Subjective Time

Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality

Valtteri Arstila
Dan Lloyd
Copyright Date: 2014
Published by: MIT Press
Pages: 688
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  • Book Info
    Subjective Time
    Book Description:

    Our awareness of time and temporal properties is a constant feature of conscious life. Subjective temporality structures and guides every aspect of behavior and cognition, distinguishing memory, perception, and anticipation. This milestone volume brings together research on temporality from leading scholars in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, defining a new field of interdisciplinary research. The book's thirty chapters include selections from classic texts by William James and Edmund Husserl and new essays setting them in historical context; contemporary philosophical accounts of lived time; and current empirical studies of psychological time. These last chapters, the larger part of the book, cover such topics as the basic psychophysics of psychological time, its neural foundations, its interaction with the body, and its distortion in illness and altered states of consciousness.ContributorsMelissa J. Allman, Holly Andersen, Valtteri Arstila, Yan Bao, Dean V. Buonomano, Niko A. Busch, Barry Dainton, Sylvie Droit-Volet, Christine M. Falter, Thomas Fraps, Shaun Gallagher, Alex O. Holcombe, Edmund Husserl, William James, Piotr Jaskowski, Jeremie Jozefowiez, Ryota Kanai, Allison N. Kurti, Dan Lloyd, Armando Machado, Matthew S. Matell, Warren H. Meck, James Mensch, Bruno Mölder, Catharine Montgomery, Konstantinos Moutoussis, Peter Naish, Valdas Noreika, Sukhvinder S. Obhi, Ruth Ogden, Alan o'Donoghue, Georgios Papadelis, Ian B. Phillips, Ernst Pöppel, John E. R. Staddon, Dale N. Swanton, Rufin VanRullen, Argiro Vatakis, Till M. Wagner, John Wearden, Marc Wittmann, Agnieszka Wykowska, Kielan Yarrow, Bin Yin, Dan Zahavi

    eISBN: 978-0-262-32274-4
    Subjects: Philosophy

Table of Contents

  1. Front Matter
    (pp. i-iv)
  2. Table of Contents
    (pp. v-viii)
  3. Preface
    (pp. ix-xii)
  4. Acknowledgments
    (pp. xiii-xiv)
  5. Contributors
    (pp. xv-xviii)
  6. Part I Historical Sources
    • [I Introduction]
      (pp. 1-2)

      Time has been a perennial issue for philosophy. It held center stage before Socrates, as the first Western “natural philosophers” grappled with the origin of all things—already a question of transformation, from chaotic beginnings to the present world they observed. Thus change, and the interchange of one and many, perplexed them, leading to debates among opposing philosophers and their schools over the meaning and possibility of motion and change, generating puzzles like Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. Plato and Aristotle both considered time explicitly, but as with the pre-Socratics, their concern was metaphysical. Philosophy takes a turn toward subjective time...

    • 1 Excerpts from The Principles of Psychology
      (pp. 3-24)
      William James

      [p. v] … Every natural science assumes certain [p. vi] data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements between which its own ‘laws’ obtain, and from which its own deductions are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1)thoughts and feelings, and (2)a physical worldin time and space with which they coexist and which (3)they know. Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book. This book, assuming that thoughts and...

    • 2 The Development of the “Specious Present” and James’s Views on Temporal Experience
      (pp. 25-42)
      Holly Andersen

      The term “specious present” was introduced to philosophy and psychology by William James in his influentialPrinciples of Psychology(1890). The specious present doctrine, as it is often referred to, is the view that we experience the present moment as nonpunctate, as having some short but nonzero duration. It can be illustrated by comparing our experience of the now or present moment with the way the present is represented on a timeline. Mathematically or physically, the present can be represented by a single point on a timeline separating past from future, moving along the line from the past toward the...

    • 3 A Brief Account of Husserl’s Conception of Our Consciousness of Time
      (pp. 43-60)
      James Mensch

      Husserl’s texts on time consciousness are among the most difficult he penned. He devoted only a single published monograph,The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness,to the subject.¹ The editing of this text is largely the work of Edith Stein, who compiled it in 1917 from earlier lectures and notes, her task being complicated by the fact that Husserl revised this material even as she worked on it.² For the rest, Husserl’s manuscripts on time-consciousness remained unpublished until the beginning of this century. The two chief sources of this material areDie Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitkonstitution(1917/18), which Rudolf and...

