Deadly Arsenals

Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats

Joseph Cirincione
Jon B. Wolfsthal
Miriam Rajkumar
Copyright Date: 2005
Edition: 2
DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk
Pages: 490
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wpkbk
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  • Book Info
    Deadly Arsenals
    Book Description:

    Deadly Arsenalsprovides the most up-to-date and comprehensive assessment available on global proliferation dangers, with a critical assessment of international enforcement efforts. An invaluable resource for academics, policymakers, students, and the media, this atlas includes strategic and historical analysis; maps, charts, and graphs of the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile delivery systems; descriptions of the weapons and regimes -and policies to control them; and data on countries that have, want, or have given up weapons of mass destruction. A Choice outstanding academic title from one of the premier nonproliferation research teams. The new edition addresses the recent, dramatic developments in Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and the nuclear black market, analyzing strategic and policy implications. Contents: Part 1: Assessments and Weapons Part 2: Declared Nuclear-Weapon States Part 3: Non-NPT Nuclear-Weapon States Part 4: The Two Hard Cases: North Korea and Iran Part 5: Proliferation Success

    eISBN: 978-0-87003-288-2
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.1
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.2
  3. Foreword
    (pp. vii-viii)
    Jessica T. Mathews
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.3

    In the three years since the first edition ofDeadly Arsenals, the field of nonproliferation has been through a period of breathtaking change—all of which is reflected in this new volume. The threat brought to life by the attacks of September 11, 2001—that terrorists might seek and one day use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons—swiftly rose to the top of an agenda that for 40 years had been focused on threats from states. North Korea’s violation of its commitments and subsequent announced withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its declaration that it had acquired nuclear weapons,...

  4. Acknowledgments
    (pp. ix-x)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.4
  5. Part One: Assessments and Weapons

    • CHAPTER 1 Global Trends
      (pp. 3-26)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.5

      The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is widely recognized as the most serious threat to the national security of the United States and other nations. Official and public attention to proliferation issues, however, has varied over the years from near hysteria to apathy. During this first decade of the twenty-first century, concern is very high, with passionate international debates over which strategies can best prevent the spread and use of these weapons.

      To inform these debates, this second edition ofDeadly Arsenalsrevises and updates all the chapters, figures, and tables from the first edition published in 2002....

    • CHAPTER 2 The International Nonproliferation Regime
      (pp. 27-44)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.6

      The global nonproliferation regime is a network of interlocking treaties, organizations, inspections, and unilateral and bilateral arrangements aimed at halting the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The systems in place to control each type of weapon rely on a central agreement that establishes a norm against the possession of weapons and a set of obligations for treaty members.

      At the core of this regime are three key treaties: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) restrains the spread of nuclear weapons; the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, possession, or use of chemical weapons; and the...

    • CHAPTER 3 Nuclear Weapons and Materials
      (pp. 45-56)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.7

      Nuclear weapons were invented more than 60 years ago. Although the technology required to produce them is complex, nuclear weapon concepts are well understood and widely available. Nine countries (China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and possibly North Korea have produced nuclear weapons. More than 40 other countries could also produce nuclear weapons, if their governments decided to invest the time, money, and political effort to do so. If they first acquired the necessary nuclear materials, even well-organized subnational organizations and terrorist groups with adequate time and resources could produce a...

    • CHAPTER 4 Biological and Chemical Weapons, Agents, and Proliferation
      (pp. 57-82)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.8

      Since the mid-1990s, governments and the public have grown increasingly concerned over the threats posed by the proliferation of chemical weapons (CWs) and biological weapons (BWs). The fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States transformed that concern into a requirement for substantial government action to respond to and prepare for terrorist attacks using chemical or biological warfare agents. Some experts categorize a number of these agents as weapons of mass destruction because of their potential to inflict massive casualties throughout a broad geographical area. More accurately, CWs and BWs have also been called “mass casualty weapons . . ....

    • CHAPTER 5 Missile Proliferation
      (pp. 83-118)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.9

      One of the most contentious proliferation debates of the past ten years has been about assessing the ballistic missile threat and deploying antimissile systems to defeat these weapons. When the end of the Cold War largely eliminated the likelihood (if not the capability) of a global thermonuclear war, policy makers turned their attention to the very real danger that nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons could be used in smaller, but still horrifically deadly, numbers. Ballistic missiles garnered the lion’s share of attention, though they constitute only one—and perhaps the most difficult—delivery method for those weapons.

      Many experts and...

  6. Part Two: Declared Nuclear Weapon States

    • CHAPTER 6 Russia
      (pp. 121-161)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.10

      The Russian Federation is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and it possesses thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), Russia maintains an accountable strategic nuclear force of 981 delivery vehicles with 4,732 associated warheads, although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is about 3,800. Russia also is estimated to have 3,400 operational nonstrategic warheads and about 8,800 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles. Overall, Russia may possess as many as 16,000 intact nuclear weapons....

