On 30 January 1933 Adolf Hitler was appointedReichChancellor by President von Hindenburg; he was commissioned to form a government, for which he was to find a majority in theReichstaglater. He had therefore come to power by virtue of the provisions of the GermanReich’scurrent constitution, although he had been proclaiming for years that he would change both the State and the constitution, through which he had reached his goal, on National-Socialist and authoritarian lines – in other words destroy them.

The Weimar Republic, successor to the Prussian/German empire defeated in the First World War, had not...

While pursuing their revolution inside Germany, the Nazis succeeded in scoring victories and gaining respect in the outside world such as had never been vouchsafed to their democratic predecessors. Apparently uninterruptedly, they extracted piecemeal revisions of the hated Versailles Treaty from their former enemies, thus enabling Hitler to fulfil one of his best vote-catching promises. When he reintroduced universal military service in 1935, no one lifted a finger: on the contrary, while Hitler was tearing up the Treaty of Versailles page by page, a stream of prominent visitors made the pilgrimage to Germany and were granted audiences. In 1934 came...

In 1937 far-reaching changes were under way in Germany, and in the succeeding years they were destined to convulse the world. Hitler’s singleminded determination to go to war can be proved with convincing clarity from his own utterances between 1920 and 1945.¹ The important point here is that towards the end of 1937 Hitler made concrete statements showing that he was set on a course of aggressive and violent foreign policy; he actually laid down the stages leading to war; he set the immediate objectives and the methods to be employed to attain them, and these, as he himself explicitly...

The court-martial of Fritsch took place almost simultaneously with the move of German troops into Austria. On 12 February 1938 Dr Kurt Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, visited Hitler on the Obersalzberg and, by means of threats, Hitler forced him to amnesty Austrian Nazis under sentence, to allow much greater freedom of action to National-Socialism in Austria and to appoint a Nazi, Dr Artur Seyss-Inquart, as Minister of the Interior.¹ By this means Hitler thought that he would ensure an internal Nazi seizure of power in Austria. Schuschnigg had no choice but to accept Hitler’s demands. Austria was in practice impotent...

It was the threat of war, a war unnecessarily initiated or provoked by Hitler with the object of overthrowing the European order and so inevitably leading to world war, which produced a German resistance movement whose object was to overthrow the regime bycoup d’étator revolutionary measures and then face the leaders of the regime with responsibility for their crimes.¹ There were a number of politicians, senior officials in various ministries and in numerous other positions, senior army officers and captains of industry who used their influence to curb and restrain Hitler’s foreign policy, working both from within and...

While the members of the German opposition, both inside and outside government service, were attempting to create the external political conditions conducive to the fall of Hitler, the military conspirators were developing plans for acoup d’etat.Thoughts on this subject went back a long way. During the Fritsch crisis the idea had germinated in the minds of Oster, Gisevius, Schacht, Witzleben, Haider and others. Without the cooperation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and his Chief of Staff, however, no militarycoupseemed practicable, and without the military, nocoupat all. Brauchitsch’s ambiguous position has already been mentioned;...

Beck’s successor was the former Deputy Chief of Staff I in the Army General Staff, General Franz Haider. Those who knew him describe him almost unanimously as religious, conservative, an outstanding staff officer in the best tradition with an ‘inexhaustible capacity for work’, correct, sober but sensitive too, with a pronounced sense of responsibility and rooted in the tradition of military discipline.¹ Though no one is prepared to eulogize Haider in the same terms as Beck, no one has voiced serious doubts about his antipathy to Hitler. Nevertheless his attitude as regards resistance is the subject of controversy and will...

The Munich Conference and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by the Western Powers administered to the anti-Hitler opposition a blow from which it could not recover. The public at large did not know what had really gone on and, from their position, it was hard for the resistance leaders to judge realistically on this point. Hitler had been proved right: the Western Powers had no wish to fight - any other view of the situation inevitably seemed unrealistic. Could he not similarly be proved right in the future? Who could deny that, thanks to his perspicacity and sleight of hand in...

