Kant and the Unity of Reason

Kant and the Unity of Reason: History of Philosophy

Angelica Nuzzo
Copyright Date: 2005
Published by: Purdue University Press
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wq4kj
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  • Book Info
    Kant and the Unity of Reason
    Book Description:

    Kant and the Unity of Reason is a comprehensive reconstruction and a detailed analysis of Kant's Critique of Judgment. In the light of the third Critique, the book offers a final interpretation of the critical project as a whole.

    eISBN: 978-1-61249-041-0
    Subjects: Philosophy

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-x)
  3. Preface
    (pp. xi-xiv)
  4. Note on the Text and Translation, Abbreviations
    (pp. xv-xvi)
  5. Part I. Kant’s Way to the Critique of Judgment
    • Chapter 1 Kant’s Philosophical Biography
      (pp. 3-22)

      This chapter presents a brief account of Kant’s life and a general overview of the development of his thought throughout the wide range of his writings and interests. The presentation follows Kant’s activity in a chronological and thematic order and discusses only the core ideas for each work. The purpose of this chapter is to show the complexity of Kant’s itinerary toward theCritique of Judgment.

      Immanuel Kant was born in the East Prussian town of Königsberg on April 22, 1724. His father, the son of Scottish emigrants, was a saddler of humble condition whose strict morality remained his son’s...

    • Chapter 2 The Critique of Pure Reason: Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason
      (pp. 23-44)

      This chapter presents Kant’s main division of the cognitive faculty (Erkenntnisvermögen) as it is developed in theCritique of Pure Reason.

      In the preface to the second edition of theCritique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the radical innovation of his critical project through the famous image of the Copernican Revolution. The problem that he outlines from the very beginning of the 1781 preface—the problem in which his revolution is inscribed—concerns the possibility of metaphysics as science or the possibility of metaphysicalknowledge. The urgency of the question is dictated by the “peculiar destiny” of our human reason...

    • Chapter 3 The Critique of Practical Reason: Pure Reason—Speculative and Practical Reason
      (pp. 45-60)

      The present chapter follows Kant’s idea of practical reason as developed in the secondCritique. While my exposition will revolve around the crucial task that Kant puts at the center of this work—namely the thesis that pure reason is practical—the discussion will further pursue the approach presented in the previous chapter and will analyze the relation between pure practical reason and sensibility.

      In seventeenth and eighteenth century moral philosophy, it is a widespread view that human action cannot be motivated by reason but only by passions. Human will is moved to decision and action exclusively by the influence...

    • Chapter 4 The Critique of Judgment: A Preliminary Investigation
      (pp. 61-82)

      The previous two chapters have provided an indirect introduction to the problematic of theCritique of Judgment. They implicitly position Kant’s 1790 work within the development of his critical philosophy. The present chapter gives a preliminary introduction to the thirdCritique. It moves along historical lines in order to address three different sets of issues. First, it presents a critical confrontation with the methodological strategies generally employed in the interpretation of this work; second, it briefly follows the emergence of the problematic of the thirdCritiquein Kant’s philosophical development; and third, it addresses the question of the internal genesis...

  6. Part II. The Introduction to the Critique of Judgment
    • Chapter 5 The Text
      (pp. 85-99)

      This chapter will approach the text of the published introduction to theCritique of Judgmentas a whole by discussing both the history of its composition and the general lines of its argument.¹ The text is reprinted, newly translated, and commented on in the following three chapters. Given the theoretical and stylistic density of the introduction, an overview of the whole argument is necessary before addressing its more particular issues. I will outline the structure of the problem of the thirdCritiquein terms of the problem presented by Kant in the preface and introduction.

      The complicated history of the...

    • Chapter 6 Introduction §§I–III: The Idea of Philosophy and the Critique of Judgment
      (pp. 100-145)

      Wenn man die Philosophie, sofern sie Prinzipien der Vernunfterkenntnis der Dinge (nicht bloß, wie die Logik, Prinzipien der Form des Denkens überhaupt, ohne Unterschied der Objekte) durch Begriffe enthält, wie gewöhnlich in dietheoretischeundpraktischeeinteilt: so verfährt man ganz recht. Aber alsdann müssen auch die Begriffe, welche den Prinzipien dieser Vernunfterkenntnis ihr Objekt anweisen, spezifisch verschieden sein, weil sie sonst zu keiner Einteilung berechtigen würden, welche jederzeit eine Entgegensetzung der Prinzipien, der zu den verschiedenen Teilen einer Wissenschaft gehörigen Vernunfterkenntnis, voraussetzt.

      Es sind aber nur zweierlei Begriffe, welche eben so viel verschiedene Prinzipien der Möglichkeit ihrer Gegenstände zulassen:...

    • Chapter 7 Introduction §§IV–VI: Reflective Faculty of Judgment and Formal Purposiveness of Nature
      (pp. 146-205)

      Urteilskraft überhaupt ist das Vermögen, das Besondere als enthalten unter dem Allgemeinen zu denken. | XXVI Ist das Allgemeine (die Regel, das Prinzip, das Gesetz) gegeben, so ist die Urteilskraft, welche das Besondere darunter subsumiert (auch, wenn sie, als transzendentale Urteilskraft, a priori die Bedingungen angibt, welchen gemäß allein unter jenem Allgemeinen subsumiert werden kann)bestimmend. Ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben, wozu sie das Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urteilskraft bloßreflektierend.

