Each of the fourteen essays in this volume is directed to some aspect of these two questions: What are the peculiarities of the concepts that we use to describe and to criticize the mental states and performances of human beings? What are the peculiarities of the knowledge that we may possess of our own mental states and attitudes and of the mental states and attitudes of others? Each of us is both a scientific student of others' beliefs, desires, and attitudes and the responsible author of his own beliefs and attitudes. The center of the freedom-of-mind problem, Professor Hampshire asserts, is the confusion that arises when we try to reconcile the explanations that we would give of the same mental state or process from the two different points of view.
Originally published in 1971.
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