Freedom of Mind and Other Essays

Freedom of Mind and Other Essays

Copyright Date: 1971
Pages: 270
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    Freedom of Mind and Other Essays
    Book Description:

    Each of the fourteen essays in this volume is directed to some aspect of these two questions: What are the peculiarities of the concepts that we use to describe and to criticize the mental states and performances of human beings? What are the peculiarities of the knowledge that we may possess of our own mental states and attitudes and of the mental states and attitudes of others? Each of us is both a scientific student of others' beliefs, desires, and attitudes and the responsible author of his own beliefs and attitudes. The center of the freedom-of-mind problem, Professor Hampshire asserts, is the confusion that arises when we try to reconcile the explanations that we would give of the same mental state or process from the two different points of view.

    Originally published in 1971.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-6936-7
    Subjects: Philosophy

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Preface
    (pp. vii-x)
  4. Sources and Acknowledgments
    (pp. xi-2)
  5. Freedom of Mind
    (pp. 3-20)

    My thesis will be that, no matter what experimental knowledge of the previously unknown causes that determine a mans beliefs is accumulated, that which a man believes, and also that which he aims at and sets himself to achieve, will remain up to him to decide in the light of argument. Secondly, I want to point to a generally unrecognized consequence of asserting the doctrine that the physical states of the organism determine uniquely corresponding states of mind. I shall argue that when this causal dependence of states of mind upon physical states of the organism is known to hold,...

  6. Subjunctive Conditionals
    (pp. 21-27)

    “If Hitler had invaded in 1940, he would have captured London.” Statements of this kind have constituted a problem for three overlapping classes of philosophers: (a) those who wish to insist that all complex statements must be truth—functions of their constituent statements; (b) those who wish to insist that saying that an empirical statement is true is equivalent to saying that it corresponds to a fact; (c) those who wish to insist that to understand a sentence as being an empirical statement involves being able to prescribe how it might in principle be, directly or indirectly, verified or falsified....

  7. Multiply General Sentences
    (pp. 28-33)

    There is a logically peculiar class of sentences, some members of which have played an important part in philosophical arguments, without their logical peculiarities being generally noticed and labelled. My purpose is simply to indicate in what respect they are logically peculiar, and to attach a label to them; unless their peculiarity is recognised and labelled, they are always liable to mislead. I cannot define this class of sentences, which I shall call “multiply general sentences,” in the sense of providing formal or syntactical rules for recognising any sentence as being a member of the class, since their logical peculiarity...

  8. Dispositions
    (pp. 34-41)

    Statements about dispositions, and descriptions of character, are often said to be, or to involve, hypothetical or quasi-hypothetical statements. This seems to me false.

    Examples of forms of sentences normally used to make statements about dispositions are: “X is intelligent,” “X is ambitious,” “X is generous,” “X is honest,” where “X” is replaceable by an expression referring to an individual. These are to be distinguished from expressions of the occurrence (narrative) type, such as “X is angry now," “X is jealous now,” “X is embarrassed now,” “X is suspicious now,” “X understood what you said.” One can convert expressions of...

  9. Fallacies in Moral Philosophy
    (pp. 42-63)

    In 1912 there appeared inMindan article by H. A. Prichard entitled “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” I wish to ask the same question about contemporary moral philosophy, but to suggest different reasons for an affirmative answer. Most recent academic discussions of moral philosophy have directly or indirectly reflected the conception of the subject-matter of moral philosophy which is stated or implied in Prichard’s article; and this conception of the subject was in turn directly derived from Kant. Kant’s influence has been so great that it is now difficult to realise how revolutionary it was; yet I...

  10. Ethics: A Defense of Aristotle
    (pp. 64-86)

    The methods of linguistic analysis have suggested to us that we may often seesaw between one theory and another in philosophy because we have not been sufficiently patient and plodding in surveying the field: the field being the full range of uses to which some problematical and central word or phrase may properly be put. The usual story is that first one range of examples is chosen, and a theory of the standard use of the examined phrase is erected upon them: then a critic points to another range of examples, and erects another theory of proper use upon them....