Once more, on 31 August, Weizsäcker and Hassell attempted to save the peace, making representations to Göring, Henderson and Josef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador.¹ During the last few days before the French and British declarations of war Schlabrendorff too was indefatigable in maintaining contact between the opposition and the few British diplomats still in Berlin.² These last-minute efforts proved to the civilians something which the soldiers had often heard from Hitler himself but had never quite believed: that Hitler, Ribbentrop and some of the other hangers-on actuallywantedwar. There were perfectly genuine possibilities of satisfying Hitler’s demands by peaceful...

Since August 1939 Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Groscurth had been working in OKH as liaison officer fromAusland/Abwehrof OKW. At the same time he formed the main link between the circle of conspirators in theAbwehrand the anti-Hitler officers in OKH; he also worked closely with Weizsäcker’s liaison officer in OKH, Counsellor and Captain (Reserve) Dr Hasso von Etzdorf. On 20 October, writing in his office diary about attempts then under way to bring about a peace settlement through Swedish or Vatican intermediaries, he noted: ‘In all peace negotiations one is confronted by the categoric demand for the removal...

On 20 November Beck had submitted a further memorandum designed to win Brauchitsch over to the conspiracy.¹ He said that since the end of the Polish campaign the situation had changed greatly to Germany’s disadvantage. The victory over Poland had been nullified by Russia’s advance westwards; the anticipated Russian military support for Germany had not been forthcoming and Russia was merely pursuing her own interests; German methods of conducting war in Poland had had a devastating effect on world public opinion; relations between Germany on the one hand and Spain, Japan and Italy on the other had cooled visibly and...

Efforts to obtain assurances from abroad had been in progress ever since the Sudeten crisis of 1938 and they never entirely ceased until just before 20 July 1944. The probings of the Kordt brothers and Adam von Trott zu Solz, have already been referred to. Now, in the period when the western offensive was continually being postponed, efforts to this end were reintensified, though using very different methods.

On 4 January 1940 Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin had a talk with the Swedish Minister in Berlin and gave him a detailed picture of the internal German situation.¹ In addition he said that...

One of the earliest constitutional drafts came from the circle centred on Oster, Heinz and Liedig. It was produced in the summer of 1937 by Professor Friedrich Alfred SchmidNoerr.¹ Its centrepiece is the ‘community of the people’(Volksgemeinschaft)— ‘the community is above everything except the law of morality’. In the preamble aloneVolksgemeinschaftappears more than forty times, practically in every sentence. The community, the draft says, is linked to the European Christian tradition and aims at peaceful coexistence with all peoples. Freedom for all forms of belief and thought is guaranteed but only ‘in so far as it is...

A draft prepared in January and February 1940 by the former Ambassador, Ulrich von Hassell, after discussion with Beck, Goerdeler and Popitz, is not quite so radical as that of Professor SchmidNoerr but its basic ideas are similar.¹ Others contributed at least as much as Hassell – Professor Johannes Popitz, the Prussian Finance Minister, Dr Jens Peter Jessen, Professor of Political Science (who worked in the Army General Staff during the war) and Dr Erwin Planck, former State Secretary and then director of a steel firm.

The first point announced in Hassell’s ‘programme’ was the determination of the (new) German government...

A ‘Provisional Basic Law’ drafted primarily by Popitz and also originating about the turn of the year 1939-1940, followed somewhat similar lines.¹ According to this ‘the supreme law of action’ was to consist of the ‘rules of propriety and good morals’. In view of the appalling brutalization and the murderous perverted savagery of the Nazi regime, this was undoubtedly called for. But habits and ideas concerning what is ‘proper’ can change considerably. Who is to decide whether and when it is ‘proper’ to shoot a fugitive, to suppress an opposition campaign or marry a divorcee ? Would it be ‘proper’...

Goerdeler’s ideas are recorded in numerous memoranda and drafts. The two most important, ‘The Aim’ written late in 1941 and ‘Thoughts in the condemned cell – September 1944’ have been fully or partially published and at least parts of many others are in print.¹ Goerdeler has frequently been accused of being a reactionary. To some extent this results from the vehemence with which differing points of view were often argued between the various political tendencies in the opposition. In Goerdeler’s case the accusation is unjustified. Admittedly he, like Popitz, wished to avoid the pitfalls of mass democracy; he was concerned to...

