Collective Bargaining and the Public Interest presents a critical assessment of the way society marshals and deploys its labour force. David Winch's analysis is based on the economic theory of how markets work and the criteria of welfare economics by which they can be evaluated. Using neoclassical economic theory to analyse the welfare economics of collective bargaining, Winch examines where and to what extent legitimate third-party inter-ests are involved when labour unions and firms come together to negotiate collective agreements. Winch also makes important recommendations for public policy. He concludes that while unions and collective bargaining serve society well, the process of dispute resolution by conflict, or strike, does not. He proposes that arbitration be employed instead of strike or lock-out as a last resort mechanism of dispute resolution.
Subjects: Political Science
Table of Contents
You are viewing the table of contents
You do not have access to this
on JSTOR. Try logging in through your institution for access.