My Storm
My Storm: Managing the Recovery of New Orleans in the Wake of Katrina
Edward J. Blakely
FOREWORD BY HENRY CISNEROS
Series: The City in the Twenty-First Century
Copyright Date: 2012
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Pages: 192
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhpk8
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My Storm
Book Description:

Edward J. Blakely has been called upon to help rebuild after some of the worst disasters in recent American history, from the San Francisco Bay Area's 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake to the September 11 attacks in New York. Yet none of these jobs compared to the challenges he faced in his appointment by New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin as Director of the Office of Recovery and Development Administration following Hurricane Katrina. In Katrina's wake, New Orleans and the Gulf Coast suffered a disaster of enormous proportions. Millions of pounds of water crushed the basic infrastructure of the city. A land area six times the size of Manhattan was flooded, destroying 200,000 homes and leaving most of New Orleans under water for 57 days. No American city had sustained that amount of destruction since the Civil War. But beneath the statistics lies a deeper truth: New Orleans had been in trouble well before the first levee broke, plagued with a declining population, crumbling infrastructure, ineffective government, and a failed school system. Katrina only made these existing problems worse. To Blakely, the challenge was not only to repair physical damage but also to reshape a city with a broken economy and a racially divided, socially fractured community. My Storm is a firsthand account of a critical sixteen months in the post-Katrina recovery process. It tells the story of Blakely's endeavor to transform the shell of a cherished American city into a city that could not only survive but thrive. He considers the recovery effort's successes and failures, candidly assessing the challenges at hand and the work done-admitting that he sometimes stumbled, especially in managing press relations. For Blakely, the story of the post-Katrina recovery contains lessons for all current and would-be planners and policy makers. It is, perhaps, a cautionary tale.

eISBN: 978-0-8122-0706-4
Subjects: Sociology
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. vii-viii)
  3. FOREWORD
    FOREWORD (pp. ix-2)
    HENRY G. CISNEROS

    THE SCALE OF THE HURRICANE WAS IMMENSE. THE POWER OF the direct hit on a city was stunning. The suffering of the residents was shocking. And the challenges of the recovery effort were unprecedented in American history.

    Of necessity, therefore, the strategy to bring New Orleans back from the brink required the best urban minds and most skillful public sector managers the nation could identify. Fortunately the New Orleans city administration found a person whose background, experience, and dedication qualified him at that level—Ed Blakely.

    I had known Professor Blakely by reputation as one of the nation’s most creative...

  4. INTRODUCTION
    INTRODUCTION (pp. 3-8)

    I ARRIVED IN NEW ORLEANS ON JANUARY 7, 2007, THE 192ND anniversary of the historic Battle of New Orleans. I had been called to take command in a new and perhaps more daunting battle, for the life and soul of the nation’s most distinctive city. This was my first official day on the job as the “czar” to lead the post-Hurricane Katrina recovery effort.

    New Orleans has one of the richest racial and cultural tapestries in the United States. It’s where jazz emerged as an art form. It was a place of fame and fable. Tennessee Williams created splendid imagery...

  5. PART I. SEEING THE PROBLEM
    • 1. AN ALARMING VIEW FROM DOWN UNDER
      1. AN ALARMING VIEW FROM DOWN UNDER (pp. 11-15)

      I GOT MY FIRST VIEW OF HURRICANE KATRINA AND ITS devastation from computer news feeds in Australia. I had moved to Sydney with my wife Maaike, an Australian, in 2003. My goals were to retire—to Sydney, a city we both loved—and to fulfill a childhood aspiration to live outside the United States. Although we were comfortable financially, when the University of Sydney offered me a professorship and, with it, permanent residency, I accepted. I also started a consulting practice. With few cares in the world, we settled into a beautiful cottage in a nice town close to one...

    • 2. GETTING TO NEW ORLEANS
      2. GETTING TO NEW ORLEANS (pp. 16-23)

      IT WAS NATURAL FOR THE ASSOCIATION TO REACH OUT TO ME. When I moved to Australia, everyone acted as if I’d resigned from the world. But my Stateside credentials remained strong. In addition to being at or near the center of activity after the Oakland fire and earthquake, and after September 11 in New York, I’d written op-eds on disaster planning and an article on natural disasters, and had served on the APA board. So in early October 2005 I booked flights to Los Angeles, Chicago, and finally Shreveport, Louisiana, for a Katrina recovery workshop sponsored jointly by the APA...

    • 3. A HARBINGER OF PROBLEMS TO COME
      3. A HARBINGER OF PROBLEMS TO COME (pp. 24-33)

      I WENT BACK TO AUSTRALIA AND RETURNED A FEW WEEKS later, the first week of December 2006. I had asked the mayor to set up a meeting for me with the people I’d be working with, to see if there was some mutual comfort and a general agreement on what my role would be if I took the job.