  11. Ryle’s The Concept of Mind
    (pp. 87-113)

    The Concept of Mindhas the radical incoherences natural to a book written in transition, the transition being from one conception of logic and philosophical method to another. Not Two Worlds, but One World; not a Ghost, but a Body; (people are not) Occult but Obvious. Professor Ryle has been betrayed into using the weapons of his enemy. It appears that the arguments which are fatal to the assertion in each case must be no less fatal to the counter-assertion: for they are logical arguments directed against the form and generality of such philosophical statements, irrespective of whether they are...

  12. The Analogy of Feeling
    (pp. 114-128)

    I am concerned in this paper with only one source of one of the many puzzles associated with our knowledge of other minds. It is often said that statements about other people’s feelings and sensations cannot be justified as being based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern, that is, as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. I shall argue that they can be so justified. I will not deny that such inferences are difficult; everyone has always known, apart altogether from philosophical theory, that they are difficult; but I will deny...

  13. On Referring and Intending
    (pp. 129-142)

    The relation of thought to action, as compared with the relation of thought to statement—this is one of the oldest issues of philosophy. What is the relation of what we mean to what we actually say? And how does it differ from the relation of what we mean to do to what we actually do?

    (1) “I intended to speak next, but then we were interrupted.”

    (2) “When I made that statement, I was not referring to you but to that man in the corner.” It is now often said that the words “intend” and “refer,” as they occur...

  14. Feeling and Expression
    (pp. 143-159)

    I shall argue that, in the particular case of feeling, the inner life of the mind is to be understood as a development from something more primitive in every man’s behaviour, of which it is the residue and the shadow. Secondly, that the primitive faculty of imitation, and of imitative play and fiction, are a necessary background to the communication of feeling.

    The first problem is: how do we identify a mere something that we feel as anger or as amusement? There is at least one necessary connection that is clear in the normal use of language. If I am...

  15. Disposition and Memory
    (pp. 160-182)

    One may argue that, for every distinct state of mind and private sentiment there must exist a distinct expression of this state in a perceptible pattern of behaviour; for it seems that the perceptible patterns of behaviour must be the original endowment from which the purely mental states or activities developed, as a kind of shadow of the original, or as a residue from it. Various metaphors might be suggested here, but I think this metaphor of the “shadow” is peculiarly appropriate to the relation of inner feeling to behaviour. When I speak of “original endowment” and of “development,” I...

  16. Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom
    (pp. 183-209)

    I believe that everyone who has ever written about Spinoza, and who has tried to interpret his thought as a whole, either has been, or ought to have been, uneasily aware of some partiality in his interpretation, when he turns once again from his own words to the original. Certainly this is my own position. When the study of Spinoza is reviewed historically, one sees that each commentator, unconsciously faithful to his own age and to his own philosophical culture, has seized upon some one element in Spinoza's thought; he then proceeds to develop the whole of the philosophy from...

  17. A Kind of Materialism
    (pp. 210-231)

    I shall discuss a philosophy of mind to which I will not at first assign an identity or date, except that its author could not have lived and worked before 1600. He is modern, in the sense that he thinks principally about the future applications of the physical sciences to the study of personality. As I expound him, I hope that it will not at first be too easy to tell whether or not he is our contemporary, whether indeed he is not still writing today. I attempt this reconstruction as a way of praising a philosopher, who has not,...

  18. Sincerity and Single-Mindedness
    (pp. 232-256)

    I shall argue that sincerity is a dubious, uncertain ideal, and that it is very difficult to attain. It is not something obvious and simple, and it is not true that we all know what it is.

    And the argument involves a general point about the peculiarities of psychology as a science. The knowledge that one can properly claim to possess of mental states and of mental processes has some peculiar features, which distinguishes it in important respects from the knowledge that one can properly claim of physical states and of physical processes. These peculiarities emerge most clearly, as one...