The New Economics One Decade Older

The New Economics One Decade Older

James Tobin
Copyright Date: 1974
Pages: 112
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x1cdj
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  • Book Info
    The New Economics One Decade Older
    Book Description:

    Challenging such established ideas as the inevitability of the business cycle and the taboo on deficit spending, the group of economists associated with the Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers attempted in the 1960s to convert their theories into government policy. The successes, failures, elations. and frustrations of what came to be called the New Economics is the subject of James Tobin's fascinating account, based on the Janeway Lectures given at Princeton in 1972. In making his assessment of the New Economics, Professor Tobin draws on his close involvement in policymaking during the Kennedy years.

    Originally published in 1974.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-7147-6
    Subjects: Business

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Preface
    (pp. v-viii)
    J.T.
  3. Table of Contents
    (pp. ix-2)
  4. 1 Triumph and Defeat in the Sixties
    (pp. 3-40)

    Camelot was scarcely ten years ago, but it has already evoked several decades’ worth of poignant nostalgia, reminiscent chronicle, and revisionist history. The period since 1960 has been one of extraordinary changes, mostly unpredicted if not unpredictable, in the society, economy, and polity. National policies have changed, often drastically, and so have the frameworks of analysis and value in which issues of policy are formulated, debated, and decided.

    In political economy, to return to Camelot is to revisit an era when growth was a good word, indeedthegood word; when dollar devaluation was unthinkable; when automation was a hope...

  5. 2 Crossfire from Left and Right
    (pp. 41-70)

    In this second chapter I propose to consider some contemporary attacks on the New Economics of the 1960s and on the associated economic policies of that decade. Some come from the left, some from the right; some are hard to place in political spectrum. I shall begin with those that come primarily from the left, and among them with charges relating to the economic role of defense and war.

    Marxists have argued for generations that war is an intrinsic economic consequence of capitalism; the youthful New Left, including the growing band of radical economists, have rediscovered and reasserted this proposition....

  6. 3 Prospects for Macro-Economic Policy
    (pp. 71-96)

    In this country, as in others, the central government has gradually assumed political responsibility for the overall performance of the economy. Today the electorate does not fatalistically accept business cycles, unemployment, and inflation as acts of nature. Incumbent administrations and opposition candidates are expected to have programs to do something about them. Presidents are judged by their economic statistics.

    Before the Great Depression, certainly before the First World War, macro-economic issues were much less central. There were plenty of economic issues in political campaigns, but they were sectional and distributional, like the complaints of Western farmers against Eastern financiers, or...

  7. Concluding Remarks
    (pp. 97-102)

    The novelty of the New Economics was exaggerated in the early 1960s, and recent reports of its death are probably exaggerated too. At first the notion that fiscal and monetary policy could keep the economy close to a track of steady growth at full employment encountered deep skepticism and suspicion. But these gave way to high expectations when the economy enjoyed a long period of prosperity and uninterrupted growth, a performance due to a happy conjunction of successful policy and good luck. The euphoria was excessive. Too much was claimed, and even more came to be expected. Some disillusionment was...

  8. Index
    (pp. 103-105)
  9. Back Matter
    (pp. 106-106)