From Kant to Husserl

From Kant to Husserl: Selected Essays

Charles Parsons
Copyright Date: 2012
Published by: Harvard University Press
Pages: 256
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbtcw
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  • Book Info
    From Kant to Husserl
    Book Description:

    In From Kant to Husserl, Charles Parsons examines a wide range of historical opinion on philosophical questions from mathematics to phenomenology. Amplifying his early ideas on Kant’s philosophy of arithmetic, the author then turns to reflections on Frege, Brentano, and Husserl.

    eISBN: 978-0-674-06542-0
    Subjects: Philosophy

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. PREFACE
    (pp. ix-xiv)
  4. Part I: Kant
    • NOTE TO PART I
      (pp. 3-4)

      In these essays the Critique of Pure Reason is cited in the usual A/B manner. Other writings of Kant are cited by volume and page of the Academy edition, Gesammelte Schriften, which are given in the translations I have used and in many other translations, including those of the Cambridge edition. In Essays 1, 2, and 3 the Critique is quoted in Kemp Smith’s translation, sometimes modified. In Essay 4 and the Postscript the Guyer and Wood translation is used for quotations.

      I use the following short titles and other translations:

      (Inaugural) Dissertation: De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et...

    • 1 THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC
      (pp. 5-41)

      Among the pillars of Kant’s philosophy, and of his transcendental idealism in particular, is the view of space and time as a priori intuitions and as forms of outer and inner intuition respectively. The first part of the systematic exposition of the Critique of Pure Reason is the Transcendental Aesthetic, whose task is to set forth this conception. It is then presupposed in the rest of the systematic work of the Critique in the Transcendental Logic.

      The claim of the Aesthetic is that space and time are a priori intuitions. Knowledge is called a priori if it “independent of experience...

    • 2 ARITHMETIC AND THE CATEGORIES
      (pp. 42-68)

      On its conceptual side, mathematics as Kant understands it involves in an essential way the categories of quantity. This much should be obvious to readers of the Critique of Pure Reason. To trace this connection in more detail, however, has not been a main concern of interpreters of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, at least recent ones. No doubt it has been thought that the connection is bound up with traditional logic and with a conception of mathematics more restrictive than what has come to prevail since the rise of set theory and abstract mathematics. The questions concerning Kant’s conception of...

    • 3 REMARKS ON PURE NATURAL SCIENCE
      (pp. 69-79)

      In attempting to crack the hardest nut in Kant’s philosophy of science, his conception of an a priori or “pure” part of science, Philip Kitcher shows both courage and an appreciation of what is central to Kant’s philosophy.¹ The issues that in the Critique of Pure Reason are the subject of the Transcendental Analytic are discussed in the Prolegomena under the heading “How is pure natural science possible?” Some of the most difficult issues faced by interpreters of Kant could thus be represented as concerning how Kant answers that question. But what does the question itself mean? What part of...

    • 4 TWO STUDIES IN THE RECEPTION OF KANT’S PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC
      (pp. 80-99)

      The present essay takes its point of departure from a thought I have had at various times in thinking about interpretations of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics in the literature, in particular that offered by Jaakko Hintikka. That was that if the interpretation is correct, shouldn’t one expect that to show in the way that Kant’s views were understood by others in the early period after the publication of the first Critique? That reflection suggests a research program that might be of some interest, to investigate how Kant’s philosophy of mathematics was read in, say, the first generation from 1781. I...

    • POSTSCRIPT TO PART I
      (pp. 100-114)

      “Arithmetic and the Categories” (Essay 2) was written just as a period of impressive growth in the study of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics was beginning. This beginning is marked by the early writings on the subject of Michael Friedman.¹ He has continued to contribute up to the present day. One of his major contributions was to integrate the study of Kant on mathematics with that of his philosophy of physical science. His writings also stimulated work by a younger generation of scholars.² Some reaction to this body of work is called for in the present reprinting. I will concentrate, however,...

  5. Part II: Frege and Phenomenology
    • 5 SOME REMARKS ON FREGE’S CONCEPTION OF EXTENSION
      (pp. 117-130)

      In discussions of the elements of set theory, we find today two quite different suggestions as to what a set is. One appeals to intuitions associated with ordinary notions such as “collection” or “aggregate.” According to it, a set is “formed” or “constituted” from its elements. The axioms of set theory can then be motivated by ideas such as that sets can be formed from given elements in a quite arbitrary way, and that any set can be obtained by iterated application of such set formation, beginning either with nothing or with individuals that are not sets.¹ According to the...

    • POSTSCRIPT TO ESSAY 5
      (pp. 131-137)

      Since the two essays on Frege reprinted here were written, a lot has happened in the study of Frege and the development of his ideas. But I will limit the scope of my postscripts to developments that bear directly on what is said in these essays.

      The first part of the present essay is structured around two ideas of what a set may be, Frege’s conception of extension and the conception of a set as constituted by its elements. I explored such ideas further in systematically motivated writings, beginning with “What is the iterative conception of set?”¹ The suggestion made...

    • 6 FREGE’S CORRESPONDENCE
      (pp. 138-157)

      The publication of this volume¹ of Frege’s correspondence completes the project of publishing the Frege Nachlass, begun by Heinrich Scholz in 1935, though because of losses during the Second World War, what is published in this volume and its predecessor² falls short of what Scholz planned. In view of the extensive searches that the custodians of the Frege Archive have made for additional letters and other materials, it seems unlikely that the Frege corpus will be much augmented in the future.³

      We now have what amounts to an edition of Frege’s collected works, which compares favorably with what is available...

    • POSTSCRIPT TO ESSAY 6
      (pp. 158-160)

      Certainly the most important development concerning Frege’s correspondence in the period since the present essay was written is the discovery and publication of Frege’s letters to Ludwig Wittgenstein. A lot has been written about Wittgenstein’s relations with Frege and the influence on him of Frege’s work, and I will not attempt to summarize it or add to it. Wittgenstein had had more than one meeting with Frege between 1911 and 1913, although testimony differs about the time and circumstances of the first meeting.¹ But the earliest of the lost letters that Scholz had acquired is dated October 22, 1913, and...

    • 7 BRENTANO ON JUDGMENT AND TRUTH
      (pp. 161-189)

      It is well known that Brentano classified “psychical phenomena” as presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. Presentations are presentations of objects, although their objects may not exist. One might say roughly that presentations are the vehicles of content, but a presentation is not propositional in form and does not embody any stance of the subject toward the content in question. Judgments are affirmations or denials of presentations. Thus they are based on presentations but are not a species of them. It is of course judgments that are true or false. Phenomena of the third class are also based...

    • 8 HUSSERL AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN
      (pp. 190-214)

      The study of the history of analytical philosophy generally begins with Frege. As a consequence, Edmund Husserl stands in some significant relation to that history almost from its beginning. Husserl and Frege exchanged letters in 1891; Husserl’s first book, Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891), contained critical comments on Frege’s Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); Frege reviewed Husserl’s book; and they corresponded again in 1906. The relation between Frege’s views and Husserl’s, particularly in Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen¹ (1900–1901), and the possibility of a significant influence of Frege on Husserl’s decisive turn away from psychologism in the late 1890s have been extensively...

  6. BIBLIOGRAPHY
    (pp. 217-230)
  7. COPYRIGHT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
    (pp. 231-232)
  8. INDEX
    (pp. 233-242)