From a Philosophical Point of View

From a Philosophical Point of View: Selected Studies

Copyright Date: 2005
Pages: 352
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  • Book Info
    From a Philosophical Point of View
    Book Description:

    One of the most important philosophers of recent times, Morton White has spent a career building bridges among the increasingly fragmented worlds of the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences.From a Philosophical Point of Viewis a selection of White's best essays, written over a period of more than sixty years. Together these selections represent the belief that philosophers should reflect not only on mathematics and science but also on other aspects of culture, such as religion, art, history, law, education, and morality.

    White's essays cover the full range of his interests: studies in ethics, the theory of knowledge, and metaphysics as well as in the philosophy of culture, the history of pragmatism, and allied currents in social, political, and legal thought. The book also includes pieces on philosophers who have influenced White at different stages of his career, among them William James, John Dewey, G. E. Moore, and W. V. Quine. Throughout, White argues from a holistic standpoint against a sharp epistemological distinction between logical and physical beliefs and also against an equally sharp one between descriptive and normative beliefs.

    White maintains that once the philosopher abandons the dogma that the logical analysis of mathematics and physics is the essence of his subject, he frees himself to resume his traditional role as a student of the central institutions of civilization. Philosophers should function not merely as spectators of all time and existence, he argues, but as empirically minded students of culture who try to use some of their ideas for the benefit of society.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-2646-9
    Subjects: Philosophy

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-x)
  3. INTRODUCTION: What I Have Learned by Rereading These Essays
    (pp. 1-2)

    In this volume, I have gathered together several studies that I have written over many years on widely dispersed subjects, and while rereading them in search of a general theme I have come to see that I have never lost the desire to philosophize in the manner of John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, and William James. Although I have sharply disagreed with some of their views, I have nonetheless kept their wide-ranging ambitions in the back of my mind even while working on the problems of metaphysics and epistemology. Of course, they worked with great distinction on such problems, but...

    • CHAPTER 1 Prologue to A Philosophy of Culture (2002)
      (pp. 5-8)

      I began my serious philosophical thinking under the influence of several major currents of thought, among them the pragmatism of John Dewey and the analytic philosophy of G. E. Moore. I found Moore a persuasive advocate of the view that the philosopher should analyze extralinguistic concepts, attributes, or propositions, and arrive at truths that are analytic and not dependent on experience for their support; but I soon discovered that Moore was unsure about the notion of analysis that underlay his main philosophical efforts, because he had developed serious doubts about the idea of an analytic statement. At about the same...

    • CHAPTER 2 Philosophy and Man: An Exhortation (1955)
      (pp. 9-13)

      The reader of my bookThe Age of Analysishas read about a dozen doctrines, as many methods, and a variety of concepts from essence to existence, life to language, logic to love, and practice to perfection. But within this welter several contrasts stand out: first of all, the fundamental one between philosophers who strive to know big things and those who are less ambitious; and secondly, the peculiarly geographical character of this division. It does seem as though the continent of Europe is the land of what Isaiah Berlin calls the hedgehog while the English-speaking world is the home...

    • CHAPTER 3 The Social Role of Philosophy (1952)
      (pp. 14-20)

      The twentieth century has witnessed a slow revolution in philosophy that has gone almost unnoticed by the layman. It has been part of its program to insist that philosophy cannot be carried on irresponsibly and pompously; it has said good-bye forever to the days of the fat, two-volumedWeltanschauung. Let those who yearn for those days try to read one of the classics of the glistering age of American philosophy—for example, Royce’sThe World and the Individual—and they will see why the era of speculative metaphysics has lost its charm for the young American philosopher. The young American...

    • CHAPTER 4 New Horizons in Philosophy (1960)
      (pp. 21-30)

      The most arresting and most distinctive feature of philosophy in the English-speaking world of 1960 is its concentration on linguistic and logical analysis. While dialectical materialism is the official philosophy of the Soviet bloc, and Western Europe continues to be strongly affected by existentialism, Britain and the United States are primarily the homes of what is called analytic or linguistic philosophy. Analytic philosophers are neither sponsored nor controlled by any government or political party, and they do not appeal to the Bohemian or the beatnik. They invite both Marxist and existentialist scorn because they spurn the pretentiousness and murk of...