    • 4 The Structure of Lived Time
      (pp. 61-74)
      Edmund Husserl

      We should start by making a few general remarks with regard to a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness. As with all such analyses, this involves the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation, and conviction with regard to objective time (with regard to all transcendent presuppositions about existents). Objectively speaking, every experience, like every real being and moment of being, may have its position in a single objective time. The same holds for the experience of perceiving and presenting time to oneself. It may be interesting to determine the objective time of an experience, including the experience that constitutes time. It might...

  7. Part II Contemporary Philosophies of Lived Time
    • [II Introduction]
      (pp. 75-82)

      How long is “now”? In the tradition of James and Husserl, philosophers examine subjective time through the phenomenological analysis of the experience of temporality. Whether “continental” or “analytic” in philosophical flavor, these analyses acknowledge from the outset that the awareness of time raises special questions. The “now” of awareness seems to contain an immediate consciousness of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, duration, sequence, and order. While the instant is “thin,” its accompanying consciousness is temporally thick, seeming to involve events that cannot cohabit a single moment. The philosophical project is to identify what is necessary and fundamental for thick...

    • 5 Primal Impression and Enactive Perception
      (pp. 83-100)
      Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi

      Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently argued that perception is enactive (e.g., Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991; Noë, 2004; Di Paolo, 2009).¹ To put it simply, perception is action-oriented. When I perceive something, I perceive it as actionable. That is, I perceive it as somethingI canreach, or not; somethingI canpick up, or not; somethingI canhammer with, or not, and so forth. Such affordances (Gibson, 1977, 1979) for potential actions (even if I am not planning to take action) shape the way that I actually perceive the world. One can find the roots of this...

    • 6 The Phenomenal Continuum
      (pp. 101-138)
      Barry Dainton

      Think of what it is like to see and hear a large firework rocket go off. Shortly after ignition, one hears thewhoooshas the rocket streaks into the night sky, and a few moments later the loud BANG as it erupts into a rapidly expanding shell of glittering, colored sparks. Change, succession and persistence seem to be vividly and immediately present in our sensory experience in cases such as these. Wehearthe rocket’s whoosh andseethe resulting light-trails spread across the sky (whose ongoing enduringblacknesswe also see: persistence can feature in our immediate experience too)....

    • 7 The Temporal Structure of Experience
      (pp. 139-158)
      Ian Phillips

      This chapter defends a naïve view of the relation between the temporal structure of the objects of experience, and the temporal structure of experience itself. According to the naïve view, when all goes well, your stream of consciousness inherits the temporal structure of the events that are its contents. You “take in” the temporal structure of the events you witness in witnessing them. As a result, the temporal structure of experience matches the temporal structure of its objects. In cases of illusion, it is as if this is so. Thus, in every case, the temporal structure of experience matches the...

  8. Part III Choppy Streams of Consciousness
    • [III Introduction]
      (pp. 159-160)

      “When I’m looking at the car first, it seems far away. But then, when I want to cross the road, suddenly the car is very near.” Thus reports patient LM, a sufferer of akinetopsia, or motion blindness (Zihl, Von Cramon, & Mai, 1983,315). According to Zihl et al., LM “had difficulty, for example, in pouring tea or coffee into a cup because the fluid appeared to be frozen, like a glacier. In addition, she could not stop pouring at the right time since she was unable to perceive the movement in the cup (or a pot) when the fluid rose”...

    • 8 Is Visual Perception Like a Continuous Flow or a Series of Snapshots?
      (pp. 161-178)
      Niko A. Busch and Rufin VanRullen

      While there is virtually no debate over the fact that the world exists continuously and that movie cameras and many other technical devices operate in a discrete fashion, there is an old and still-ongoing debate regarding whether the world is represented in a continuous or a discrete fashion in the human mind. Moreover, the notions of what it means to say that the mind represents the world in a (dis)continuous fashion have changed over previous decades. Before we begin to discuss historical and contemporary accounts of the issue of continuous versus discrete perception, it will be useful to offer a...

