Saul Kripke's work has had a tremendous impact on philosophy in the last thirty years and continues to dominate key debates in the field. In the first introduction to his philosophy written expressly for general students, G.W. Fitch provides a thorough exposition of Kripke's ideas. Beginning with a discussion of the early work on modal logic, the foundation for many of his later philosophical contributions, Fitch also examines the central ideas and arguments in Naming and Necessity, including Kripke's account of ordinary proper names, theories of reference, the conception of necessity, and the nature of identity. He goes on to discuss Kripke's views on theoretical identifications, the puzzle of belief, and his argument against materialism as well as outlining his work on semantic paradoxes, his theory of truth, and his controversial interpretation of Wittgenstein's famous private language argument. Kripke's ideas are situated alongside those of his precursors and some of the most important and interesting responses to them are explored. Fitch clarifies Kripke's ground-breaking contributions to philosophy and shows how they have challenged traditional interpretations.
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