As a result of numerous meetings and discussions a number of drafts were produced by the ‘Kreisau Circle’, the most important in July 1941, May and October 1942 and June 1943;¹ they must be regarded as having the same provisional character as those of Goerdeler and judged accordingly; they were even further removed from reality. Although the ‘Kreisau Circle’ was at one on a number of principles, these were so broadly stated that much was left in the air, primarily for the sake of agreement. The Circle was so named after Graf von Moltke’s estate where the group frequently met....

Constitutional drafts by socialists who were involved in the opposition to Hitler have not so far appeared. Perhaps this is due in part to a better understanding of conspiratorial principles. Moreover, Social-Democrats such as Dr Leber saw little value in joining the ranks of those who were busily manufacturing too many drafts and programmes as it was.¹ Social-Democrats had good reason to avoid political prominence in the first hours after acoup:after they had formed the Republic in 1918—19, and after they had been forced by an Entente ultimatum to sign the Versailles Treaty (while the nationalist opposition...

During the winter 1939—40 contacts with the enemy had either failed to materialize or had come to nothing; there had followed the victorious German offensives against Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. It had all been a great triumph and it would have been surprising had many been found in the summer of 1940 to lift their voices in favour of the removal of theFührerand Chancellor of the GermanReich.Yet the determined opponents of Hitler did not relax for a single moment. Moltke in particular did not swerve from his attitude or his views, even in face...

Among the German opposition too people were beginning to think that defeat was inevitable. Two months after the invasion of Russia it was generally thought by those in touch with Hassell, Popitz and Goerdeler that the enemy could now foresee the total overthrow of Germany and that not even ‘a decent government would still receive an acceptable peace’.¹ This, however, did not preclude further soundings regarding the truth of this statement and perhaps the possibilities of negotiation.

On 14 August 1941, from a British battleship in the north-east Atlantic, Churchill and Roosevelt proclaimed the Atlantic Charter, a general agreement on...

About the same time and also because of the obviously imminent entry of the United States into the war the opposition approached Louis P. Lochner, the press correspondent and head of the Associated Press Bureau in Berlin. Lochner had been in touch for years with Hermann Maass, ex-Director of theReichCommittee of German Youth Organizations, and with Colonel-General Beck. In August 1939 Maass had arranged through Beck to pass to Lochner a copy of Hitler’s speech of the 22nd. Lochner was present on occasions at secret meetings of the opposition.¹

In late September 1941 a preliminary talk took place...

Throughout the war numerous contacts existed between members and friends of the ‘Kreisau Circle’ on the one hand and neutral or Allied countries on the other. Only the most important can be dealt with here.¹

The entry of the United States into the war was a turning point which led to fresh thinking and renewed efforts in many quarters, including the ‘Kreisau Circle’. Trott, together with other members of the Circle, in particular Dr Hans Schönfeld’ and Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier who had worked with Trott in the Foreign Ministry in 1939 and 1940, drafted a memorandum which may be regarded...

Despite Allied refusals to deal with them the active members of the opposition continued their efforts even after Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on the formula of ‘Unconditional Surrender’ in Casablanca in January 1943.

In the same month Trott went to Switzerland, where he met Dulles through the good offices of Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz who was on Dulles’ staff. Trott tried to explain to Dulles how essential it was for the enemy to differentiate between Germans and Nazis if the resistance movement was to have any possibility of action.¹ People in the resistance movement began to feel that ‘the Anglo-Saxon...

Until the very last moment, only a few days before 20 July 1944 in fact, Trott was still pursuing his efforts to establish contacts and obtain assurances. As did a number of other members of the opposition from the ‘Kreisau Circle’ and their friends (Eugen Gerstenmaier for instance), Trott visited Sweden in the autumn of 1943 (27 October to 3 November) and in late October had an exhaustive discussion with Dr Ivar Anderson, editor of theSvenska Dagbladet.¹ The subject of their talk was the establishment of some contact with Allied diplomats. The opposition urgently needed outside help for their...