    • 9 Are There Cracks in the Facade of Continuous Visual Experience?
      (pp. 179-198)
      Alex O. Holcombe

      In a bowling alley, a professional player launches his ball down the lane. As the ball rolls toward the pins, our visual experience of it is smooth and seamless. The ball shifts in position continuously, and this seems to be represented with high fidelity by our brain. There are no subjective gaps, no stutter, and no noticeable blur.

      One might assume that, in every instant, the brain simply processes the retinal input through various feature and shape detectors, with the results becoming available to awareness, millisecond by millisecond. This picture of a continuous system, with information continually ascending the system...

  9. Part IV Fragments of Time
    • [IV Introduction]
      (pp. 199-200)

      The wagon wheel illusion (as it appears in continuous lighting, away from the silver screen) seemed at first to support the idea that perception is a stream of cinematic snapshots. The EEG studies of Busch and VanRullen (chapter 8) point at least to oscillations in sensitivity in perception—to be perceived, it helps to catch the nearest alpha wave. This periodicity could create a wagon wheel illusion when the rhythms of the moving stimuli are just right. Holcombe’s (chapter 9) discussion, however, reminds us that perceived motion is a joint production of many processes, each of which can be fooled...

    • 10 Perceptual Asynchrony in Vision
      (pp. 201-216)
      Konstantinos Moutoussis

      Studies of the visual system in both monkey and human have suggested a picture of functional specialization with respect to the processing of different visual attributes (Zeki, 1993 ). Such a specialization makes sense, since the computational procedures for the processing of, say, color are quite different from those necessary for the processing of, say, motion: the motion-specialized system needs to calculate the way in which an object changes position in space over time, whereas the job of the color-specialized system is to compare the light composition reflected from different objects and thus calculate their color, discarding any changes in...

    • 11 Constructing Time: Dennett and Grush on Temporal Representation
      (pp. 217-238)
      Bruno Mölder

      Incorporating the role of time is necessary for those theories that attempt to explain our conscious experience as well as for theories about the information processing that underpins experience. This chapter focuses on two models that have taken temporal properties, both at the level of experience and at the level of information processing, under special consideration. It is common to these models that they elaborate the constructivist view that temporal content results from constructive processing in the brain. The chapter attempts no more than outlining and explaining these models, as well as defending them against some common criticisms. The first...

  10. Part V Subjective Times and Lived Time
    • [V Introduction]
      (pp. 239-240)

      From lived time in the first two sections, this volume has turned toward laboratory time—that is, the perception of changes in artificial and sometimes unnatural environments—to reveal the ongoing construction of temporal perception and judgment. In style and nomenclature, phenomenology feels remote from the language of psychological experiment. But as John Wearden, Alan O’Donoghue, Ruth Ogden, and Catharine Montgomery point out in chapter 14, the button presses and verbal reports of laboratory volunteers are no less subjective than the musings of Proust. Laboratory behaviors are conscious productions, not automatic reflexes, and are thus “primary phenomenology,” or more or...

    • 12 Temporal Windows as a Bridge from Objective to Subjective Time
      (pp. 241-262)
      Ernst Pöppel and Yan Bao

      What is the present? Is it the border with no temporal extension between past and future? Or is the present a temporal interval with some duration that can be measured? If the present has only one meaning, both answers cannot be true. But has the “present” just one meaning? This is only one question if one deals with subjective time and how it relates to objective time. And there are many more; time in general and subjective time in particular appear like an unexplored landscape. Here are more questions—to question the self-evident:

      Why do we separate time in three...

    • 13 Time and Magic—Manipulating Subjective Temporality
      (pp. 263-286)
      Thomas Fraps

      The interest of scientists in examining the psychological, perceptual, and cognitive methods developed by magicians can be traced back over a hundred years (Binet, 1894; Jastrow, 1897; Triplett, 1900), predating a now-classic essay on the theory of magic written by two of the most influential magicians of that era (Maskelyne & Devant, 1911), who already acknowledged a possible connection between the art of magic and science.

      Recently there has been renewed and increased interest in the scientific examination of the methods employed by magicians to achieve their apparently impossible feats and illusions (e.g., Parris et al., 2009; Kuhn, Amlani, &...

