The attack of September 11 2001 demonstrated, to unprecedented effect, the vulnerability of states to transnational terrorist networks.¹ Within hours of the attack, the Irish government ordered the State’s security and intelligence agencies to review the level of threat against Ireland (Irish Times2001a). They began work that afternoon (Author’s interviews). On September 25 the government, through its spokesman, confirmed that Ireland was not under threat of a direct attack but could suffer ‘collateral damage’ in the event of an attack close by (O’ Connor and Minihan 2001). Days later, on October 3, the State’s national security policy was significantly...

To engage with the investigation presented in this study knowledge of the principal organisations at the frontline of proactive security is necessary. So here, general characteristics of these organisations are set out together with a brief analysis of how the State coped with two previous crises, the Emergency of 1939–45 and the Northern Ireland Troubles since 1969. Doing so will also help contextualise subsequent analysis. For example, the discussion on Northern Ireland will consider, among other issues, the use of law against subversion, what on-island terrorism meant for the Defence Forces’ operational posture and the challenges which border security...

The previous chapter summarised the Irish national security apparatus, considered the State’s responses to threats during the Emergency and during the Troubles and drew some comparisons between Ireland’s frontline agencies and those of other states. Attention focuses now on the literature of Irish national security policy. This review will be divided into three sections to reflect what appear to be central empirical concerns of the authors. These are firstly, political pressure on the Garda Síochána; secondly, financial pressure on the Defence Forces; and thirdly, Anglo-Irish considerations in Irish national security policy. The objective is to situate the study in the...

This study contends that when the Irish security and intelligence agencies were ordered to re-evaluate national security policy after 9/11 they did so in an atmosphere of heightened financial and political pressures on their organisations. Serious policy weaknesses occurred. Furthermore, several problems of policy persist. In Chapter 3, the findings of leading scholars suggested that Irish policy managers in the frontline agencies were subject to continuous financial and political pressures. This was so even at moments of perceived crisis for the security of the State. The major consideration here is whether the ways that the agencies have learned to deal...

This chapter will analyse security policy against what the frontline agencies say are the threats facing the State. In so doing, the extent of policy problems and how these are linked to political and financial pressures on the agencies will be further investigated. Buzan’s model of threat intensity will underpin the analysis. It provides three elements of state which must be protected – institutions, territory and most importantly, the binding idea that binds citizens to the authorities. Moreover, it offers a broad set of criteria to support a critique of policy responses to identified threats. These criteria are specificity of threat,...

So far, this study has examined Irish policy over a timeline stretching over the seven years after 9/11. Now, the focus narrows to the period immediately after the attack, during which Irish security policy underwent rapid review and all the main aspects of current policy were put in place (e.g. the decision to emphasise emergency planning as the primary concern). The dates in question are between September 11 and approximately October 3 2001.

On the afternoon of September 11 the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, and the Tánaiste, Mary Harney, convened a meeting of the ‘heads of the security services of key...

This study was written on the elementary but frequently overlooked premise that the unexpected often happens. Hence its first task was to map out that which was expected; the normality to which decision-makers were socialised and within which they would seek to remain to avoid being cut off from well practised ‘traffic rules’ for conducting policy. Historical institutionalism and, more particularly, Bulmer and Burch’s model of it, has emerged as a useful resource for the task of navigating the uncharted channels of Irish security policy. Its use underpins the conclusion that national security policy in the years after 9/11 was,...