Skip to Main Content
Have library access? Log in through your library
Pakistan

Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military

Husain Haqqani
Copyright Date: 2005
Pages: 397
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpjrx
  • Cite this Item
  • Book Info
    Pakistan
    Book Description:

    Among U.S. allies in the war against terrorism, Pakistan cannot be easily characterized as either friend or foe. Nuclear-armed Pakistan is an important center of radical Islamic ideas and groups. Since 9/11, the selective cooperation of president General Pervez Musharraf in sharing intelligence with the United States and apprehending al Qaeda members has led to the assumption that Pakistan might be ready to give up its longstanding ties with radical Islam. But Pakistan's status as an Islamic ideological state is closely linked with the Pakistani elite's worldview and the praetorian ambitions of its military. This book analyzes the origins of the relationships between Islamist groups and Pakistan's military, and explores the nation's quest for identity and security. Tracing how the military has sought U.S. support by making itself useful for concerns of the moment -while continuing to strengthen the mosque-military alliance within Pakistan -Haqqani offers an alternative view of political developments since the country's independence in 1947.

    eISBN: 978-0-87003-285-1
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Foreword
    (pp. vii-viii)
    Jessica T. Mathews

    Of all the United States’ partners in the global war on terrorism, Pakistan is the most vexing and arguably the most important. For years it has been accused of encouraging terror, through support of the former Taliban government in Afghanistan and by promoting armed opposition to Indian control of Kashmir. Following the events of September 11, 2001, however, Pakistan cast its lot with the United States, providing assistance to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and sharing valuable intelligence. Today, Pakistan is simultaneously a breeding ground for radical Islam and a key ally in the U.S. effort to eliminate terror in...

  4. Acknowledgments
    (pp. ix-xi)
  5. Map of the Region
    (pp. xii-xii)
  6. 1 Introduction: Identity and Ideology
    (pp. 1-50)

    Pakistan for more than a decade has been accused of supporting terrorism, mainly because of its support for militants opposing Indian rule in the disputed Himalayan territory of Jammu and Kashmir and also its backing of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. After September 11, 2001, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Pakistan heeded U.S. pressure to reverse course and take a stand against terrorism. Pakistan became a key U.S. ally, facilitating U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and sharing intelligence about Al Qaeda operatives. Nevertheless, terrorists continue to operate in, and from, Pakistan. The country is now...

  7. 2 Defending Ideological Frontiers
    (pp. 51-86)

    Pakistan’s second military regime, led by General Yahya Khan, was relatively short-lived (1969–1971), but its impact on the country was long lasting. The preoccupation of Pakistan’s ruling elite now was to fend off challenges to its dominance from populist political parties. In East Pakistan, the Awami League (AL, founded by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, who had earlier articulated the vision of Pakistan as a secular nation-state) was questioning the cultural and economic neglect of the Bengali majority by the central government and demanding greater autonomy. The Awami League’s leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, campaigned for a six-point program that envisaged a...

  8. 3 Old and New Pakistan
    (pp. 87-130)

    The breakaway of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh was the most traumatic event in Pakistan’s short life as an independent nation. The country’s population was reduced by more than half. Pakistan lost a significant portion of its territory, its geopolitical role in Southeast Asia, and an important segment of its economy. More important was the psychological setback that came from defeat at the hands of India. Islamic ideology had obviously proved insufficient to keep Bengalis part of Pakistan. The prestige of the Pakistan army―called by General Sher Ali Khan the invisible charisma that enabled the rule of the country―had also...

  9. 4 From Islamic Republic to Islamic State
    (pp. 131-158)

    General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq became Pakistan’s third military ruler on July 5, 1977, ostensibly to hold elections within ninety days. He ruled for eleven years―the longest tenure of any of Pakistan’s rulers to date―until his death in a mysterious plane crash on August 17, 1988. Zia ul-Haq is often identified as the person most responsible for turning Pakistan into a global center for political Islam. Undoubtedly, Zia went farthest in defining Pakistan as an Islamic state, and he nurtured the jihadist ideology that now threatens to destabilize much of the Islamic world; but in doing so he saw himself as...

  10. 5 Afghan Jihad
    (pp. 159-198)

    Pakistan, long wanting to extend its influence into Afghanistan, willingly accepted U.S. help and became the staging ground for the guerrilla war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. After Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to support hard-line Islamist mujahideen in the ensuing civil war, leading to the rise to power of the Taliban, but Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan was not just the inadvertent consequence of America’s proxy war against the Soviet Union.

    Although Pakistan’s leaders after independence had assumed that the country would inherit the functions of India’s British government in guiding Afghan policy, Afghanistan responded to the...

  11. 6 Military Rule by Other Means
    (pp. 199-260)

    At the time of his death, General Zia ul-Haq wielded absolute power. He was president of Pakistan as well as the chief of army staff. No one had planned for the contingency of his sudden death. The 1973 constitution, as amended by Zia ul-Haq, provided for succession to the office of president by the chairman of Pakistan’s indirectly elected senate. The incumbent of that office at the time of Zia’s death was Ghulam Ishaq Khan, an elderly bureaucrat who had been the late general’s most trusted civilian associate. The vice chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, invited...

  12. 7 Jihad without Borders
    (pp. 261-310)

    On February 4, 2004, Pakistan’s military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, told Pakistan’s newspaper editors in Islamabad, “Pakistan has two vital national interests: Being a nuclear state and the Kashmir cause.”¹ The statement represented continuity in Pakistani strategic thinking almost twenty-nine months after Musharraf revived Pakistan’s alliance with the United States in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and the Washington area. For American consumption, however, Musharraf claimed that he was leading Pakistan through a “major strategic reorientation.”² U.S. officials seemed to accept that claim at face value.

    The immediate price Musharraf paid to qualify...

  13. 8 Conclusion: From Ideological to Functional State
    (pp. 311-330)

    In an effort to become an ideological state guided by a praetorian military, Pakistan has found itself accentuating its dysfunction, especially during the past two decades. The commitment or lack of commitment of the ordinary Pakistani citizen to Islam has hardly been the major issue in Pakistan’s evolution. A large number of otherwise practicing Muslims have demonstrated through the ballot box time and again their desire to embrace pragmatic political and economic ideas. Most Pakistanis would probably be quite content with a state that would cater to their social needs, respect and protect their right to observe religion, and would...

  14. Notes
    (pp. 331-372)
  15. Index
    (pp. 373-396)
  16. About the Author
    (pp. 397-398)
  17. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
    (pp. 399-399)
  18. Back Matter
    (pp. 400-400)