    • 14 Subjective Duration in the Laboratory and the World Outside
      (pp. 287-306)
      John Wearden, Alan O’Donoghue, Ruth Ogden and Catharine Montgomery

      This chapter deals with the topic ofsubjective duration, defined as judgments of various sorts about how long stimuli and events last, or judgments about how fast time seems to pass. Studies of subjective duration have formed the major part of the study of time perception by psychologists (see Fraisse, 1964, for example), although duration judgments are only part of the broader psychology of time, encompassing as it does such things as judgments of temporal order, as well as the study of rhythm perception and production.

      The literature on the perception of duration is far too voluminous to be reviewed...

  11. Part VI Intersections:: Timeless Philosophy and Timely Experiment
    • 15 Subjective Time: From Past to Future
      (pp. 309-322)
      Valtteri Arstila and Dan Lloyd

      It is natural to think of passing time as a kind of motion. But in this metaphor, what moves and what does not? With respect to the river of time, do you stand on the bank and watch time flow by? Or are you floating in the river, flowing along with time as it passes by the landscape? In the chapters preceding, we saw a distinction in metaphorical framework that deepens the rift between retentionalism, extensionalism, and cinematism. Interpretation one: the objects of perception move past a fixed Now. (You stand on the riverbank of the stream of time.) For...

  12. Part VII Off the Clock
    • [VII Introduction]
      (pp. 323-328)

      If we had an organ for sensing time, how would it work? The phenomenology and psychology of time lead naturally to this question, the theme of the second half ofSubjective Time.In physical (and metaphysical) terms, Time may be simple, a dimension among others. But the previous chapters confirm that subjective time is far from simple. Our lived experience of time has an intricate structure, and its phenomenology is distinct from its psychology. Our immediate experience of the present moment is laden with an awareness of the past and an anticipation of the future, neither of which could be directly...

    • 16 The Neural Mechanisms of Timing on Short Timescales
      (pp. 329-342)
      Dean V. Buonomano

      In modern society, our lives are dependent on the technological innovations that have allowed us to keep track of time—from the nanosecond accuracy of the atomic clocks used for global-positioning systems to the clocking of our yearly trip around the sun. In between these extremes we track the minutes and hours that govern our activities. We rely daily on the technological innovations that have allowed us to accurately tell time over scales that span fifteen orders of magnitude.

      In nature, animals also keep track of time over an equally impressive range of scales: from tens of microseconds, necessary for...

    • 17 Illusory Distortion of Subjective Time Perception
      (pp. 343-354)
      Ryota Kanai

      Our conscious experience is remarkably diverse, including as it does experiences ranging from seeing the marvelous red and orange colors of a sunset to the unpleasant feeling of pain that makes you moan. The experience of the passage of time constitutes an essential dimension common across diverse forms of conscious experience, since subjective experience of any event—both internal events like thought and external events of the world—necessarily endures and unfolds through time.

      The passage of time can be introspected to gauge how long our experience lasts. Such capacity to process temporal information in sensory events is essential for...

    • 18 Cognitive versus Associative Decision Rules in Timing
      (pp. 355-376)
      J. Jozefowiez, A. Machado and J. E. R. Staddon

      Though assisted by constructed clocks and calendars, our sense of time is actually deeply rooted in biological mechanisms we share with all other animal species (Lejeune & Wearden, 1991). Our understanding of these mechanisms has been much advanced by operant-conditioning experiments with humans and (infrahuman) animals. In these experiments, an operant response, such as key-pecking or button-pushing, is reinforced or not depending on the time elapsed since a specific stimulus (a so-calledtime marker¹).

      In a fixed-interval (FI) schedule, for instance, a response is reinforced only after a certain, fixed amount of time has elapsed since the time marker (Skinner,...

  13. Part VIII What and When
    • [VIII Introduction]
      (pp. 377-378)

      Perception is embodied, as many of the previous chapters emphasize. What we sense is interwoven with how we sense it, a function of moving organs and limbs in a dynamical dance with shifting environments. The authors of the previous section considered action governed by prospective timing, where an animal needs to wait before it acts. In this section we turn from action to perception. Perception is often depicted as a synchronous process of information coordination. The pen in my grasp is one object, built out of haptic aspects of weight, solidity, and felt shape, mixed in with glimpses of color...