In autumn of 1939 Dr Hans Bernd Gisevius began his career as ‘diplomat’ of the opposition when he smuggled a letter from Dr Schacht to George Frazer, the banker and former president of the Bank for International Settlements, in Switzerland.¹ Gisevius also played a role in connection with the talks in Rome conducted by Dr Josef Müller in 193940.² At the instigation of Oster and Canaris, Gisevius was called up to serve in the Army, more precisely in theAmt Ausland/Abwehr, and in summer of 1940 he was installed in a counterintelligence post under theAbwehrin the German Consulate...

Until the final days preceding 20 July 1944 all possible contacts were kept open and some fresh ones created. As late as 15 July Dr Theodor Steltzer, a prominent member of the ‘Kreisau Circle’, passed a memorandum to Moltke’s British friends, Lionel Curtis in particular, giving the situation and views of the ‘Circle’; the object was to prevent the Allies taking ill-considered post-war measures.¹

In September 1943 Goerdeler told Hassell that he still had a line to Churchill through Jakob Wallenberg. He went on to say, however, that Churchill had passed word that London would ‘look with benevolent interest’ upon...

Since the Western Allies were turning a deaf ear to all attempts at contact and the situation in the East was becoming increasingly menacing, voices were to be heard both in Hitler’s entourage and among the opposition in support of a separate agreement between Germany and Russia. From the opposition point of view a factor in its favour was a declaration by Stalin in February 1942 when he differentiated between Hitler and his clique as transient figures on the one hand and the German people as a permanency on the other.¹

Quite apart from the removal of Hitler it was...

Dr Otto John was a lawyer, legal adviser to the GermanLufthansa. From prewar days he had been working with the opposition group inAmt Ausland/Abwehrand from February 1944 with Canaris’ successor Colonel Georg Hansen in particular. His brother Dr Hans John was scientific assistant to Dr Rüdiger Schleicher, a senior civil servant(Ministerialrat)in theReichMinistry of Aviation and Head of the Institute for Aeronautical Law in Berlin University.¹ In his position withLufthansaOtto John had been able to carry out intelligence missions for theAbwehrand he used both these and his position as cover...

As the war went on influential opposition circles came to realize that the removal of the dictator in person, his murder in other words, was an essential prerequisite to the success of any attemptedcoup. A sacred oath had been sworn to him; in strict legal terms and in the minds of the unthinking citizenry and soldiery, the majority in fact, he was the legally established warlord and Supreme Commander. Unless, therefore, its Supreme Commander were first removed, the Army could not be counted upon; yet it was the sole instrument with which acoupcould be carried out. The...

When General von Witzleben together with General Haider, the Chief of Staff of the Army, were planning the overthrow of Hitler in September 1938, the majority of the conspirators did not yet think it essential for the success of the project that Hitler should be killed immediately. A small number, however, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Oster and Major Heinz, agreed about 20 September that they would kill Hitler even without the agreement of the other conspirators.¹

It was proposed to adopt the following simple plan: While Berlin was occupied by troops of III Army Corps under Witzleben’s command, Witzleben himself and...

Not only Brauchitsch and Halder but also many other generals who had previously been in close touch with the opposition or had belonged to it, had increasingly taken refuge in strict military duty. They shut their eyes even to what they wereforcedto see and know — the daily shootings in hundreds, primarily in German-occupied Poland, of Jews, doctors, professors, writers, architects, engineers, librarians, teachers, communists and alleged partisans or gipsies. Colonel-General Blaskowitz’s courageous protest in late 1939 awoke no echoes; in the spring Brauchitsch and Halder accepted Hitler’s removal of the SS and Police units, in particular the so-called...

About the turn of the year 1942-43 something like a sense of catastrophe spread through Germany and in some cases to the front.¹ Stalingrad and the annihilation of Sixth Army were fearful blows, from which the German Army never recovered. At the same time the demand for ‘unconditional surrender’ was announced from Casablanca implying the abolition not only of the Nazi regime, which was more or less detested in any case, but of German sovereignty as a nation. The failure of the opposition’s attempts at contact abroad in the spring and summer of 1942 had made the Allied attitude clear;...