      I had a packed agenda. I met with police superintendent Warren Riley and chief administrative officer Brenda Hatfield, who said with a warm smile, “I’ll be glad to get this recovery off my desk.”

      Legislative director and mayor’s aide de camp...

    • 4. “FIX IT!”
      4. “FIX IT!” (pp. 34-40)

      I WAS ANNOUNCED AS THE RECOVERY “CZAR” IN NEW Orleans on January 7, 2007, 16 months after Katrina. “Dr. Blakely, a globetrotting academic with a long résumé, has a mandate for renewal from Mayor C. Ray Nagin and a city desperate for leadership,” reported the New York Times on my appointment.

      Even with my experiences with major disasters in Oakland, Los Angeles, and New York; even with my extensive nonacademic resume; even with my successes in the nonprofit sector working with large staffs and budgets; even with my international experiences in unfamiliar cultures ranging from Turkey to the Caribbean to...

  6. PART II. WHERE TO FROM HERE?
    • 5. IMAGINING A FUTURE OUT OF MUD: A RECOVERY PLAN
      5. IMAGINING A FUTURE OUT OF MUD: A RECOVERY PLAN (pp. 43-54)

      MAYOR NAGIN WAS ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA. HE HAD to decide among at least three competing recovery plans: one promoted by the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) commission; the second, a scheme of neighborhood plans put forward by the consulting firm of Lambert and Associates; and the third, an initiative by the Greater New Orleans Foundation (GNOF) to synthesize all the plans from all over the city into one consolidated monster plan covering everything the city ever needed or wanted.

      BNOB was developed primarily by the business community with the mayor’s agreement. It used soon-to-be-infamous “green dots” to...

    • 6. INSIDE THE MAYOR’S “COCOON”
      6. INSIDE THE MAYOR’S “COCOON” (pp. 55-63)

      MY FIRST TWO WEEKS IN CITY HALL WERE ILLUMINATING. Although I hadn’t expected a big welcoming party, I was surprised at simply being put out to sea with almost no contact with anyone, including the mayor. I spent my first two weeks reviewing resumes, finding office space, and getting an office up and running with the help of the mayor’s personnel assistant. But no one called to see what I was doing. No one seemed to want to know.

      In January 2007, the city work force was less than half its pre-Katrina size of over 5,000. Mayor Nagin had been...

    • 7. PUTTING MY TEAM ON THE FIELD: RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
      7. PUTTING MY TEAM ON THE FIELD: RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (pp. 64-75)

      THE MAYOR STARTED HIS SECOND TERM WITH ROUGHLY twenty senior staff, including those I’ve just described as his “cocoon,” reporting directly to him. When I arrived, there were three direct line officers: myself, as director of recovery management, with a small team of 20; Brenda Hatfield, CAO , with several thousand employees; and Donna Addkison, chief development officer and head of economic development and housing, with about 200.

      As I’ve indicated, Addkison and I couldn’t get on the same page from the outset. We had only one meeting during my first six months, and that one at the mayor’s insistence....

    • 8. POLITICS AND MONEY
      8. POLITICS AND MONEY (pp. 76-88)

      THE NEW ORLEANS RECOVERY WAS LARGELY ABOUT THE politics of money and who controlled it: city or state, black or white, rich or poor, downtown or the neighborhoods. In the recovery, there was money on the table. It could be used to determine who came back to New Orleans, and who didn’t. Much of the recovery played out at the contentious vector of money, land, housing, and race politics.

      Four months after I took over the recovery, we received preliminary approval from the LRA for the $417 million in recovery block grant funds from the federal government. The state viewed...

    • 9. REVIVING A DROWNING ECONOMY
      9. REVIVING A DROWNING ECONOMY (pp. 89-98)

      KNOWLEDGEABLE POLICY SCHOLARS ARGUED OPENLY THAT perhaps New Orleans had little economic reason to live.

      Leading policy economist Ed Glasser, in a piece he described as a “thought experiment,” which I learned about in my first visit to Harvard in 2007, said that with the federal government pledging billions of dollars in aid, most of which never materialized, people would be better off not thinking about a place-based strategy that emphasized cash payments to residents. Instead, they could choose to use the cash to reinvest in whatever living arrangements they had in the city, or to relocate to Atlanta, Houston,...

  7. PART III. ELEMENTS OF THE CITY
    • 10. IN SEARCH OF CIVIC LEADERSHIP
      10. IN SEARCH OF CIVIC LEADERSHIP (pp. 101-106)

      THANKS TO ITS MUSIC, NEW ORLEANS IS JUSTIFIABLY KNOWN as the “soul city.” But if the term “soul” is taken to mean “soul-mate,” as in the sharing of a common identity and sense of directions and goals, then New Orleans falls far short of the mark. New Orleanians frequently use soul to refer to the collective spirit of the city. The city has a spirit, but it lacks manifestations of it that foster cohesion.