    • CHAPTER 5 A Plea for an Analytic Philosophy of History (1953)
      (pp. 33-39)

      There are many mansions in philosophy, but some are more luxuriously outfitted, larger, and better situated than others. High on a broad hilltop are the great homes of metaphysics, logic, epistemology, and ethics, while somewhere down below, huddled together on narrow streets, are the two-family dwellings of political philosophy and jurisprudence, the modern apartments of esthetics, and the boarding-houses for philosophers of the special sciences. The philosophy of history has never lived on the hill, not even in its most affluent days. Like esthetics and others among the poor relatives it has welcomed guests from the hill late in the...

    • CHAPTER 6 Historical Relativism and the Evaluation of Histories (2003)
      (pp. 40-50)

      One of my main tasks in this paper is to present a framework for the discussion of a number of philosophical problems concerning narrative discourse. After outlining what seem to me to be the main features of a narrative, I try to clarify some philosophical questions concerning truth and objectivity in historical investigation, writing, and criticism. Many of my observations about narration are not new, but I try to place familiar as well as new observations in a fresh light by providing a logical context within which they arise. Although I try to keep in mind the ordinary use of...

    • CHAPTER 7 Historical Inevitability (1956)
      (pp. 51-55)

      Sir Isaiah Berlin’s brilliant essayHistorical Inevitabilityis the product of an unusual combination of qualities in its author, a remarkable thinker who combines the logico-analytic skill that we associate with the tradition of Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, with the historical insight and sensibility that are more usually associated with historians and philosophers in the Continental tradition. Berlin’s versatility reflects his own history, which is that of a Russian who was brought to England in his childhood, who became an influential friend of the philosophical revolution that converted Oxford into a center of linguistic philosophy, and...

    • CHAPTER 8 Tolstoy the Empirical Fox (2003)
      (pp. 56-68)

      It is more than A half-century since Isaiah Berlin publishedThe Hedgehog and the Fox, his brilliant and influential interpretation of Tolstoy’s view of history. Using a dark saying of the Greek poet Archilochus, Berlin argued that the great novelist was a fox who knew many things but vainly aspired inWar and Peaceto be a hedgehog who knew one big thing. Although I admire Berlin’s distinction between two kinds of intellect and have used it to advantage in some of my writing, I have concluded upon rereading the great novel that Tolstoy was a fox who wanted to...

    • CHAPTER 9 John Dewey: A Great Philosopher of Education (1966)
      (pp. 71-73)

      When i first picked up John Dewey’sLectures in the Philosophy of Education: 1899, its title brought chilling thoughts of the darkest and loneliest parts of university libraries, those sad stacks devoted to what used to be called pedagogics. And as I had spent part of my youth studying the background of Dewey’s thought, I knew that a good deal of nineteenth-century philosophy could be dull beyond belief. From the pages of the editor’s accurate introduction, old forbidding terms and figures leaped forward—Froebelianism, Pestalozzianism, Herbartianism, William Torrey Harris, George Sylvester Morris—and my heart sank even deeper. Yet I...

    • CHAPTER 10 Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning (1954)
      (pp. 74-80)

      Among religious intellectuals in 1954, the most important question, the question that exercises them most even when it is not asked in this form, is not “Does God exist?” but rather “Should I be religious?” And this reformulation has been the source of both liberation and confusion, particularly in the sphere of higher education, where it has become increasingly fashionable to urge the importance of religious instruction for the undergraduate. If you adopt the more traditional way of stating the religious question, you cannot avoid asking yourself what evidence there is for belief in God or what arguments there are...

    • CHAPTER 11 Religious Commitment and Higher Education (1957)
      (pp. 81-87)

      The main concern of the previous essay was undergraduate religious instruction. In the present essay, I should like to offer a few related reflections and proposals on the distinct, but closely connected, problem of instruction in a divinity school which is part of a large university. I have no particular divinity school and no particular university in mind and my proposals may be utopian, but I wish to exercise the philosopher’s right to sketch an ideal which, I hope, is not too remote to be carried out some day. To my limited knowledge, it has not yet been tried in...

