Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has attracted much criticism and few friends. Yet it is one of the books that most students of philosophy have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch defends Kripke's account against the numerous objections that have been put forward over the past twenty years, arguing that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning, many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position, and many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument a new strength.
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