    • 19 What Determines Simultaneity and Order Perception?
      (pp. 379-408)
      Piotr Jaśkowski

      All physical objects in the universe are embedded in three-dimensional space, and all physical events are immersed in time. Therefore, to properly act, human beings evolved abilities to orient in space and to put events in temporal order. It seems quite easy to say that an event occurred earlier than another one. However, this task becomes more difficult when the events occur very close in time to the other. It is rather obvious that in judging the order of two events the human mind has to rely on some brain events evoked by the external stimuli. It is, therefore, at...

    • 20 The Research on Audiovisual Perception of Temporal Order and the Processing of Musical Temporal Patterns: Associations, Pitfalls, and Future Directions
      (pp. 409-430)
      Argiro Vatakis and Georgios Papadelis

      Almost all everyday acts are governed by time. Acts such as walking and speaking are often taken for granted and are considered easy to execute and understand. These acts, however, are not nearly as easy as they appear to be. They are in fact highly complex acts that unfold over time and require attending and perceiving the temporal order of the individual units of each single act. Temporal perception (in terms of temporal synchrony) is also essential (along with space and semantic congruency) in multisensory integration in determining whether the observer will experience a unified audiovisual event or two separate...

    • 21 On the Flexibility of Human Temporal Resolution
      (pp. 431-452)
      Agnieszka Wykowska and Valtteri Arstila

      Our ability to efficiently interact with the environment is to a large extent dependent on how exact we are in perceiving the world’s temporal properties. Imagine a situation in which one is to cross a busy street. Such an environment requires a temporal resolution down to the milliseconds range to be able to estimate the speed of an approaching car and its distance relative to one’s position. The same holds for, say, a soccer player, who needs not only to estimate the speed of the to-be-kicked ball but also the speed of the player who is supposed to receive the...

  14. Part IX Action and Passion
    • [IX Introduction]
      (pp. 453-454)

      “Here” and “now” are fantastically elastic concepts. Here I am, in our local arm of the Milky Way. But I’m just as much here in front of the computer. My Now can be broadly construed as the current geological epoch (as opposed to Then, the Age of Dinosaurs), or zoomed to the instantaneous Now of approximately 10:13:24 a.m. “I” sit comfortably in heres of all sizes, from the cosmic to the intimate, and the zoom from the cosmic here to the local is a smooth one. Except at close quarters, where we might ask, Where, exactly, is my personal “here”?...

    • 22 Temporal Perception in the Context of Action
      (pp. 455-476)
      Kielan Yarrow and Sukhvinder S. Obhi

      We do not usually experience the world as passive recipients of sensory information. Instead, we explore our environment through action. For senses like sight and touch, a framework exists to explain how we can interpret and predict the consequences of our own actions. In order to accurately distinguish sensory events arising in the environment from the sensations we ourselves generate, we make use of an efferent copy of our motor command(s) to generate predictions (Sperry, 1950; von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). In this chapter, we will offer a selective review of studies investigating how our sense oftimeis affected...

    • 23 What Emotions Tell Us about Time
      (pp. 477-506)
      Sylvie Droit-Volet

      When we compare the episodes of our everyday lives experienced in different emotional states, we have the strange impression that time is either sped up or slowed down. While time seems like an eternity when waiting for someone we love, it suddenly seems to fly when the loved one arrives. Time no longer exists! Initially, the study of our feeling of time was the preserve of writers and philosophers. Based in part on anecdotal reports, some philosophers have considered that time does not exist independently of our internal representations. Kant (1787) claimed that time is an a priori representation that...

    • 24 Embodied Time: The Experience of Time, the Body, and the Self
      (pp. 507-524)
      Marc Wittmann

      Daily rhythms of many biological and psychological functions are controlled by an endogenous biological clock with a period of approximately 24 h (Roenneberg, Daan, & Merrow,2003). Circadian clocks, which are entrained by light, regulate physiology and behavior over the course of the day and enable an organism to anticipate and prepare for regular environmental changes. Circadian physiological rhythms define time units of a day that are biologically determined and have an impact on human experience and behavior (Wittmann et al., 2006a). Notably, the circadian clock seems to be related to human time perception for intervals in the hours range. Whereas...

  15. Part X Altered Times
    • [X Introduction]
      (pp. 525-528)

      As the preceding chapters have made evident, in many settings humans are inept timers. One might suppose that our collective defects are momentary, acute episodes, hiccups in the flow of subjective time. Perhaps our misapprehensions are each fairly quickly corrected by some combination of internal and external cues. In contrast, the chapters in this section consider chronic time distortions of several types. Valdas Noreika, Christine Falter, and Till Wagner begin with a survey of duration distortions arising in natural contexts (e.g., time of day, or time of menstrual cycle), in different stimulus environments, in altered states of consciousness (hypnosis and...

