Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary

Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary

JOSEF KORBEL
Copyright Date: 1972
Pages: 312
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x145j
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    Detente in Europe: Real or Imaginary
    Book Description:

    Josef Korbel, whose career encompasses both scholarly and diplomatic roles, presents a crisp, up-to-date survey of postwar relations between East and West. Seeking analytic, reasoned answers to the question of détente, he discusses in detail the changes in mood, policy, and practice that have occurred and are occurring.

    What exactly does rapprochement mean to the U.S.S.R., the U.S., East and West Europe? Is its primary objective the relaxing of tension or the achievement of security? the expansion of national interests? ideological conversion? reduction of Soviet influence? What have been the practical results of the policy of detente in the political, economic, and cultural spheres? What are the "realities" of the situation? Are the Western and Eastern blocs willing to consider a general European settlement? What effect did the Czechoslovak invasion have? What of the future?

    The heart of Mr. Korbel's discussion is the cornerstone of a détente edifice, West Germany's Ostpolitik, her rapprochement strategies. His reasonable conclusion looks to the future: the assets, dangers, and prospects of détente for the peace-keeping of Europe.

    Originally published in 1976.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-7212-1
    Subjects: Language & Literature

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Preface
    (pp. vii-viii)
    J. K.
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. ix-2)
  4. Introduction
    (pp. 3-8)

    Politics has a tendency to produce handy terminologies, designed to characterize some condition in international affairs or to enunciate some new political concept. The world has been inundated with such expressions: peaceful coexistence, satellite or client countries, cold war, communist world domination, containment, imperialism, neo-colonialism, revanchism, liberation, liberalization, building bridges, convergence, Socialist Commonwealth, Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine, Nixon Doctrine, Brezhnev Doctrine, etc.

    These terms, coined mostly in the West, conveniently crystallize our thinking and reduce a complex problem to a comfortable and understandable size. Sometimes they reflect the reality of the moment, at another time they have no significance beyond...

  5. CHAPTER 1 Ideology
    (pp. 9-26)

    The wartime allied coalition did not limit itself to the defeat of nazism and fascism. It also enunciated a program of building a Europe of national governments that would be committed to the principles of democracy; a number of international agreements, signed by the Big Three, laid down foundations toward this end. The Declaration on Liberated Europe signed at Yalta provided a framework for this program for all countries of Europe, victorious and defeated, and obligated the signatories to see to its fulfillment. The agreement on Poland, also signed at Yalta, contained specific provisions for establishing democracy there. The Potsdam...

  6. CHAPTER 2 Politics
    (pp. 27-106)

    The ideological struggle between the West and East was, naturally enough, accompanied by a power conflict and a new political alignment. As long as the necessities of war compelled the Big Three to work together, their attention was focused on Germany. Numerous statements made during the war, particularly at Teheran and Yalta, contained only general principles of their policy toward postwar Germany, such as denazification, democratization, reparations, punishment of war criminals, disarmament and occupation. A final solution of the German problem was to be decided at a peace conference, the date of which was postponed, according to the Potsdam Agreement,...

  7. CHAPTER 3 Economics
    (pp. 107-140)

    Before World War II, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had only marginal trade with the Soviet Union. The obstacles for developing this trade were both political and economic in nature. These countries did not even have diplomatic relations with Moscow until shortly before the outbreak of the war. The exception was Poland, whose political relations with Moscow were even more tense than those of some of the other nations of the area. The economic structures of the Central and Eastern European countries were not complementary to that of the Soviet Union. Russia’s agricultural production was in continuing crisis...

  8. CHAPTER 4 The Problem of Germany
    (pp. 141-186)

    The problem of Germany lies at the heart of detente in Europe. Today, no constructive relationship between the East and West is possible without German participation.

    During and for a short period after the war, and under the assumption of cooperation among themselves, the Allies had planned a quite different alternative: Germany was to be subjected to occupation by allied forces for an indefinite period of time; she was to remain disarmed, her industry stripped of armament production; her political development was to be kept under the watchful scrutiny of the Allies. Germany was never again to be permitted to...

  9. CHAPTER 5 Brandt’s Detente
    (pp. 187-246)

    The new coalition government brought to an end the dream of reunification that had persisted for twenty long years. In place of the illusion, it substituted the reality of a policy of reconciliation.

    Neither Willy Brandt nor Walter Scheel, the leader of the FDP, were to be embarrassed by their past when they inaugurated their new version ofOstpolitik,which differed materially from their CDU/CSU predecessors. The SPD, as the opposition party, had been against rearmament of the FRG and its membership in NATO, convinced as it was that these steps would hamper efforts for reunification. In March 1959 it...

  10. A Conclusion
    (pp. 247-252)

    Is detente in Europe real? durable? Or is the term destined to join the host of threadbare political clichés?

    The evidence of almost fifteen years of East-West European relations suggests that the détente is real, although limited in nature and scope, but that its durability is at best uncertain and at worst illusory. It may be that, given the character of international relations, one cannot expect more positive and permanent results. Perhaps nations and governments must be confined to modest goals of an immediate nature in the long process of the settlement of conflicting issues. However, the results of real...

  11. TABLES
    (pp. 253-278)
  12. Bibliography
    (pp. 281-292)
  13. Index
    (pp. 293-302)