Henning von Tresckow continued his efforts with undiminished energy but he seemed to be tilting at windmills. He tried to influence Manstein, the Commander-in-Chief Army Group South (known as Army Group Don up to 14 February 1943),¹ but did not expect any ‘initiative’ from him.² In the winter of 1942—43 Beck had written to Manstein saying that the war could not be won and that something must be done, but Manstein had replied that a war was only lost if one considered it lost.³ Captain Kaiser noted in his diary on 6 April 1943, after a conversation with Tresckow,...

For some time the idea had been mooted that the Replacement Army should be used to take over power in Germany but all such projects had so far been checkmated because Colonel-General Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment and Commander-in-Chief Replacement Army, refused to cooperate.¹ A further obstacle was the highly involved chain of command governing military districts in Germany. The title of the local commander in Stuttgart, for instance, was: Commanding General Rear Headquarters V Army Corps and CommanderWehrkreisV. The first part of this indicated that as ‘Deputy’ Commander V Corps he commanded the static, replacement and training...

Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg was born in Jettingen on 15 November 1907; his family was Catholic and belonged to the ancient Swabian nobility. His father was a high-ranking official in the court of Württemberg and later became Marshal of the Court to King Wilhelm II of Würrtemberg. His mother, nee Grafin von Üxkiill, was a great-granddaughter of Gneisenau and a considerable personality in her own right. The castle named Stauffenberg near Hechingen can be traced back to 1262. The brothers Berthold Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and his twin Alexander were two years older; Berthold was later closely involved in...

On 1 October 1943 Stauffenberg assumed duty as Chief of Staff to the AHA, Berlin, under General Olbricht. Working unofficially during the summer, he had briefed himself on the ‘Valkyrie’ plans; he was familiar with the subject, having written a prize-winning article ‘Thoughts on Home Defence against Enemy Parachute Troops’ which probably had some influence on his planning.¹ Shortly after Stauffenberg had officially assumed duty Colonel von Tresckow had to take over a regiment, which more or less divorced him from the centre of the conspiracy. Stauffenberg now applied himself to the creation of conditions for initiation of ‘Valkyrie’, in...

March, April and May 1944 were comparatively ‘quiet’ months for the conspiracy since no real opportunity for an assassination attempt presented itself. They were more than fully occupied, however, with all sorts of other endeavours and preparations. The conspirators were patriotic Germans and very good soldiers; they had no wish to damage their country or its Army; their object was to save both from ruin. They therefore took their official duties most seriously and did their utmost to fulfil them. They could only discuss or deal with plans for thecoupin greater or less haste, during short momentary intervals...

Even since the opposition had seriously considered killing Hitler in his headquarters or, as the phrase was, ‘cordoning off’ the headquarters, much thought had been given to the technical signals problem of cutting the headquarters off from the outside world. If Hitler was only to be arrested there was no hope of success unless it could be so cut off; he would have been able personally to issue counter-orders and make speeches; hardly anyone would have listened to the conspirators. Even if Hitler were dead, however, his remaining entourage might create many difficulties. Keitel, Jodl and Donitz in particular were...

A word must now be said about the final preparations in the field of internal politics. Here non-military personalities and groups dominated the scene and the differentiation between the civilian side of the opposition and the special interests of the military is quite clear. Since the first few hours of thecoupwere inevitably governed by the military action and the revolt never progressed beyond this stage, the next part of this book necessarily deals primarily with soldiers and their activities; nevertheless the decisive, fundamental importance of the civilian element in the opposition must not be forgotten. In the preparatory...

The decision to attempt assassination did not come easily to Stauffenberg, but he reasoned more logically than those who wanted acoupand the murder of Hitler as its essential condition but could not bring themselves to do anything about it. At the latest by the beginning of 1943 he was clear in his mind that acoupmust be preceded by the murder of Hitler.¹ Once decided that assassination was the prerequisite for everything else, the question whether he should do it himself or not was no longer a matter of primary importance. For him, the decision in favour...

About 7.0 a.m. on 20 July Corporal Schweizer drove his master, Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, with his brother Berthold to Rangsdorf airfield.¹ On the 19th, after receiving his summons to headquarters, Stauffenberg had contacted General Eduard Wagner, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, and he had made available a Heinkel ‘He 111’ for the return flight.² On the outward flight Stauffenberg presumably used the normal courier aircraft, a Junkers ‘Ju 52’.³ Stauffenberg’s aide, Lieutenant von Haeften, was waiting at the airfield; he and Stauffenberg got in and Schweizer placed the briefcase containing the bomb near his master...

