Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements
Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements
Edward D. Mansfield
Helen V. Milner
Copyright Date: 2012
Published by: Princeton University Press
Pages: 240
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7snnf
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Book Info
Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of International Trade Agreements
Book Description:

Preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) play an increasingly prominent role in the global political economy, two notable examples being the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. These agreements foster economic integration among member states by enhancing their access to one another's markets. Yet despite the importance of PTAs to international trade and world politics, until now little attention has been focused on why governments choose to join them and how governments design them. This book offers valuable new insights into the political economy of PTA formation. Many economists have argued that the roots of these agreements lie in the promise they hold for improving the welfare of member states. Others have posited that trade agreements are a response to global political conditions. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner argue that domestic politics provide a crucial impetus to the decision by governments to enter trade pacts. Drawing on this argument, they explain why democracies are more likely to enter PTAs than nondemocratic regimes, and why as the number of veto players--interest groups with the power to block policy change--increases in a prospective member state, the likelihood of the state entering a trade agreement is reduced. The book provides a novel view of the political foundations of trade agreements.

eISBN: 978-1-4008-4253-7
Subjects: Political Science
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. v-vi)
  3. List of Figures and Tables
    List of Figures and Tables (pp. vii-viii)
  4. Preface and Acknowledgments
    Preface and Acknowledgments (pp. ix-x)
  5. Commonly Used Abbreviations
    Commonly Used Abbreviations (pp. xi-xii)
  6. CHAPTER 1 Introduction
    CHAPTER 1 Introduction (pp. 1-22)

    International trade agreements have played an important and growing role in the global political economy. Among the most important agreements of this sort are preferential trade agreements (PTAs), a set of institutions that are designed to foster economic integration among member-states by improving and stabilizing each member’s access to other participants’ markets. All PTAs require members to mutually adjust their trade policies, granting each member preferential access to the others’ markets. As such, they are one of the most prominent forms of international cooperation. This book addresses why and when countries join these trade agreements and how they design them....

  7. CHAPTER 2 A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements
    CHAPTER 2 A Political Economy Theory of International Trade Agreements (pp. 23-69)

    In this chapter, we present a theory of the domestic political conditions that lead countries to enter into formal trade agreements. More specifically, we aim to explain the establishment of PTAs, institutions in which member-states reciprocally lower their trade barriers on each other’s products and thereby grant each member preferential market access. As we discussed in chapter 1, our focus is on why and when countries have chosen to enter such agreements, understanding that there is substantial variability in the spread of PTAs over time and the countries that join them. Why have some countries joined many PTAs, while others...

  8. CHAPTER 3 Systemic Influences on PTA Formation
    CHAPTER 3 Systemic Influences on PTA Formation (pp. 70-92)

    The central argument of this study is that domestic politics shapes the decision to form a PTA. Before turning to an empirical analysis of this topic in chapter 4, however, we spend this chapter addressing the international influences on PTAs. We do so for various reasons. Systemic theories of international relations argue that it is necessary to understand the global context in which nation-states make decisions before we can consider how domestic politics shapes these decisions (e.g., Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Keohane 1984; Jervis 1997). Without a prior analysis of systemic factors, as Robert Keohane (1984, 26) puts it, “unit-level...

  9. CHAPTER 4 Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation
    CHAPTER 4 Regime Type, Veto Players, and PTA Formation (pp. 93-121)

    In this chapter, we test the theoretical propositions about domestic politics that we developed in chapter 2. Using a new dataset, we aim to identify the domestic and international factors that affect a country’s decision to join and ratify a PTA. We review why democratic regimes are especially likely to enter PTAs and why a large number of veto players reduce the odds that a country will join such arrangements. Then we test these arguments after accounting for the effects of various other economic and international variables, including those that were of greatest importance in the systemic analysis we conducted...

  10. CHAPTER 5 Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements
    CHAPTER 5 Auxiliary Hypotheses about Domestic Politics and Trade Agreements (pp. 122-154)

    We examine a variety of additional hypotheses that flow from our core argument in this chapter. These tests will allow us to probe aspects of our argument’s logic and distinguish it from alternative models linking domestic politics to PTA formation.

    Recall that we posit that leaders are caught between demands for protection from various interest groups and the need for economic growth, which helps them retain office. Governments have a hard time committing to not granting too much protection to interest groups. Voters, including interest groups that prefer free trade, focus attention on a country’s economic situation, holding governments accountable...

  11. CHAPTER 6 Conclusions
    CHAPTER 6 Conclusions (pp. 155-178)

    International trade agreements are key features of the global political economy. For centuries, countries have coordinated their trade policies and more recently regulated many other forms of economic exchange through these agreements. Lately, however, PTAs have proliferated at an especially rapid rate. The EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, ASEAN plus three, SADC, and other PTAs have a significant bearing on the current world economy and are among the most important regional and international institutions. Trade agreements are also central instruments through which countries can promote international cooperation. The purpose of this study has been to explain why and when governments elect to...

  12. Bibliography
    Bibliography (pp. 179-200)
  13. Index
    Index (pp. 201-211)
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