the divergent methodological and philosophical foundations of the individual sciences, and takes into account all currently relevant positions of the philosophy of science. The Journal considers the historical dimension of the sciences as context for understanding current problems of philosophy of science.

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Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie © 2009 Springer
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