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Dasein Disclosed

Dasein Disclosed

John Haugeland
Copyright Date: 2013
Published by: Harvard University Press
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  • Book Info
    Dasein Disclosed
    Book Description:

    At his death in 2010, the Anglo-American analytic philosopher John Haugeland left an unfinished manuscript summarizing his life-long engagement with Heidegger's Being and Time. As illuminating as it is iconoclastic, Dasein Disclosed is not just Haugeland's Heidegger-this sweeping reevaluation is a major contribution to philosophy in its own right.

    eISBN: 978-0-674-07459-0
    Subjects: Philosophy

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Editor’s Introduction
    (pp. vii-xl)

    John Haugeland, well-known philosopher of mind and cognitive science who taught at the universities of Chicago and Pittsburgh, died unexpectedly in June 2010. This posthumously published volume combines a book manuscript that was incomplete at the time of his death with other published and unpublished papers on the early philosophical work of Martin Heidegger.

    Haugeland’s groundbreaking reflections on intentionality, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence formed the core of his philosophical work. He had entered philosophy just as digital computing and serious research on artificial intelligence were beginning to reshape the discipline’s conceptions of mind and cognition. His books,Artificial Intelligence:...

  4. ONE Early Papers on Heidegger

    • Heidegger on Being a Person (1982)
      (pp. 3-16)

      This paper presents a nonstandard and rather freewheeling interpretation ofBeing and Time,with emphasis on the first division. I make Heidegger out to be less like Husserl and/or Sartre than is usual and more like Dewey and (to a lesser extent) Sellars and the later Wittgenstein. My central point will be Heidegger’s radical divergence from the Cartesian-Kantian tradition regarding the fundamental question: What is a person?

      According to Aristotle, man is a logical or “word-using” animal, a political or “community-participating” animal, and a featherless biped. In a sense easier to appreciate than to explain, the last is only incidental,...

    • Dasein’s Disclosedness (1989)
      (pp. 17-40)

      Dasein is its disclosedness(SZ133). This formula, while not exactly an equation, is at least an announcement that dasein cannot be understood apart from its disclosedness, nor disclosedness apart from dasein; each can be understood only with, and indeedas,the other. Here I will begin with an interpretation of disclosedness and use that as a guide to interpreting dasein.

      Heidegger says a variety of things about disclosedness, and it is not always clear how they are connected or even mutually compatible. Since any interpretation must address this diversity, it is appropriate at the outset to list (some of) the claims:...

  5. TWO Dasein Disclosed

    • Proposal for a Guggenheim Fellowship
      (pp. 43-47)

      I will write a book interpreting the substantive (“nondestructive”) half of Heidegger’sBeing and Time,including the third division (which was, in fact, never written). While by no means “introductory,” the work will be written so as to maximize its accessibility to non-Heideggerians, including philosophers whose main background is in so-called analytic philosophy and philosophically sophisticated nonphilosophers. (I have a lot of experience teaching this material at a high level to such audiences.)

      My interpretation is distinctive (controversial, “original”) in several ways, even aside from the (so far as I know) unprecedented inclusion of the third division. In the first...

    • Introduction
      (pp. 48-50)

      Heidegger was born; he was a Nazi; he died.¹

      In the meantime, he publishedBeing and Time(1963; English translation, 1962), the most celebrated and possibly the most important philosophical work of the twentieth century. The present essay is an exposition and interpretation of part I of that work, with special consideration for readers trained mainly in recent Anglo-American traditions. The latter does not mean that Heidegger will be recast as an “analytic” philosopher in disguise—far from it. Rather, it indicates only a kind of background and vocabulary that will be taken for granted.

      Two “technical” difficulties confront any...

    • 1 The Being Question
      (pp. 51-63)

      Heidegger declares the aim of his magnum opus on page one:¹

      The intention of the following treatise is a concrete working out of the question of the sense of ‘being.’ (SZ1)

      This purpose must be born in mind throughout, not just because it is easy to lose track of in the course of preparatory analyses but rather and mainly because those analyses themselves are properly intelligible only in light of it. Thus, the famous accounts of everydayness, authenticity, death, temporality, and so on really are essential steps toward working out the “being question” and liable to be misunderstood apart...

