“The guiding principle of mid-twentieth century federalism,” writes A. H. Birch, “is the need for co-operation.”¹ Given the demands and complexities of modern government, it is no longer possible for either level government in a federation to operate in hermetically sealed jurisdictions. For this reason, and also because Canada’s constitution as judicially interpreted has made it difficult to reallocate legislative and financial jurisdictions in order to reflect changing circumstances, “cooperative federalism” has increasingly shaped Canada’s federal-provincial relations for the past thirty years.² Cooperative federalism essentially means the use of federal-provincial agreements to permit cooperation coordination between the two levels of...

On the face of it, one may well be tempted to argue that when it comes political-administrative institutions what is true at the federal level is also true at the provincial level, and that a joint planning approach to federal-provincial relations would be well suited or at least compatible with these institutions. Apart from the fact that provincial legislative assemblies do not have an upper chamber as does the national Parliament, parliamentary practices and procedures at the federal and provincial levels are similar in that they are both deeply rooted in British traditions. Moreover, in line with British governmental forms,...

By 1971–72, it became apparent that DREE would have to introduce some far reaching changes in its approach to federal-provincial relations in its attempt to alleviate regional economic disparities. All provincial governments were by then demanding more consultations with DREE, not only in matters relating to implementation, but also in formulating new programs.

Moreover, in the 1972 general election, the federal Liberal party saw its parliamentary majority reduced to an almost untenable minority position with the party losing over thirty seats in English Canada and suffering some humiliating defeats in traditionally safe Liberal seats. During the election campaign—with...

Between June 24, 1974, and June 23, 1977, fifteen subsidiary agreements the Canada-New Brunswick GDA involving some 373 million dollars were signed. The terms “first generation” and “second generation” of subsidiary agreements are frequently employed to separate agreements whose programs and projects were developed before (or during) the introduction of the GDA approach in New Brunswick from those developed subsequent to its signing. No universally accepted date separating two generations exists, but for the purpose of this study it is proposed all agreements signed on or before February 17, 1975, constitute the first, and that those signed after this date,...

Second generation subsidiary agreements were to differ from first generation ones in that they would adhere more judiciously to the GDA’s original intent and design. For one thing, more emphasis would be put on the process of jointly identifying “development opportunities” and less on continuing or extending programs first initiated before the introduction of the GDA approach. For another, with DREE’s decentralized organization more firmly in place, provincial DREE offices would now be expected to follow more dutifully the established procedures for developing subsidiary agreements and for consulting other federal departments.

In developing the GDA approach, DREE officials contended that...

In analysing a new approach to federal-provincial decision making, one would not ordinarily place much emphasis on its implementation, mainly because policies and programs are often formulated in such a fashion that “implementors” are directed by established and clearly defined limits—this is particularly true with regard to intergovernmental programs in Canada. Officials overseeing the implementation of a typical non-GDA federal-provincial program may at times disagree on what constitutes legitimate cost, but more often they concern themselves with monitoring such things as the flow of cash to ensure that the estimated expenditure is exceeded. Canada’s medical insurance provides such an...

Although this study has examined in considerable detail the formulation and implementation of subsidiary agreements, several important questions either remain unanswered or need further elaboration. These will be investigated in the present chapter and include: Who are the principal actors in the GDA formulation process? How do officials from both levels of government relate to each other under the GDA approach? What are the procedures for approving subsidiary agreements at each level of government and how closely are they followed? How do politicians and officials relate under the GDA approach?

It is worth outlining again briefly how the GDA formulation...

The foregoing case study has sought to demonstrate how the GDA approach operates and to underline its importance. It now remains to assess how it conforms or adapts to Canada’s principal political-administrative institutions. What implications does the GDA approach have for such political institutions as Parliament and the provincial Legislative Assembly? What are the consequences of the GDA approach for the traditional working patterns of the federal bureaucracy and for the federal government’s relations with the provinces? What does the case study tell us about the impact of the GDA approach on decision making at the provincial level?

Though it...

What implications does the GDA approach have for federal-provincial relations? How does it relate to the constitutional division of responsibility? What advantages and drawbacks does it hold for Canada’s political system? More generally, what can we conclude about the GDA approach? In answering these questions, this concluding chapter will assess the GDA approach in the context of contemporary Canadian federalism.

Even by contemporary standards, the GDA approach and the decentralization of DREE have significantly altered the pattern of federal-provincial relations in the field of economic development—a field recently described as representing “an important leading edge of federal activity.”¹ For...