America, Germany, and the Future of Europe

America, Germany, and the Future of Europe

Gregory F. Treverton
Copyright Date: 1992
Pages: 252
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zvs8g
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  • Book Info
    America, Germany, and the Future of Europe
    Book Description:

    Gregory Treverton reviews the significant episodes in Europe's history after World War II, emphasizing America's preoccupation with Europe and the decisive effect of U.S. foreign policy on European security and economic arrangements during the postwar years.

    Originally published in 1993.

    ThePrinceton Legacy Libraryuses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

    eISBN: 978-1-4008-6287-0
    Subjects: Political Science

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-vi)
  3. Preface
    (pp. vii-x)
  4. Abbreviations
    (pp. xi-2)
  5. Introduction
    (pp. 3-14)

    In my opinion, the center of readjustment, if readjustment is to be, lies in Germany, not in Russia or with us.” So wrote Henry Adams in 1897.¹ For different reasons, Adams’s judgment is applicable almost a century later. In today’s turmoil in Europe, the center of readjustment is the center, Germany.

    Looking back over the more than forty postwar years, they now seem a race in decline between the Soviet threat and the trans-Atlantic security order the threat justified. The threat shaped the postwar order in Europe and, especially, the American role in that order. It excused the bipolar structure...

  6. CHAPTER ONE Dividing Germany
    (pp. 15-37)

    Just as the postwar order ended in Germany, so it also began there. It ended the day the Berlin Wall was punched open, November 9, 1989; or perhaps earlier in the summer the day communist Hungary decided it had more to gain from capitalist West Germany than it had to fear from Moscow and so let roll the “freedom trains” carrying East Germans to new lives in West Germany. In those weeks the division of Germany ended, in important psychological and political ways if not yet in all formal ones, and with it, so ended the postwar order in Europe....

  7. CHAPTER TWO Creating Dependence
    (pp. 38-63)

    The argument still rages over the extent to which the turn from cooperation to hostility among the wartime partners was inevitable. In any event the turn came, and with it ended the hopes for great power entente, or even world federalism, embodied in the United Nations. Those hopes reemerged only with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and then in more modest form.

    Yet despite the turn, the kind of European dependence on the United States that was enshrined in the NATO alliance was not the initial conception on either side of the Atlantic. During 1946 and 1947, while the...

  8. CHAPTER THREE Integrating Germany, Engaging America
    (pp. 64-91)

    The words were President Harry Truman’s. He spoke on September 9, 1950, ten weeks after North Korean troops had poured across the border into South Korea. The effect of his announcement is difficult to overstate. American forces in Europe were to be converted from occupiers of Germany into deterrers of the Soviet Union. While their dispatch was not regarded as permanent—indeed it was advertised as temporary—logically, so long as the Soviet threat continued, so should the presence of additional troops.

    The decision was part of a complicated bargain with America’s European allies, especially France, over rearming western Germany....

  9. CHAPTER FOUR Economics and Security
    (pp. 92-118)

    At war’s end, regional arrangements had not been fundamental to the thinking of Americans and their principal interlocutors, the British. The two nations shared the premises that postwar economic arrangements would be global in scope, and Britain would resume something like its prewar role. As those two premises were gradually found wanting, the American emphasis shifted from restoring a global order with Britain as a nearly equal partner, to reconstructing Europe as a temporary expedient, to, finally, accepting that Europe’s recovery required Europe’s integration, even if Britain opted out.

    Throughout, economic and security considerations were entangled, and Germany was pivotal....

  10. CHAPTER FIVE Moscow’s German Problem
    (pp. 119-152)

    At Charles de Gaulle’s press conference on the twentieth anniversary of Yalta, February 4, 1965, he spoke of the German problem as “above all the European problem,” of the German anguish “created by its own uncertainty about its boundaries, its unity, its political system, its international role, so that the more its destiny remains undetermined, the more disturbing it always appears to the whole continent.” A resolution of “the German anomalies” could not come, he warned, before radical change in Russia, which “must evolve in such a way that it sees its future not in totalitarian constraint at home and...

  11. CHAPTER SIX Europe’s Past, Europe’s Future
    (pp. 153-172)

    With the Cold War over, we know best what Europe’s future will not resemble, and that is the last forty years. In neither security nor economics will the future have the clarity of sharp division, with the armies of opposing alliances poised along the German-German border and with western Europe’s continental economic system, the Common Market, ending at the boundaries of the security order, excluding all Europe east of West Germany. So, too, the glacial stability of the old order, however unappealing it could be, is gone. That Humpty-Dumpty cannot be reassembled, not to mention the Wall, and it provides...

  12. CHAPTER SEVEN A European Germany or a German Europe?
    (pp. 173-205)

    The anxieties provoked among other Europeans by Germany’s unification, visible enough beneath the surface, centered not on the Soviet Union’s weakness but on Germany’s strength. The fact that those anxieties were more prominent in older rather than younger Europeans suggests they may be simply anachronisms. But a Europe with a dominant Germany had not always been a stable or happy Europe. Isn’t Germany simply too big, eastern Europe too unstable, and Russia too weak? If not, why not? What has changed to make what has been unhappy before not so this time?

    When the history of the postwar order in...

  13. A Final Word
    (pp. 206-214)

    There is a place in the future Europe for the United States, but it is a far less prominent one than in the first decade after World War II. Europe still needs America but not with the same desperateness it did then, and American attentions are not nearly so concentrated on Europe as they were then. The time may come again when Europe will need America desperately, and the need may call forth comparable American attention. That time might come if real danger again appeared in Europe’s east, from Russia, if Europe’s core around Germany disintegrated, or if both occurred...

  14. Notes
    (pp. 215-230)
  15. Index
    (pp. 231-240)