Austria's Eastern Question, 1700-1790

Austria's Eastern Question, 1700-1790

Karl A. Roider
Copyright Date: 1982
Pages: 272
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7ztkqn
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  • Book Info
    Austria's Eastern Question, 1700-1790
    Book Description:

    Focusing on the policy of the Hapsburg Monarchy toward the Ottoman Empire during the whole of the eighteenth century, Karl A. Roider maintains that it was in the early part of that century when Austria first faced the twin problems of Ottoman decline and Russian expansion into southeastern Europe.

    Originally published in 1982.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-5669-5
    Subjects: Political Science, History

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. Maps
    (pp. ix-x)
  4. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xi-xii)
  5. A Note on Form
    (pp. xiii-2)
  6. INTRODUCTION
    (pp. 3-6)

    The struggle between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire is one of the great dramas in the diplomatic and military history of the early modern period. After the battle of Mohács in 1526, which brought the houses of Habsburg and Osman into direct conflict, these two mighty states engaged in repeated wars to determine which one would ultimately dominate southeastern Europe. The rivalry was far more than a struggle of great political powers; it became in the popular mind a contest between Christianity and Islam, between gods and prophets. The ability of the Habsburgs to halt and eventually to...

  7. CHAPTER ONE The Art of Diplomacy
    (pp. 7-20)

    On 7 December 1699 the Ottoman ambassador Ibrahim Pasha and the Austrian ambassador Count Wolfgang Öttingen, each accompanied by a substantial military escort, approached the Austro-Turkish border somewhere between the Turkish fortress of Belgrade and the Austrian fortress of Petrovaradin (Peterwardein). At the place of meeting stood three stakes, the center one marking the border itself, the other two ten paces on either side, one in Habsburg and one in Ottoman land. Some weeks before, each embassy had left its capital on the same day; each had journeyed to this spot where it was now to cross into the land...

  8. CHAPTER TWO Turkey in Austria’s “World War,” 1700-1714
    (pp. 21-37)

    Viewed from the twentieth century—or from the nineteenth—the Treaty of Carlowitz appears as the great turning point in Austro-Turkish relations. From that time on, the Turks no longer threatened Austria’s existence but feared a possible Habsburg onslaught that would strip them of additional land and power. On the other hand, the Austrians, it is thought, looked upon the Ottoman Empire as seriously weakened and had only to choose the right moment to push the Turks farther into the Balkan Peninsula and possibly out of Europe altogether. Quite to the contrary, in the years immediately following the treaty, few...

  9. CHAPTER THREE Victory, 1716-1718
    (pp. 38-57)

    In December 1714, shortly after Charles XII departed for Sweden, the sultan declared war on the Republic of Venice. The attack came as no surprise. Since 1700 Western representatives at the Porte had reported that, of all the losses suffered at Carlowitz, the Turks resented most the surrender of the Morea to Venice. Each time the Ottomans spoke of war, Venice seemed their most likely target. The Venetians were aware of the danger themselves. During the War of the Spanish Succession, their delegate in Constantinople joined the French and the Hungarians in encouraging the grand viziers to invade Austria. While...

  10. CHAPTER FOUR Peace with Turkey, Alliance with Russia, 1718-1736
    (pp. 58-70)

    Following the Treaty of Passarowitz, the Austrians enjoyed almost two decades of peace with the Ottoman Empire. During that time most of their diplomatic attention focused on serious problems in the West. In 1725 Charles finally reconciled himself to the loss of Spain by concluding the Treaty of Vienna, an alliance between Austria and Spain sealed by the proposed marriage of two of Charles’s daughters to sons of the Spanish queen, Elizabeth Farnese. To Charles’s surprise, the accord evoked a storm of protest throughout much of Europe. To oppose it, Britain and France, who objected the most vehemently, formed the...

