This stronger alliance gave priority to negotiating an internationally acceptable treaty and safeguarding Canada's land-based nickel industry. A second coalition - officers from the Department of Finance, the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce, and the Ministry of State for Science and Technology - contended that the push for quantitive restrictions diverted attention from the more crucial areas of protection of technological and financial resources. Riddell-Dixon argues that the dominant coalition succeeded because of ministerial support, structural and functional advantages, and an effective choice of tactics. Consequently they were able to manage other domestic sources of foreign policy.
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