    • CHAPTER 7 China
      (pp. 163-188)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.11

      China is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and possesses enough nuclear material for hundreds of nuclear weapons (see table 7.1 at the end of the chapter). China has approximately 400 nuclear weapons and various delivery platforms, mostly short- and medium-range missiles. Approximately 20 Chinese weapons are deployed on missiles that can reach the continental United States. After developing its first nuclear weapon in 1964, China became a major supplier of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to the developing world. The United States and other countries have worked to draw China step-by-step into the international nonproliferation...

    • CHAPTER 8 France
      (pp. 189-196)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.12

      France is a nuclear weapon state recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It deploys approximately 350 nuclear weapons on 84 nuclear-capable aircraft and 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on four nuclear submarines (3 of them carrying 16 missiles each) (see table 8.1 at the end of the chapter). In fiscal year 2005, the country appropriated $4.084 billion (20 percent of its annual defense budget) to maintain its nuclear arsenal.¹ France has conducted 210 nuclear weapons tests, the first on February 13, 1960, and the last on January 27, 1996. France produced approximately 1,110 nuclear warheads between 1960 and 1992. It...

    • CHAPTER 9 The United Kingdom
      (pp. 197-202)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.13

      The United Kingdom is recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nuclear weapon state. It currently maintains four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, each armed with up to 16 Trident II missiles and with 48 warheads (see table 9.1 at the end of the chapter). Between 1952 and 1992, the country produced approximately 834 nuclear warheads.¹ It has conducted 44 nuclear weapons tests, the first on October 3, 1952, and the last on November 26, 1991. It has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

      The 1998 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) confirmed that the United Kingdom’s new nuclear force structure...

    • CHAPTER 10 The United States
      (pp. 203-218)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.14

      The United States was the first country to develop and test a nuclear weapon and is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States continues to maintain the world’s largest force of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, although the arsenal is gradually being reduced in accordance with several arms control agreements with Russia (see table 10.1 at the end of the chapter).¹ Under the accounting rules of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), the United States maintains an accountable strategic nuclear force of 1,225 delivery vehicles with 5,966 associated warheads,² although the actual number of deployed...

  7. Part Three: Non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States

    • CHAPTER 11 India
      (pp. 221-237)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.15

      India possesses the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weapons within a few days or weeks, with fighter-bomber aircraft being the most likely delivery vehicle (see table 11.1 at the end of the chapter). By the end of 2005, India may have produced between 334 and 504 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium,¹ enough to produce between 75 and 110 nuclear weapons.² It is not known how many actual weapons India has produced from this material, though it is most likely on the low end of the estimates. India may also be producing significant quantities of highly enriched uranium at...

    • CHAPTER 12 Pakistan
      (pp. 239-258)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.16

      Pakistan possesses the components to deploy a small number of nuclear weapons within a few days or weeks (see table 12.1 at the end of the chapter). By the end of 2005, Pakistan may have produced between 1,110 and 1,440 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium,¹ enough to produce between 50 and 110 nuclear weapons.² Their principal device design uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium (HEU) rather than plutonium. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are reportedly stored in component parts, with the fissile core separated from the non-nuclear explosives.³ Where Pakistan stores its fissile material and warheads is not publicly known. Pakistan...

    • CHAPTER 13 Israel
      (pp. 259-276)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.17

      Israel has an advanced nuclear weapons capability and is thought to possess enough nuclear material for between 100 and 170 nuclear weapons. Israel is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has not acknowledged that it has nuclear weapons. It is, however, indisputably regarded as a de facto nuclear weapon state. The exact number of weapons Israel has assembled is unknown but is likely on the lower end of the possible range. In all Israel may have produced between 530 and 684 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from the start of its nuclear research reactor at Dimona in early...

  8. Part Four: Two Hard Cases

    • CHAPTER 14 North Korea
      (pp. 279-293)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.18

      North Korea has an active nuclear weapon program and may already possess enough separated plutonium to produce as many as nine nuclear weapons (see table 14.1 at the end of the chapter). It is unclear how many, if any, weapons North Korea has built. U.S. intelligence agencies have stated that “in the mid-1990s North Korea had produced one possibly two, nuclear weapons,”¹ but this estimate may be based on assumptions about Pyongyang’s intentions and capabilities rather than direct evidence.

      North Korea continues to operate a small plutonium production reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear center that can produce enough weapons-grade plutonium...

