Thomas Sheridan’s comment, insinuating that traders acted ‘merely for money’, encapsulates the premise of this book – or rather, the mirror of it. That is, this book argues that the business culture of the British Atlantic was one which was socially embedded and did not allow for pure profit maximising, at least in the short term – hence the question mark. In fact, Sheridan is more likely commenting on the idea that traders did not produce anythingper se, but worked for profit from trade.² Indeed, many merchants were successful in making money and were well respected for doing so....

Whilst the business culture of the merchants was shaped by the wider economic, social, and cultural milieu in which they functioned, Joshua Johnson’s riposte in 1772 demonstrates that the long-term goal was to make a profit. As Isaac Wikoff noted two years later, ‘The Design of Trade is to make a profit in the End. I am sure I would have Quit a business immediately in which no Evident profit should arise.’² Johnson’s reference to weighing the pistoles and the ‘Johannes’ or ‘Joe’ conjures a wonderful image of an avaricious merchant, but it also underscores the wider Atlantic context in...

Misfortunes may be sure to happen! Merchants such as James Clemens understood that risk was an everyday part of their work; it was frequent and pervasive. More importantly, they realised that some risks could not be guarded against, but that prudence and attention to detail could help to manage others. Benjamin Franklin noted in 1760 that whilst the needs of life were fixed and determined, ‘TheVariety of Lossesa Trader is liable to, by Trusting at Land, and Adventuring by Sea, by perishable commodities, and Perils from Thieves and Fire, make it manifest, that he is set in the...

Franklin’s ‘game’ encapsulates the idea behind Robert Axelrod’s famous bookThe Evolution of Co-operation, wherein the logic of co-operation is investigated through game theory. It is perhaps strange to see Benjamin Franklin using nearly the same terminology as a modern political scientist, but it reminds us of the always illusive nature of trust. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, risk could be managed to some extent, but eventually trust had to come into play. Interestingly, Axelrod’s ‘tit-for-tat’ game is not about punishment, as it might at first sound, but about being ‘nice’, never being the first to defect. Rather,...

If there was one clear signal to start asking questions about a merchant’s financial viability, it was one of their bills of exchange being protested for non-payment. This usually meant that the payer did not have enough funds with the drawee, and whilst this did not necessarily mean the payer was insolvent, it certainly started rumours.² Joshua Johnson noted in 1771 that Hanbury & Co. had protested Barnes & Ridgate’s bills, which had hurt their credit.³ A merchant’s ability to get credit was so tied up with reputation, that itwashis reputation, hence the term credibility. Credit was an ‘intenselysocial...

Metcalf Bowler of Providence wrote this rather begging letter to elite merchants Brown & Benson in early 1784. By this time, the post-war slump was already in progress and lesser merchants and shopkeepers all along the eastern seaboard were experiencing financial difficulties. During 1784 Bowler paid what he could in a number of instalments of cash, but by 1785 he was reduced to paying Brown & Benson with various goods such as molasses. In the end, he assigned all his real estate including his shop and home to Brown & Benson as security for his debts, and his wife even had to sign...

Alexander Johnston wrote this comment about New York to a correspondent in Scotland in 1783. Johnston had decided to set up in business there having travelled around the Atlantic sorting out his financial affairs. He obviously saw that new opportunities would be available to men like him following the American War of Independence. In order to organise his new trading venture as best as possible, he had set up a new partnership in St. Kitts where he had been in business for some time with his brother and a Mr Moore, and another house, under the name of John Stewart...

McKnight & McIlwrath’s comment highlights the fact that there were many wars during this period; and that many merchants were used to, and comfortable with, coping in a war economy. Indeed, the Treaty of Amiens in 1801, to which this quote refers, created only a temporary lull in the French Wars. McKnight & McIlwrath were trading from Ayr, Scotland, but John Perhouse of Philadelphia noted a similar attitude a few weeks later, commenting that the merchants there were in despair having planned for a long war.² Clearly, some merchants were more prepared, willing, or able to conduct business in a difficult business...

Whatever the original motivations behind British expansion and colonialism in the Atlantic, there is no doubt that the character of this empire was ‘commercial’.² Furthermore, during the eighteenth century the ‘cult of commerce became an increasingly important part of being British’, enhancing the role and reputation of merchants as a group.³ If we think in terms of informal maritime empire, one based on the economy rather than sovereignty or dominion, there is no doubt that the British Empire was the most successful at this point in time.⁴ Even after Independence the United States continued to be Britain’s largest single trading...