    • CHAPTER 12 The University in Transition (1966)
      (pp. 88-90)

      Arthur Schlesinger Jr. reports in AThousand Daysthat John F. Kennedy exclaimed soon after his election, “How am I going to fill these 1,200 jobs? . . . All I hear is the name Jim Perkins. Who in hell is Perkins?” At the time vice president of the Carnegie Corporation and later president of Cornell, James Perkins, it seems, was recommended for virtually every post Kennedy had to fill; and Perkins’s excellent book,The University in Transition, goes a long way toward explaining why. Its publication also makes it possible for everyone to discover that James Perkins is a...

    • CHAPTER 13 Philosophy in a Utopian Institute for Advanced Study (1989)
      (pp. 91-94)

      In his novel The Pickwick Papers, Charles Dickens tells of an author who tries to compose an essay on Chinese metaphysics by consulting one encyclopedia article on China and another one on metaphysics; and some of you may suspect me of trying to do something similar in this talk. Ever since 1953 I have been a visiting member or a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, and ever since 1952 I have come periodically to Japan in order to teach or discuss philosophy. So philosophy, Japan, and advanced study have been three interests of mine...

    • CHAPTER 14 The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism (1950)
      (pp. 97-106)

      John Dewey has spent a good part of his life hunting and shooting at dualisms: body-mind, theory-practice, percept-concept, value-science, learning-doing, sensation-thought, external-internal. They are always fair game and Dewey’s prose rattles with fire whenever they come into view. At times, the philosophical forest seems more like a gallery at a penny arcade, and the dualistic dragons move along obligingly and monotonously while Dewey picks them off with deadly accuracy. At other times, we may wonder just who these monsters are. But vague as the language sometimes is, on other occasions it is suggestive, and the writer must confess to a...

    • CHAPTER 15 Ontological Clarity and Semantic Obscurity (1951)
      (pp. 107-111)

      The aversion to philosophical entities like attributes, propositions, powers, and substances is not new but it has been expressed more belligerently in the twentieth century than at any other time in the history of philosophy. Plato’sideas, Descartes’minds, and Aristotle’ssubstanceshave been attacked by nominalists, behaviorists, and phenomenalists with all the weapons of logical analysis; and now that we have given the smoke a half-century in which to clear, we may evaluate some of the gains that have been made toward the goals of the offensive. It is with one part of this evaluation that I am concerned...

    • CHAPTER 16 On the Church-Frege Solution of the Paradox of Analysis (1948)
      (pp. 112-115)

      Alonzo Church¹ has proposed a solution of the paradox of analysis as formulated by C. H. Langford² in which Church makes use of Frege’s distinction between the sense (Sinn) of a name and its denotation (Bedeutung).³ The main purpose of the present note is to show that a version of the paradox may be presented which is not directly solved by Church in his review but which, in turn, may be solved by using another distinction of Frege—that between the ordinary (gewöhnlich) and the oblique (ungerade) use of a name. The second part of the note will be concerned...

    • CHAPTER 17 Oughts and Cans (1979)
      (pp. 116-120)

      For more than twenty years, Isaiah Berlin and I have discussed—in and out of print—the relationship between a moral statement that a person ought to perform a certain action and the statement that the action is voluntary.¹ I have held that the relationship is not that of logical implication, and I have also held that the relationship is moral because I think it may be expressed by the moral statement “No action is obligatory if it is not voluntary.” But one may see from Berlin’s introduction to hisFour Essays on Libertythat while he now seems to...

    • CHAPTER 18 Causation and Action (1969)
      (pp. 121-129)

      The question whether human actions are causally connected with choices and motives is at least as old as the debate over free will and determinism. Some philosophers have analyzed a voluntary action as one caused by a choice; others have analyzed it as one which would not have been performed if the agent had chosen not to perform it; and still other philosophers, with no explicit metaphysical axe to grind, have asserted that an action may be causally explained by citing a choice or a character trait. In all of these cases it has been argued, and I think correctly,...

    • CHAPTER 19 Hart and Honoré on Causation in the Law (1960)
      (pp. 130-133)

      Causation in the Law, by H.L.A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, and A. M. Honoré, Rhodes Reader in Roman-Dutch Law at the same university, is an excellent study of the main problems that surround the idea of causation in the law. It is an unusually careful and lucid treatment of a perplexing set of concepts and a splendid example of the way in which the tools of contemporary philosophical analysis may be fruitfully applied. Prof. Hart is a distinguished philosopher as well as a legal scholar, a representative of a point of view that now flourishes at Oxford and...