    • 2 Philosophical Method
      (pp. 64-75)

      How does onedophilosophy? Heidegger says that ontology is the “science” of being. But it is not a science like any other: there are no experiments perform, no surveys to conduct, no bones or artifacts to unearth. How then, are results obtained and validated?

      These are questions ofmethod—something philosophers have always grappled with. Descartes, for instance, sought unshakable foundations for knowledge via his method of hyperbolic doubt and the clear and distinct ideas that could survive it. Kant introduced the method of transcendental critique, which changed the focus from substantive knowledge itself to the conditions and...

    • 3 Dasein
      (pp. 76-90)

      The three central topics ofBeing and Timeare being, dasein, and time. Yet dasein, the only one not mentioned in the title, takes up most of the book—at least in the divisions we have. It is important to understand why that should be.

      Heidegger initially introduces and highlights dasein as the entity that asks the being-question:

      [W]orking out the being-question entails making an entity—the inquirer—perspicuous in its being. Asking this question is itself essentially determined,qua way-of-beingof an entity, by what is asked about—namely, being. That entity, which we ourselves in each case are,...

    • 4 Being-in-the-World
      (pp. 91-98)

      Dasein can be characterized in several different fundamental ways. It is introduced as the entity that asks the being-question and that, moreover, always already understands being somehow or other. This is really the main point about dasein. It explainswhydasein is a central topic in a book devoted to “reawakening” that question.

      But dasein is also singled out as the entity that we ourselves in each case are. This provides an initial insight into the topic of our discussion—an insight further enriched by two formal indications (of which, more in a moment).

      Yetby farthe most elaborate...

    • 5 The World of Everyday Dasein
      (pp. 99-120)

      With this chapter we begin the analysis of being-in-the-world—dasein’s basic makeup—and, more specifically, the world “side” of that makeup. At the same time, we begin the first phase of the existential analytic of dasein, the phase devoted to everydayness. The everyday world is that wherein everyday life is lived, and much of the account will be taken up with the intraworldly entities in the midst of which it is lived. But the ultimate goal is an understanding of the “worldishness”(Weltlichkeit)of this world.

      At the outset, Heidegger distinguishes four different senses of the word ‘world.’ Of these,...

    • 6 The Who of Everyday Dasein
      (pp. 121-136)

      Dasein is a living way of life that embodies an understanding of being, including its own being. Its basic structural makeup is being-in-the-world—or, more fully articulated, who/being-in/world. Having considered the everyday world as one “side of the coin” (in its everydayness), we now turn to the other: thewhoof everyday dasein.

      The very word ‘who’ signals that our topic is people: those who live the way of life that dasein is. But it is not just another word for ‘person,’ as the architectonic already makes clear. As the counterpart of the world in the structure of being-in-the-world, the...

    • 7 Being-in as Such
      (pp. 137-151)

      We’ve just finished big chapters about the world and the who, and also about equipment and others (intraworldly entities). We’ve exhibited the anyone (understood as a distributive singular term) as the neutral “I-myself” of peoplequacases of dasein. And we’ve used “comportment toward entities as entities” as a general expression for letting them show up. Now we have to talk about the “relationsbetween” them (except that the coin metaphor turns “relation” inside out). Put another way, what is conspicuously lacking is any account ofhowthat comportment lets entities show up asentities. Yet that is clearly the...

    • Glossary of Haugeland’s Translations from Sein und Zeit
      (pp. 152-154)
  6. THREE Late Papers on Heidegger

    • Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger (2005)
      (pp. 157-166)

      While brilliance and originality surely top the list of qualities shared by Brandom and Heidegger, another commonality is a tendency to treat their predecessors as partial and sometimes confused versions of themselves. Heidegger, therefore, could hardly be indignant on principle if Brandom finds a fair bit ofMaking It Explicitin the first division ofBeing and Time. Nevertheless, some details may deserve a closer look. Here I concentrate on the more recent of the Heidegger essays reprinted inTales of the Mighty Dead:“Dasein, the Being That Thematizes.”