    • 25 Variability of Duration Perception: From Natural and Induced Alterations to Psychiatric Disorders
      (pp. 529-556)
      Valdas Noreika, Christine M. Falter and Till M. Wagner

      In an early paper on the experience of time in mental disorders, Lewis (1932, 617–618) provided a number of subjective reports of unusual temporal distortions collected from psychiatric patients, such as that by an individual suffering from “involutional melancholia”¹:

      I can’t estimate time. I can’t say what time it is because it’s an artificial day; what you call a day with the artificial day is very much shorter than the ordinary day. The time goes very much quicker ... I noticed my watch was accelerated. ... What I mean is this; since we had breakfast this morning, according to...

    • 26 Time Processing in Developmental Disorders: A Comparative View
      (pp. 557-598)
      Christine M. Falter and Valdas Noreika

      Developmental disorders typically manifest themselves during infancy or childhood. In contrast to disorders acquired in adulthood, disorders with an onset early in development can lead to further cascading effects on brain functions that are not primarily affected by influencing the pace and direction of developmental trajectories. Dysfunctions associated with developmental disorders are not confined to the specific diagnostic features as set out in the diagnostic classification systems (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000; ICD-10, WHO, 1993). Secondary dysfunctions in general domains such as impaired perception, cognition, or motor processing are common. This chapter will be concerned with the role of secondary dysfunctions in...

    • 27 The Potential Link between Temporal Averaging and Drug-Taking Behavior
      (pp. 599-620)
      Allison N. Kurti, Dale N. Swanton and Matthew S. Matell

      The capacity to perceive time in the seconds to minutes range, or interval timing, allows organisms to develop temporal expectations about when significant events should occur, therein promoting the efficient organization of behavior. However, disruptions in temporal perception, such as those that have been seen following drug use, for example amphetamine (Eckerman et al., 1987), methamphetamine (Maricq, Roberts, & Church, 1981; Matell, Bateson, & Meck, 2006), cocaine (Matell, King, & Meck, 2004), marijuana (Mathew et al., 1998), MDMA (Frederick & Paule, 1997), and other drugs of abuse (Paule et al., 1999), can have dramatic impacts on the temporal organization of...

    • 28 The Perception of Time in Hypnosis
      (pp. 621-636)
      Peter Naish

      It would be understandable for a reader to wonder why, out of all the situations that might reasonably have an influence upon time perception, something as esoteric as hypnosis has been chosen as a topic. As might be guessed, it is because hypnosis has a rather special impact upon temporal judgment, and trying to discover why has the potential to add to our understanding of both hypnosis and time perception.

      It has been recognized for a long time (Bowers & Brenneman, 1979) that when people are roused from a session of hypnosis and asked how long they believe it lasted,...

    • 29 Time in the Psychopathological Mind
      (pp. 637-654)
      Melissa J. Allman, Bin Yin and Warren H. Meck

      What does “time” mean to you? Think about the Grand Canyon for a moment: try to imagine millions of years of erosion by the Colorado River, revealing billions of years of the Earth’s geological history. It’s hard to imagine all of thattime.Time itself can bestow historical beauty and appeal, and like other aspects of psychophysics and perception, controls much of our interactions with events in our internal and external lives. We typically think about the consequences of our actions in hypothetical time, and these temporal dynamics influence our valuations of future rewards and past experience. It’s as if...

  16. Part XI Reflections
    • 30 The Disunity of Time
      (pp. 657-664)
      Dan Lloyd and Valtteri Arstila

      In our mundane terrestrial pursuits, local clocks unite to give the one and only current time, fixing orders and intervals. Since physics follows the clock, we are obliged to be aware of time and timing in order to act effectively and perceive accurately in the real world. Our sensitivities to orders and intervals fall under the general concept of subjective time. In its primary meaning, subjective time is theexperienceof temporality, the phenomenology of duration and passage explored in the first two sections of these volumes. But time is nonetheless experienced in the experiments surveyed in the remaining sections....

  17. Index
    (pp. 665-668)