    • CHAPTER 20 The Question of Free Will: Some Preliminary Remarks (1993)
      (pp. 134-140)

      Anyone who asks at the end of the twentieth century what free will is, whether we have it, and how we know that we have it, owes an explanation to those who may wonder why they should read yet another volume devoted to these antique and supposedly antiquated questions. In reply to those who so wonder I should say that my treatment of the subject is distinguished by advocating a combination of ideas that may make this study of interest even to hardened specialists on free will and to those who have studied the long history of philosophical thinking about...

    • CHAPTER 21 Harvard’s Philosophical Heritage (1957)
      (pp. 143-148)

      The analytic philosophical movement that seriously influenced Vienna, Cambridge, and Oxford in the twentieth century could hardly have left Harvard untouched, and for this reason the following questions are asked by many whose conception of the subject was formed in an earlier generation: “What has happened to philosophy at Harvard? Where is the Alpine splendor of Royce’s absolute idealism, the playful practicality of James, and the literate Latin naturalism of Santayana? All melted away! And what do we see now but a wasteland of linguistic analysis, a verbalistic desert, a dusty retreat without even a Whitehead to blow the metaphysical...

    • CHAPTER 22 Experiment and Necessity in Dewey’s Philosophy (1959)
      (pp. 149-159)

      John Dewey, more than any other thinker in modern times, viewed the history of Western philosophy as a fruitless quest for certainty, as a misguided effort to discover a class of truths which would be stable, certain, and self-evident. And for this reason the notion ofa prioriknowledge, or knowledge which is supposed to be independent of experience, was almost always suspect in Dewey’s philosophy. For more than a half-century, he campaigned against the view that there are two sorts of knowledge: one rational, necessary, unchanging, certain; and the other empirical, contingent, and merely probable. Preoccupation with the status...

    • CHAPTER 23 Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis (1949)
      (pp. 160-166)

      The appearance of Prof. C. I. Lewis’sAnalysis of Knowledge and Valuation, with its forthright defense of the thesis that all statements of value are empirical, presents an opportunity to examine the present state of pragmatic value theory and ethics. In particular it presents an opportunity to compare Lewis’s views with those of Dewey on the relation between value and obligation. The third book of Lewis’sAnalysiscontains a carefully worked out doctrine which closely resembles the one Dewey outlines in the tenth chapter ofThe Quest for Certainty, but these doctrines exhibit a great difference as well. The agreement...

    • CHAPTER 24 Desire and Desirability: A Rejoinder to a Posthumous Reply by John Dewey (1996)
      (pp. 167-177)

      Shortly after his ninetieth birthday, John Dewey¹ acknowledged receiving from me two publications in which I had criticized some of his views in ethics: mySocial Thought in America, and my “Value and Obligation in Dewey and Lewis,” both published in 1949.² Since I never heard anything more from Dewey about them, I surmised that he had probably not read them or that, if he had, he did not think it worth bothering to discuss my criticisms. I was therefore very surprised when I read in the final volume of hisCollected Worksthat hehadpaid attention to them...

    • CHAPTER 25 Peirce’s Summum Bonum and the Ethical Views of C. I. Lewis and John Dewey (1999)
      (pp. 178-185)

      This is primarily a note on the ethical views of C. I. Lewis in which I compare them with some ideas of John Dewey and with some remarks of Charles Peirce about thesummum bonum.¹ In a letter to me in 1963, Lewis hints at a way of dealing with an objection of mine to his views by appealing to an idea of Peirce, but before turning to Lewis’s letter I want to say something in the first two sections below about the background of my differences with him, especially insofar as they involve the views of Dewey, Peirce, and...

    • CHAPTER 26 Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, and Quine’s Holism (1986)
      (pp. 186-198)

      In this paper, I make some comments and raise certain questions about what Quine has called his epistemological “holism”.¹ My chief aim is to persuade Quine to agree with me that we may include sentences containing expressions such as “ought”, “ought not”, “may”, “has a right to”, and “is entitled to” in certain bodies of sentences that may be tested in a holistic manner that I shall soon characterize. In my view, such sentences appear in normative ethics as well as in normative epistemology. For example, I regard the sentence “Newton had a right to defend his life” as a...