      According to research by Lawrence Vale and Thomas Campanella in The Resilient City, among the most important tools in a disaster recovery is a city’s cohesiveness,...

    • 11. MORE THAN BRICKS AND STICKS: REVIVING NEIGHBORHOODS
      11. MORE THAN BRICKS AND STICKS: REVIVING NEIGHBORHOODS (pp. 107-114)

      ON MY MANY BIKE EXPEDITIONS AROUND NEW ORLEANS AS the Bicycle Guy, I got to see the city’s residents as neighbors, and in neighborhoods. Some places suffered little storm damage but had large-scale problems that predated the storm, such as dilapidated houses and neglected streetscapes. I saw that income was and is a dividing factor, but not entirely so: a larger determinant of a neighborhood’s viability appeared to be the mix of people who were committed to making the neighborhood a stronger community after Katrina than before.

      The residents of Broadmoor and Lakeview, for example, had neighborhood survival characteristics. They...

    • 12. THE RACE CARDS OF RECOVERY
      12. THE RACE CARDS OF RECOVERY (pp. 115-121)

      NEW ORLEANS IS ONE OF THE SADDEST RACE STORIES IN THE nation. The cumulative and historic race issues are enormous, and little has been done to change them.

      New Orleans may be a glamorous place on its face. But beneath the glitter a devastating poverty festers that Katrina made all too public. The poverty rate in Louisiana is the nation’s second worst. In New Orleans itself, 38 percent of all black kids live below the poverty line, and among fourth graders, only 44 and 26 percent read and do math at their grade performance, according to Phyllis Landrieu. As one...

    • 13. A MEDIUM OFF MESSAGE
      13. A MEDIUM OFF MESSAGE (pp. 122-126)

      AS I BEGAN PACKING MY OFFICE FOR MY DEPARTURE FROM New Orleans in May 2009, I came across Marshall McLuhan’s pioneering book on one of my shelves. His famous statement about the media being the message I found to be partially correct in New Orleans: there, during the recovery, it seemed that the media made too many messages.

      In my time as recovery czar, I became an object of print news scorn but received generally good treatment from the major television networks in the city. My overall impression is that the mayor and I too often became scapegoats for a...

    • 14. LEVEES AND FEMA: THE REAL HAZARDS FOR NEW ORLEANS
      14. LEVEES AND FEMA: THE REAL HAZARDS FOR NEW ORLEANS (pp. 127-134)

      IN ONE OF MY VERY FIRST FIELD NOTES IN NEW ORLEANS IN January 2007, I wrote, can the city fool Mother Nature? That question is still relevant, ominous, and unanswered. In some ways, it is a foundational question for the ongoing recovery. The levees render the city a cup with a sinking bottom. The city faces the mighty Mississippi on one side and a big lake on the other. Its unique geo-hazards must be confronted.

      Every two weeks, usually on Friday, the New Orleans District of the Corps of Engineers brought a small army of military and civilian experts to...

  8. PART IV. ASSESSING THE RECOVERY
    • 15. CHANCE TO ASSESS THE RECOVERY
      15. CHANCE TO ASSESS THE RECOVERY (pp. 137-143)

      IN LATE NOVEMBER 2008, AS MY APPOINTMENT AND THE second term were coming to an end, Mayor Nagin and I met over lunch to take the next steps and begin changing the city’s message from “recovery” to “normalcy.” Continuous stories of struggle at some point wear out. There was talk in Congress of Katrina fatigue.

      I discussed options with the mayor. We agreed that the recovery phase for the city needed to move on. At a budget hearing for 2009, the mayor and I put in place a new organizational approach that featured an office of community development. For me,...

    • 16. IN THE “BIG EASY,” NOTHING COMES EASY, NOT EVEN LEAVING
      16. IN THE “BIG EASY,” NOTHING COMES EASY, NOT EVEN LEAVING (pp. 144-152)

      I LEFT NEW ORLEANS AT THE END OF MAY 2009, WITH A GREAT send-off party given by Mayor Nagin and attended by about 150 guests. I received many accolades: for example, the proverbial “key to the city” and the designation of my date of departure as Edward J. Blakely Day. The city council were unanimously generous in their praise of my service.

      At an event organized by my staff, I read from one of the many letters I’d received from returned residents, thanking me and urging me to “stay and finish the job.” I did the media rounds and radio...

  9. Chapter Notes
    Chapter Notes (pp. 153-160)
  10. APPENDIX: Memorandum of Understanding
    APPENDIX: Memorandum of Understanding (pp. 161-176)
  11. INDEX
    INDEX (pp. 177-182)
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