International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation

International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation

GILBERT R. WINHAM
Copyright Date: 1986
Pages: 464
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7ztgcg
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  • Book Info
    International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation
    Book Description:

    This book is a political history of the Tokyo Round (1973--1979), the largest and most significant multilateral trade negotiation since the founding of the GATT in 1947. Gilbert Winham provides a detailed account of the processes by which the negotiation was accomplished and an assessment of the Tokyo Round's substantive impact on the international trading system.

    Originally published in 1987.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-5817-0
    Subjects: Business

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. PREFACE
    (pp. ix-xii)
  4. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
    (pp. xiii-2)
  5. INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 3-14)

    An argument can be made that the postwar system of international economic cooperation narrowly averted a crisis of major proportions in the early 1970s. One aspect of this crisis occurred on August 15, 1971, when the U.S. government suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold. This action precipitated the breakdown of the fixed exchange system negotiated in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. The U.S. action represented a sudden devaluation of the leading international currency against gold, and it led to a period of great uncertainty as the major world currencies sought an equilibrium rate against the U.S. dollar....

  6. 1 THE TOKYO ROUND AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    (pp. 15-57)

    The GATT trade negotiation called the Tokyo Round was concluded in Geneva in April 1979. Officially it began at a ministerial trade conference in September 1973 in Tokyo, from which it derived its name. Unofficially the negotiations started earlier than that. At the close of the Kennedy Round in 1967, the GATT secretariat, led by Sir Eric Wyndham-White, sought to convince the major trading nations to extend trade liberalization into the nontariff area, which had been largely overlooked at the Kennedy Round. This early effort was unsuccessful, but by the early 1970s chaos in the international monetary system resurrected fears...

  7. 2 BACKGROUND: CREATING THE CAPACITY TO NEGOTIATE
    (pp. 58-90)

    Large negotiations like the Tokyo Round often appear as discrete phenomena in the flow of political events. They get initiated with a fanfare that assures the attention of the policy community, and develop an internal force that preempts national policymaking in the subjects covered by the negotiation. They necessarily widen political discussion. The visibility of large negotiations undoubtedly has some political advantage for the participants. It imparts urgency to the issues being dealt with, and it increases the authority of the process itself. It enhances the legitimacy of the results. But it can also obscure the fact that negotiations are...

  8. 3 THE NEGOTIATION LAUNCHED, 1973–1974: ISSUES BEFORE THE TOKYO ROUND
    (pp. 91-127)

    The Tokyo Round had its official beginning, and took its name from, a GATT ministerial meeting held in Tokyo on September 12–14, 1973. This meeting was attended by representatives of 102 nations, including both members and nonmembers of GATT, and at its conclusion the participants unanimously adopted the Tokyo Declaration which launched the multilateral trade negotiation. The aim of the negotiation was stated in the broadest terms possible: to “achieve the expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world trade and improvement in the standard of living and welfare of the people of the world” and to “secure additional benefits for...

  9. 4 EARLY PHASE, 1974–1977: RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IN AGRICULTURE
    (pp. 128-167)

    It is characteristic of large multilateral negotiations to move in spasms, with large spaces of time sandwiched between periods of useful activity. When a large negotiation is moving forward, it is a ponderous affair, with a long succession of meetings that gradually chip away at the subject matter of the exercise. The process can take on a machinelike quality, lurching along seemingly under the force of its own momentum. Yet the process is surprisingly delicate, and the mechanism of common endeavor which sustains it can easily be upset. When the negotiation has become stalled, it takes uncommon effort to pick...

  10. 5 MIDDLE PHASE, 1977–1978: THE BONN SUMMIT RUN-UP
    (pp. 168-211)

    The meeting between Robert Strauss and the EC leaders in July 1977 launched the Tokyo Round into a period of intense activity. The negotiation proceeded on a decentralized basis, with the various subject areas of the Tokyo Round being handled in small groups of specialized personnel. There was little overlap among the different areas at this stage, and the results of the negotiation process were lumpy, with some areas reporting more progress than others. A major effort of stocktaking was made immediately prior to the Bonn economic summit of July 1978, in an effort to demonstrate progress to the seven...

  11. 6 ENDPHASE, 1978–1979: COMPLETION OF THE CODES
    (pp. 212-255)

    It is often said that negotiations move in phases over time.¹ If this is the case, it is necessary for the analyst to distinguish clearly between one phase and the next. In the Tokyo Round, this task is made easy by the fact that the Bonn summit served as a natural watershed in the negotiation. Prior to Bonn, the work of the negotiation had advanced from an exchange of general exploratory proposals to the drafting of specific clauses of the various codes. Disagreements over wording were haggled over and resolved at the technical level insofar as possible, and in this...

  12. 7 ENDPHASE, 1978–1979: TARIFFS, WINE GALLONS, AND OTHER MATTERS
    (pp. 256-305)

    Like the code negotiations at the Tokyo Round, the tariff negotiation was a compartmentalized affair. The tariff negotiation had its own specialists and to some extent its own timetable. Offers had been tabled by the Big Three early in 1978, and some negotiation had occurred between them during the spring of that year. By the time of the Bonn summit, most nations participating in the tariff negotiation had tabled specific negotiating offers. For some countries, particularly the developed nations, offers were based on formula reductions; for the developing countries, offers were made on an item-by-item basis.

    Once offers were tabled,...

  13. 8 INTERNAL DECISIONMAKING IN THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS
    (pp. 306-349)

    Most of the action of the Tokyo Round occurred in Geneva. In classic diplomatic fashion, representatives were sent from participating governments. In this manner, the external negotiation took on an institutional reality that bore some analogy to the lawmaking process of a modern parliament. However, unlike individuals who are the constituents of a national parliament, the constituents of the Tokyo Round were nation-states which possessed a complicated decisionmaking structure in their own right. For any individual nation at the Tokyo Round, the negotiation in Geneva was only half the problem, for behind that interaction was an internal intragovernmental process needed...

  14. 9 EXPLANATION OF PROCESS AND RESULTS
    (pp. 350-401)

    The end of a negotiation in international relations rarely brings an end to the problems that brought about the negotiation in the first place. There are few areas of international relations, and especially not international trade, where major problems are of the once-and-for-all variety. Relationships in the international system are continuing, and so are the problems. Major negotiations like the Tokyo Round are not so much intended to settle problems as they are to provide an opportunity for a concentrated examination of the most vexing aspects of continuing relations. Of course, negotiators try to resolve the problems their nations face,...

  15. 10 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
    (pp. 402-412)

    In the half decade since the Tokyo Round, things have not gone well for GATT or the world trading system. World recession deepened in the early 1980s, and problems of debt and monetary exchanges worsened international economic relationships. Public attitudes at the elite and mass level seemed less supportive of liberalism. Certain illiberal practices were applied by national governments. All this has created concern over whether the liberal consensus of the postwar period can be maintained. Such concern arises because it is widely recognized that the world trading system is an inherently fragile system. It is a system where relations...

  16. APPENDIX A THE TOKYO DECLARATION
    (pp. 413-416)
  17. APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF SIX “CODE” AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED AT THE TOKYO ROUND
    (pp. 417-424)
  18. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
    (pp. 425-438)
  19. INDEX
    (pp. 439-449)
  20. Back Matter
    (pp. 450-450)