    • CHAPTER 27 Holistic Pragmatism and Ethics (2002)
      (pp. 199-210)

      I want to make a case for applying the epistemology of holistic pragmatism to moral philosophy, but before doing so, I will make some remarks on the history of applying holistic pragmatism to science. Holistic pragmatism differs from James’s pragmatism in a way that Russell noted in 1908, when he said that James held inPragmatismthat there are two kinds of truths that are not subject to pragmatic testing, a view inconsistent with the pragmatic holism Russell attributed to James only a year later. One of these kinds of truth James illustrated by “1 and 1 make 2” and...

    • CHAPTER 28 The Psychologism of Hume and Arithmetical Truth (2003)
      (pp. 211-214)

      David Hume, the greatest empiricist of the Enlightenment and in my opinion its greatest philosopher, subscribed to two views that have had profound impact on the history of philosophy. One is the view called psychologism, according to which we may use the natural science of psychology to solve certain problems of philosophy; a second is the view that there is a sharp distinction between the methods of testing statements in arithmetic and those in natural science. Here I examine the impact of Hume’s psychologism on this distinction by comparing his views with some that emerged in the twentieth century. I...

    • CHAPTER 29 Why Annalists of Ideas Should Be Analysts of Ideas (1975)
      (pp. 217-226)

      Although I Have worked in the philosophy of history and in the history of ideas, I have rarely combined these interests by writing in the philosophy of the history of ideas. Recently, however, I have developed a few thoughts in this second-story subject that I will try to communicate here. My main point is that it is absurd to write the history of ideas without understanding them, and I try to support this point by critically examining the work of some intellectual historians. Readers who think this is a truism may stop reading here, but I ask others to stay...

    • CHAPTER 30 The Revolt against Formalism in American Social Thought of the Twentieth Century (1947)
      (pp. 227-242)

      Historians of american thought and critics of American culture have often noted a profound kinship between some of our distinctive currents of thought—pragmatism in philosophy, institutionalism in economics, legal realism in the law, economic determinism in politics, and what was once called the new history. When one examines these movements from a methodological, ethical and political point of view, one can see a striking similarity in the ideas of Charles Beard, John Dewey, Justice Holmes, James Harvey Robinson, and Thorstein Veblen. This similarity, which has been observed by several students of the progressive era, may be illuminated by calling...

    • CHAPTER 31 Pragmatism and the Revolt against Formalism: Revising Some Doctrines of William James (1986)
      (pp. 243-254)

      When prof. shoichi oshimo of Doshisha University was kind enough to encourage me to lecture about William James, he told me that I would probably be addressing an audience composed of persons with very different interests and very different backgrounds in philosophy. Therefore, I wish to apologize in advance if I should say what is obvious to some members of the audience and what may be difficult for others. Needless to add, any speaker in my situation faces the sort of task that James himself often undertook, for he wished not only to contribute to technical philosophy but also to...

    • CHAPTER 32 The Politics of Epistemology (1989)
      (pp. 255-269)

      It has often been asserted with great confidence that the purest parts of philosophy are political in nature, that even a theory of knowledge may be identified with a particular political point of view. Although this idea has been associated with the far left, anyone familiar with the history of philosophical thought knows that the far left has not been its sole advocate. John Dewey condemned Aristotle’s epistemology as antidemocratic; William James once exclaimed about how democratic pragmatism was;¹ John Locke, as we shall soon see, thought that the doctrine of innate ideas was a tool of those he called...

    • CHAPTER 33 Original Sin, Natural Law, and Politics (1956)
      (pp. 270-283)

      Some years ago, in my bookSocial Thought in America, I reported on the declining reputation of American liberal thinkers like Dewey and Holmes, not realizing that I was noting a tendency that would soon swell into an effort to discredit totally the ideas of some of the most distinguished Americans of the present century. I still consider my criticism of Dewey and Holmes to be just, but the current intellectual atmosphere makes it plain that, for all my reservations, I have more in common with them than with most of their contemporary detractors.Social Thought in Americais not...

