Summary I examine three accounts of divine freedom. I argue that two recent accounts which attempt to explain God’s freedom without appealing to alternative possibilities fail. I then show how a view of divine freedom based on Robert Adams’s idea that God’s grace means he has no obligation to create the best world is able to explain how God can be free while also being perfectly good and perfectly rational.
Annals of Philosophy is one of the oldest philosophical journals in Poland (since 1948). It is published four times per year in both the online and traditional ways. The journal aims to publish the best original research papers in philosophy, as well as translations, reviews, accounts and polemics.
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Roczniki Filozoficzne / Annales de Philosophie / Annals of Philosophy © 2016 John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin President Vice-Rector, rev. prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Derdziuk