Canada and the International Seabed

Canada and the International Seabed: Domestic Determinants and External Constraints

ELIZABETH RIDDELL-DIXON
Copyright Date: 1989
Pages: 240
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt804jh
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  • Book Info
    Canada and the International Seabed
    Book Description:

    This stronger alliance gave priority to negotiating an internationally acceptable treaty and safeguarding Canada's land-based nickel industry. A second coalition - officers from the Department of Finance, the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology - contended that the push for quantitive restrictions diverted attention from the more crucial areas of protection of technological and financial resources. Riddell-Dixon argues that the dominant coalition succeeded because of ministerial support, structural and functional advantages, and an effective choice of tactics. Consequently they were able to manage other domestic sources of foreign policy.

    eISBN: 978-0-7735-6196-0
    Subjects: Law

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-vi)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. vii-viii)
  3. Figures and Tables
    (pp. ix-x)
  4. Preface
    (pp. xi-2)
  5. CHAPTER ONE Introduction
    (pp. 3-18)

    On the eve of the opening session of the United Nations’ Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (unclos iii), Mitchell Sharp, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, declared it to be “the most important diplomatic conference ever held under the auspices of the UN.”¹ Although his statement certainly reflected the importance Canada accorded the Conference, it was not a perception peculiar to Canada. Over 150 states subsequently devoted nine years to the complex negotiations of unclos iii. By its conclusion, significant increases in coastal state jurisdiction had been accepted and a unique regime governing the exploitation of...

  6. CHAPTER TWO Canada’s Interests
    (pp. 19-28)

    Before any examination of Canada’s policies at unclos iii, their evolution and the means by which they were pursued, it is imperative to explore the breadth and depth of the Canadian interests in these law of the sea negotiations. For example, given the wide range of possible interests, we might well ask what specific interests were actualy in the ascendant as the Canadian delegation negotiated the law of the sea and, particularly, the deep seabed mining issues. If we compare the range of interests discussed in this chapter with the policies presented in chapter 3, Canada’s official choice of priorities...

  7. CHAPTER THREE Canada’s Policies on Deep Seabed Mining at unclos iii
    (pp. 29-56)

    Canada’s policies on deep seabed mining did not spring to life the eve of the Conference’s first session. Indeed, their general tenets had been germinating during the preceding five years. The period from 1968 until the commencement of unclos iii in December 1973 was, in fact, critical to the identification of Canada’s interests and the development of its policies on deep seabed mining and other law of the sea issues. As one report puts it: “The statement of basic positions began as early as 1968 and continued as late as the second session of the Conference in Caracas in 1974....

  8. CHAPTER FOUR Federal Government Actors
    (pp. 57-95)

    Inasmuch as the federal cabinet ministers and bureaucrats were the most important actors in determining Canada’s policies on deep seabed mining, this case can be said to be typical of Canadian foreign policy development. Cabinet ministers held the ultimate authority for the decisions taken, while members of the bureaucracy were the sources of most policy positions and were responsible for the implementation of the decisions. Although, in theory, there was a clear cut division of power and responsibility between the cabinet and the bureaucracy, in practice, civil servants played the lead role in formulating and implementing Canada’s policies on deep...

  9. CHAPTER FIVE Provincial and Municipal Governments
    (pp. 96-105)

    With regard to external affairs, the Canadian constitution does not provide for a clear-cut division of power and responsibility between federal and provincial governments. In practice, however, most provincial players regard their federal counterpart as the dominant actor in this domain.¹ As a result, responsibility for foreign policy generally rests with the federal government. Canada’s policies on deep seabed mining were no exception to this rule: they were negotiated in the federal iclos, drafted by the dea lawyers, and approved by the federal cabinet.

    In Canada, federal and provincial governments share in the development of natural resources. Under the constitution,...

  10. CHAPTER SIX Nongovernmental Actors
    (pp. 106-131)

    Not surprisingly, both business and organized labour lobbied to influence Canada’s position on deep seabed mining. What was surprising was the result: Canada’s policies reflected the priorities of organized labour rather than those of the business sector. It is a trend that is frequently alleged to be otherwise.¹ On the other hand, neither the lobbying efforts of labour unions nor those of business organizations determined the policy outcome, for the major battles were fought and won within the civil service. The bargaining strength of these two groups’ respective allies within the federal civil service was thus the key determinant as...

  11. CHAPTER SEVEN The Canadian Delegation
    (pp. 132-151)

    Because the cabinet’s instructions to the Canadian delegation were phrased in fairly general terms,¹ the delegation was able to exercise significant influence in the policy-making process. It did, however, have to operate within the parameters set by the directives from Ottawa. The range of its options was also circumscribed by developments at the Conference, as well as by international events and forces.

    The Canadian delegation was remarkably effective in protecting and promoting Canada’s interests at the Conference. This was particularly evident in the areas negotiated by Committees Two and Three. It was clear, however, that the delegation also had a...

  12. CHAPTER EIGHT The Policy-Making Process
    (pp. 152-182)

    Having examined the range of Canada’s interest in deep seabed mining, its domestic actors and their policy priorities, it is time to bring together the various component parts of the process by which Canada’s policies on deep seabed mining were formulated. How did the process operate? Why was priority given in Committee One to Canada’s milieu goal of securing an internationally acceptable treaty and its possession goal of safeguarding the Canadian nickel industry? And, finally, what can this case study tell us about the relative importance of domestic determinants and international constraints, the nature of intra-governmental decision making, the relationship...

  13. Glossary
    (pp. 183-184)
  14. Notes
    (pp. 185-198)
  15. Bibliography
    (pp. 199-214)
  16. Index
    (pp. 215-225)