    • CHAPTER 34 Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Progressive Era (1988)
      (pp. 284-298)

      I want to begin by thanking you for the very great pleasure and honor you have given me by asking me to deliver the second Edward J. Bloustein Lecture in Jurisprudence at the Rutgers School of Law. I should say at once that I come here not as a specialist in jurisprudence but as a philosopher and as a philosophical historian of American ideas. However, I shall come as close to jurisprudence as I can by talking today about the role that various branches of philosophy play inThe Federalist, that great work in which James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and...

    • CHAPTER 35 The American Intellectual versus the American City (1961)
      (pp. 299-309)

      Although the city has become one of the most absorbing and most intensively studied social problems in America in 1961, and although it is now fashionable for intellectuals to express an almost tender concern for its future, to hope that its decay can be arrested, and to offer plans for its revitalization, this has not always been the attitude of our greatest American thinkers.¹ For a variety of reasons, they have expressed different degrees of hostility toward urban life in America, hostility which may be partly responsible for a feeling on the part of today’s city planner and urban reformer...

    • CHAPTER 36 The Philosopher and the Metropolis in America (1963)
      (pp. 310-320)

      In the intellectual versus the city, Lucia White and I argued that dismay and distrust have been predominant attitudes of the American intellectual toward the American city.¹ This, we argued, is true not only of famous American novelists, sociologists, social workers, and architects, but also of influential philosophers and philosophically minded writers from the eighteenth century to the twentieth. In our book, we examined the views of philosophers side-by-side with those of social workers, sociologists, literary men, and other intellectuals who wrote during the same period, and therefore we presented no continuous examination of what our major philosophical thinkers said...

    • CHAPTER 37 William James (1986)
      (pp. 323-330)

      It is more than a half century since Ralph Barton Perry published his magisterial and worshipfulThought and Character of William James,and for many years since then philosophers have hoped that someone would critically re-examine the thought ofWilliam James with a less adoring attitude than Perry’s, and, of course, with less ignorance and misunderstanding than one finds among authors who have written about James with only the foggiest ideas of what he stood for philosophically. Students of the history of American culture have similarly hoped that the life of William James would be carefully re-examined by a scholar who...

    • CHAPTER 38 The Later Years of George Santayana (1963)
      (pp. 331-332)

      I have always thought that Bertrand Russell was right in not taking George Santayana seriously as an analyst of knowledge, of truth, and of essence—Santayana’s favorite concept¹— and I have thought for a long time that William James and John Dewey were justifiably irritated by his snobbishness, coldness, and reactionary sentiment. As a metaphysician and epistemologist, Santayana lacked great depth and logical power, and for one who set himself up as a moralist he seemed to me strangely lacking in sympathy for human beings. Because Daniel Cory, who has edited the volume of letters,Santayana: The Later Years,has...

    • CHAPTER 39 English Philosophy at Midcentury: An American’s Impressions (1951)
      (pp. 333-338)

      To a visiting American, one of the most striking things about English philosophy in 1951 is the complete triumph of the analytic movement associated with the names of G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and the late Ludwig Wittgenstein. Of course, as we shall see, profound differences within this movement make it extremely difficult to present one doctrinal platform to which these great philosophers and their followers would subscribe, but there are a number of common traits of significance which are illustrated in their writings and teachings. One of the first things to notice is how hostile to speculative metaphysics English...

    • CHAPTER 40 Memories of G. E. Moore (1959)
      (pp. 339-343)

      G. E. Moore was at once the most distinguished and the most admirable philosopher I have ever known personally, and I am sure that my feelings are shared by many philosophers all over the world. I also feel sure that he would have wished me to confine myself to analyzing or criticizing his philosophical views on this occasion, but I am moved to talk also— even primarily— about Moore as a teacher, about Moore as a guide and inspiration to young philosophers, and about Moore as a man. I should like, in some of my remarks, to make those of...

    • CHAPTER 41 W. V. Quine (2001)
      (pp. 344-348)

      It saddens me greatly to think that during the past year three Harvard philosophers who were very good and old friends of mine have left us: Nelson Goodman, Burt Dreben, and now, alas, Van Quine. I have spoken warmly of all of them elsewhere, but today I offer a special word of thanks to Van, who was my teacher. I learned more from him than I learned from any other teacher, both during my student days and afterward.

      I took his course on mathematical logic in 1938, which dated the beginning of a friendship I always prized. We ceased to...

    (pp. 349-352)
  12. INDEX
    (pp. 353-355)