  11. CHAPTER FIVE Defeat, 1737-1739
    (pp. 71-90)

    Like the fundamental issue, the conditions facing the Habsburg policy-makers in 1736 were in many ways similar to those in 1715. Austria was just completing a succession war with France, its treasury was seriously depleted, and its army weakened. Although the fighting in the War of the Polish Succession had ended, the final peace settlement had not been signed, and Vienna feared a resumption of hostilities if the negotiators failed to reach agreement. As in 1715, the Ottoman Empire had not injured Austria directly and seemed to have no intention of doing so. This time no emissary was sent to...

  12. CHAPTER SIX Peace, 1740-1769
    (pp. 91-108)

    The years 1740 to 1769, while by no means without their times of crisis and concern, represented the longest interval of tranquillity between Austria and Turkey in the eighteenth century. To be sure, on the surface the Ottoman Empire remained Vienna’s traditional foe. During the great debates in 1749 concerning the goals of Habsburg foreign policy, many of Maria Theresa’s counselors continued to refer to the Turks as Austria’s “natural” and “most dangerous” opponents, and in 1755 one of Kaunitz’s arguments in favor of an alliance with France was that French influence at the Porte would prevent this implacable enemy...

  13. CHAPTER SEVEN Allies? 1769-1771
    (pp. 109-130)

    Following the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, the attention of Austria and other European powers again turned to events in Poland. The death of King Augustus III in 1763 and the election the following year of his successor Stanislaus Poniatowski, lover and protégé of the formidable Catherine II of Russia, caused considerable commotion in the courts of Europe. Although Kaunitz was not pleased with Poniatowski’s success, he realized that there was little Austria could do to oppose it. In April 1764 Berlin and St. Petersburg had concluded a treaty of alliance that meant any confrontation with Russia could lead...

  14. CHAPTER EIGHT Partitions Great and Small, 1772-1775
    (pp. 131-150)

    Despite the efforts to discourage Russian expansion in the Balkans, Joseph and Kaunitz never rejected totally the thought that perhaps the Monarchy would be better served by cooperating with the Russians rather than by opposing them. They knew that the military preparations designed to intimidate Catherine could backfire at any moment, perhaps drawing Austria into a dangerous war with Russia from which Vienna feared Prussia would benefit most. As Kaunitz advised Maria Theresa, “ ‘It is to be assumed that he [Frederick] would not be displeased to see us engaged in a war with that power [Russia], since whatever the...

  15. CHAPTER NINE Taming the Bear, 1774-1786
    (pp. 151-168)

    Recent scholarship has identified the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, which ended the Russo-Turkish war, as the beginning of the Eastern Question.¹ According to its provisions, Russia annexed the northern coast of the Black Sea between the Bug and Dnepr rivers, the fortresses of Kerch and Enikale in the Crimea, and part of Kabardia; the Crimea became independent and thus open to Russian intrigue; Russian merchants won the right to sail freely on the Black Sea; and the Russian sovereign received vaguely worded rights to protect the Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire, rights that would later be used to meddle in...

  16. CHAPTER TEN Austria’s Last Turkish War, 1787-1790
    (pp. 169-188)

    After the Crimean crisis, affairs in the East became briefly quiet again, so that Joseph could pursue Austrian interests elsewhere. He now believed that he could do so more effectively, since his role in aiding Catherine’s acquisition of the Crimea had placed her considerably in his debt. Immediately following the conclusion of the Crimean affair, he took steps to secure two diplomatic objectives: the exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria and the opening of the Scheldt River, which had been closed to overseas shipping since the sixteenth century. The more important was the exchange project, which Vienna knew would...

  17. EPILOGUE
    (pp. 189-196)

    Although the convention at Reichenbach ended the Austro-Turkish war in fact, it still had to be concluded formally. This was the task of the Austrian and Turkish delegates and the Prussian, British, and (by everyone’s consent) Dutch mediators who gathered at Sistova. The town itself, chosen because it would require minimal expenses and had been the birthplace of the current grand vizier, was succinctly described by the British representative as “the world’s end.”¹ Although the congress opened in the last week of December 1790, it failed to issue a final treaty until 4 August 1791. One cause for the considerable...

  18. Notes
    (pp. 197-234)
  19. Bibliography
    (pp. 235-246)
  20. Index
    (pp. 247-256)
  21. Back Matter
    (pp. 257-257)