      Die bestimmende Urteilskraft unter allgemeinen transzendentalen Gesetzen, die der Verstand gibt, ist nur subsumierend; das Gesetz ist ihr a priori vorgezeichnet, und sie hat also nicht...

    • Chapter 8 Introduction §§VII–IX: A Critique of the Faculty of Judgment—Aesthetic and Teleological
      (pp. 206-258)

      Was an der Vorstellung eines Objekts bloß subjektiv ist, d. i. Ihre Beziehung auf das Subjekt, nicht auf den Gegenstand ausmacht, ist die ästhetische Beschaffenheit derselben; was aber an ihr zur Bestimmung ∥ des Gegenstandes (zum Erkenntnisse) dient, oder gebraucht werden kann, ist ihre logische Gültigkeit. In dem Erkenntnisse eines Gegenstandes der Sinne kommen beide Beziehungen zusammen vor. In der Sinnenvorstellung der Dinge außer mir ist die Qualität des Raums, worin wir sie anschauen, das bloß Subjektive meiner Vorstellung derselben (wodurch, was sie als Objekte an sich sein mögen, unausgemacht bleibt), um welcher Beziehung willen der Gegenstand auch dadurch bloß...

  7. Part III. The World of Experience:: Beauty and Life
    • Chapter 9 The Analytic of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment (§§1–29): The Beautiful and the Sublime
      (pp. 261-292)

      This chapter opens the last section of the book. Herein I analyze the unfolding of theCritique of Judgmentalong its different divisions. As a general methodological device, I adhere to the line of Kant’s argument. My aim is to present a synthesis of Kant’s arguments by focusing on the main questions addressed. The present chapter provides an outline of the two books of the first division of theCritique of Judgment: the Analytic of the Beautiful and the Analytic of the Sublime. These two parts constitute the Analytic of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment. My opening remarks discuss the...

    • Chapter 10 The Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments (§§30–54): Sensus Communis and Genius, Nature, and Art
      (pp. 293-310)

      In the first edition of theCritique of Judgment, the Deduction appears as a “third book” of the Analytic of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment—a title that Kant successively drops as a typographical error.¹ In the Deduction, which occupies almost one half of the Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment, Kant repeats the moments of the judgment of taste within a new frame of discussion and following a new demonstrative aim. We can distinguish two main parts of the Deduction.² In §§30–38, Remark, Kant provides the properly formal “deduction” of the judgment of taste (i.e., the justification...

    • Chapter 11 The Dialectic of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment (§§55–60): The Analogic Logic of the Faculty of Judgment
      (pp. 311-327)

      The second division of the Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment is dedicated to the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment. With the solution of the antinomy of taste, Kant gains reference to the idea of the supersensible and discloses the mediating function of the faculty of judgment as the faculty placed between understanding and reason, nature and freedom. While the introduction (§IV) already made clear that the faculty of judgment is the heuristic faculty through which we engage in scientific research, §59 reveals that “analogy” is the method of judgment’s search for meaning. The analogic function of...

    • Chapter 12 The Analytic of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment (§61, §§62–68): The Internal Purposiveness of Natural Organisms
      (pp. 328-339)

      The second part of theCritique of Judgmentis a critical investigation into the teleological faculty of judgment. The division of the second part follows the scheme of an Analytic, a Dialectic, and a Methodology of the teleological faculty of judgment. If compared to the critique of the aesthetic faculty of judgment, this second part attributes a different relevance to its three divisions respectively. The reason is provided by Kant’s claim in the introduction according to which the key to theCritique of Judgmentis the aesthetic faculty of judgment—the teleological faculty being just a function of judgment in...

    • Chapter 13 The Dialectic of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment (§§69–78): Mechanism and Teleology
      (pp. 340-353)

      The Dialectic of the Critique of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment is the dialectic proper toreflectivejudgment in general (§69). Here, Kant argues for the compatibility of mechanistic and teleological explanations of nature within the perspective of our reflection on nature’s manifold empirical forms (§§70–71). As in the former twoCritiques, a dialectic arises because of the immanent constitution of our mind (“natural dialectic”). More precisely, it arises from the “discursive” character of our understanding, which strives toward the unconditioned following reason’s aims even though its immanent use confines it to the realm of the conditioned. A crucial...

    • Chapter 14 The Methodology of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment (§§79–91): Faculty of Judgment and Practical Reason
      (pp. 354-368)

      Kant concluded the Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgment with a short appendix concerning theMethodenlehreof taste (§60). Herein a few pages were enough to argue that no methodology but, at the most, only a propaedeutic for all fine arts was feasible. For taste does not allow for universal rules, and a “science of taste” is properly an impossible discipline. In §60, however, the important issue of the relation between taste and moral ideas was developed in the aftermath of the symbolic relation between beauty and the morally good. Structurally similar is the conclusion of the Critique of...

  8. Bibliography
    (pp. 369-388)
  9. Index
    (pp. 389-398)
  10. Back Matter
    (pp. 399-399)