    • CHAPTER 15 Iran
      (pp. 295-314)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.19

      Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, but for more than two decades Tehran has secretly pursued the ability to produce nuclear materials that can be used in weapons. U.S. officials and intelligence services in several other nations have concluded that Iran is embarked on a nuclear weapon program, although no direct evidence of weapon activities has been made public.¹ Iran remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite Iran’s membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that agency’s Secretariat concluded in November 2004 that Iran had “failed . . . to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement.”...

  9. Part Five: Nonproliferation Successes

    • CHAPTER 16 Libya
      (pp. 317-328)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.20

      After over three decades of trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, Libya announced that it was abandoning its clandestine nuclear program on December 19, 2003.¹ Libya’s major nuclear facilities include a 10-megawatt light-water research reactor and a critical assembly (100 watts), both located at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. In 2003, Libya permitted international officials to inspect eleven previously undisclosed nuclear sites and to remove and destroy key components of its nuclear weapons program.

      Libya renounced its chemical weapons (CW) program in December 2003 and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 6, 2004. In March 2004, Libya reported...

    • CHAPTER 17 Iraq
      (pp. 329-361)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.21

      Iraq never successfully developed a nuclear weapon, and its nuclear program begun in the 1970s almost certainly ended in 1991. After conducting six years of inspections in Iraq, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded in 1997 that its dismantling, regular monitoring, and verification efforts—along with the damage from the Gulf War—had incapacitated the country’s nuclear weapons infrastructure.¹ During December 1998, U.S. and British air strikes during Operation Desert Fox inflicted further damage on Iraqi leadership offices linked to the program. But many suspected Iraq still had nuclear ambitions and retained the capability and intention to restart its...

    • CHAPTER 18 Non-Russian Nuclear Successor States: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
      (pp. 365-381)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.22

      Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are now all non-nuclear-weapon states, which have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nuclear weapons are no longer deployed on their territories. However, when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, four newly independent republics—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—had strategic nuclear weapons deployed on their territories as well as significant amounts of nuclear materials. International security and nonproliferation concerns focused immediately on the fate of the nuclear weapons deployed in the non-Russian nuclear republics. More than 8,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in the non-Russian republics, the eventual fate of which was initially...

    • CHAPTER 19 Argentina
      (pp. 383-392)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.23

      Today, Argentina does not possess nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded stocks of nuclear-weapons-usable materials, but from the 1960s to 1980s it did have a nuclear development program that many observers feared could be applied to weapons production. Argentina is among the very few countries that have been able to develop a nuclear program without becoming fully dependent on foreign technology, and it has become a significant exporter of peaceful nuclear technology in its own right. As a partner in major elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, Argentina has continued to develop its civil nuclear industry. Notably, Argentina joined the Nuclear Suppliers...

    • CHAPTER 20 Brazil
      (pp. 393-406)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.24

      Brazil is a non-nuclear-weapon state and does not possess nuclear weapons or unsafeguarded stocks of weapons-usable material. Some elements in the Brazilian military previously sought the option to develop nuclear weapons or “peaceful nuclear explosives.” This effort was pursued partly in competition with Argentina, which pursued a similar nuclear program during the 1970s and 1980s, but primarily in an effort to gain international prestige. Brazil changed course in the 1990s, placing all its nuclear facilities under bilateral inspections with Argentina and later accepting safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since that time, Brazil has assumed a leadership position...

    • CHAPTER 21 South Africa
      (pp. 407-418)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.25

      South Africa is a non-nuclear-weapon state and a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since 1991, South Africa has made the transition from an undeclared possessor of nuclear weapons to a responsible participant in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is the first nation to develop and possess nuclear weapons and then renounce them. In a historic reform of South Africa’s politics, President F. W. de Klerk ended the country’s decades-long policy of racial separation and brought an end to white minority rule. Democratic elections in April 1994 brought Nelson Mandela to the presidency. Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, remains committed...

  10. APPENDIXES

    • APPENDIX A The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
      (pp. 421-426)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.26
    • APPENDIX B The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
      (pp. 427-434)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.27
    • APPENDIX C The Chemical Weapons Convention Fact Sheet
      (pp. 435-442)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.28
    • APPENDIX D Nuclear Supplier Organizations
      (pp. 443-450)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.29
    • APPENDIX E The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
      (pp. 451-456)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.30
    • APPENDIX F Glossary
      (pp. 457-466)
      DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.31
  11. Abbreviations and Acronyms
    (pp. 467-468)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.32
  12. List of Maps, Figures, and Tables
    (pp. 469-470)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.33
  13. Index
    (pp. 471-487)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.34
  14. About the Authors
    (pp. 488-488)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.35
  15. About Carnegie’s Nonproliferation Resources
    (pp. 489-489)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.36
  16. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
    (pp. 490-490)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.37
  17. [Map]
    (pp. 491-491)
    DOI: 10.2307/j.ctt6wpkbk.38