      The basic premise of the essay is that “Being and Time...

    • Letting Be (2007)
      (pp. 167-178)

      The official aim ofBeing and Timeis to reawaken the question of the sense of being—the project Heidegger calls “fundamental ontology.” In that work and others from the same period, he employs, as a new technical term, the expressionsein lassen,“to let be.” This is a compound transitive verb, the subject of which (if made explicit at all) is generally dasein or dasein’s world and the direct object of which is entities or some species thereof. So, simple uses of the term might be claims like “dasein lets entities be” or “the everyday world lets equipment be.” Moreover,...

    • Death and Dasein (2007)
      (pp. 179-186)

      I take at face value the professed aim ofBeing and Time:to reawaken the question of the sense of being. The formulation itself implies that the “being-question” used to be awake (presumably among the Greeks) but has since somehow fallen asleep or gone dormant. Reawakening it would have to mean taking it up again as a serious and vital question on which genuine progress could be made. How much progress Heidegger in fact made, or thought he made, I cannot say, but presumably some.

      Our entrée into the topic here must be via the phenomenon of dasein and for...

    • Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism (2000)
      (pp. 187-220)

      In their lengthy and powerful appendix to Dreyfus’s (1991)Being-in the-World,Dreyfus and Rubin argue that the “existentialist” portions ofBeing and Time—those having to do with authenticity, falling, anxiety, death, conscience, guilt, and resoluteness—are an attempt to secularize Kierkegaard’s notion of religiousness a, while also incorporating certain features of his religiousness B (though without the latter’s essential risk or vulnerability). They conclude, however, that, for all its ingenuity, this attempt results in an inconsistent position and is therefore a failure.

      It is undeniable that Heidegger drew most of these terms and much of what he says in...

    • Temporality (2002)
      (pp. 221-240)

      1. The declared, official aim ofBeing and Timeis to reawaken the question of the sense of being—everything in the book should be read as bearing on this aim and this question.¹

      —Temporality(Temporalität)is Heidegger’s concise name for what he also calls dasein’s “ekstatic-horizonal unity,” which is the most basic structure of any understanding of entities and their being.

      —What I hope to do is make a start on explaining what this means and why it is plausible.

      We can begin by setting out as “beacons” two of Heidegger’s most fundamental theses.

      —First,being, dasein,...

  7. FOUR Papers on Heideggerian Themes

    • Social Cartesianism (2004)
      (pp. 243-259)

      I begin with brief, critical overviews of three well-known arguments in the philosophy of language due respectively to Nelson Goodman, W. V. O. Quine, and some amalgam of the later Wittgenstein and Saul Kripke.¹ I then maintain that the failings in these three arguments have a common origin. And I conclude by suggesting that this common origin is a modified legacy of Cartesianism—a legacy that Heidegger, by contrast, managed to overcome.

      InFact, Fiction, and Forecast,Goodman (1954) considers two problems concerning induction. The first is the traditional logical/epistemological problem of justifying our formal canons of good inductive inference....

    • Authentic Intentionality (2002)
      (pp. 260-274)

      Once upon a time, we “knew” what computation is: it is what ever it is that Turing machines do—generalized, of course, to include von Neumann machines, production systems, Lisp machines, and all the other provably “equivalent” architectures. By these lights, so-called analog computers were not really computers in the strict sense but only devices that had that name for historical reasons. Now, however, things do not seem so clear—hence the reason for this book.¹ I will mention in passing just two of the numerous issues that have clouded the idea of computation in the last decade or two....

  8. References
    (pp. 277-280)
  9. Acknowledgments
    (pp. 281-284)
    Joan Wellman
  10. Index
    (pp. 285-291)