Shortly after 1 p.m. the knowledge was available in the Bendlerstrasse that the attack on Hitler had been made. But apparently only two of the conspirators possessed this knowledge, Lieutenant-General Thiele and General Olbricht, and both remained inactive for the time being. The measures prepared and partially rehearsed on 15 July should have been set in motion immediately, but nothing was done.¹

The principal reason for this inactivity was, of course, the failure of the assassination attempt. Obviously, this had been considered most unlikely. The thinking must have been: either there is no explosion and then there will not be...

As in Berlin andWehrkreisIII, in the majority of the otherWehrkreisethe first measures connected with thecoupwere taken not so much in ignorance of the failure of the assassination attempt as in spite of it and despite receipt of orders to the contrary from the Führer’s headquarters. The conspirators did not realize that, from 4.0 p.m., most of their teleprinter messages were not only going toWehrkreis headquartersbut were also being routed through ‘Wolfschanze’.¹ His telephone conversation with Fromm told Field Marshal Keitel what was brewing in the Bendlerstrasse, even if he had not already...

Special conditions obtained in three areas in which the 20 July resistance movement was more successful than in the majority ofWehrkreise.In Prague the German troops were in the midst of a hostile Czech population; the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was increasingly becoming a combat zone infested by partisans. Here the position of allWehrmachtand SS units was so precarious that they could not give even the slightest sign of disunity or weakness. It was hardly to be expected, therefore, that the orders issued from Berlin on 20 July would be carried out and yet in large...

Shortly before 4.0 p.m. the conspirators in the Bendlerstrasse, Berlin, had started to issue the ‘Valkyrie’ codeword to the Army schools in and around Berlin. The first orders had reached the Berlin Guard Battalion by 4.10 p.m. Teleprinter messages to theWehrkreiseand Military Commanders in the occupied territories were being despatched from the signal centre from 4.45 p.m. Stauffenberg had arrived back in the Bendlerstrasse between 4.0 and 5.0 p.m. and since then had worked indefatigably, answering the numerous questions from theWehrkreiseand insisting that the orders be carried out. Beck, Hoepner, Schulenburg, Gisevius, John, Gerstenmaier, Yorck and...

Colonel-General Fromm first declared that the leaders of the attempted revolt — Colonel-General Beck, Colonel-General Hoepner, General Olbricht, Colonel Graf von Stauffenberg, Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim and Lieutenant von Haeften — were under arrest and demanded that they hand over their weapons. The others present he constituted as a court martial. Colonel-General Beck asked to be allowed to keep his pistol ‘for private use’ and Fromm allowed him this but told him to hurry.¹ Beck raised his gun and tried to say a few words to Fromm about their long years of military service together but Fromm interrupted him brusquely and again...

At the same time as Beck, Hoepner, Stauffenberg, Olbricht, Mertz and Haeften a number of other officers and civilians were detained: Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, Graf von der Schulenburg, Graf Schwerin von Schwanenfeld, Berthold Graf von Stauffenberg, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernardis, Lieutenant-Colonel von der Lancken, Olbricht’s aide (who was not in the secret and not involved) Captain Barnim von Ramin, and Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier.

Dr Otto John, without knowing it, narrowly escaped arrest and was able to disappear to Madrid on 24 July on a Lufthansa plane.¹ Major (Luftwaffe) Friedrich Georgi, Olbricht’s son-in-law, was able to leave the building after it had...

The ‘People’s Court’ was set up in 1934 to give practical expression to the ‘sound sense of the people’ (gesundes Volksempfinden) against enemies of ‘the community’(Volksgemeinschaft).¹ In fact every aspect of it was dubious: the stated intention; the assumption that the sense of the people was indeed sound and that the court’s sentences would reflect this ‘sense’; the claim that those brought before it, even if found ‘guilty’, were in fact enemies of the ‘community’. The truth was that from the outset the People’s Court was intended as an instrument of political domination by the Nazi government, an instrument...