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Research Report

The role of collective action in determining the benefits from IPPK logging concessions:: A case study from Sekatak, East Kalimantan

Charles Palmer
Copyright Date: Jan. 1, 2004
Pages: 30
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02268
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Table of Contents

  1. (pp. 1-2)

    Since the fall of ex-President Suharto’s centralized and autocratic government in 1997, the Republic of Indonesia has undergone rapid decentralization, which has resulted in changes to the institutions and processes governing the management of natural resources in the country (Barr and Resosudarmo 2002). Governance over forests has shifted in a haphazard manner, from a centralized system of logging concessions and protected areas to one now informally controlled by over 300 district-level governments. These changes have resulted in newly empowered forest-dependent communities exerting property rights over adat (customary) forest, leading in many cases to communities negotiating directly with logging companies¹ in...

  2. (pp. 3-3)

    The reform of Indonesia’s 1967 Basic Forestry Law in 1999, UU No. 41/1999, gave some provisions for the recognition of customary (adat) lands, while Government Regulation No. 6/1999 gave authority to district governments (Pemerintah Daerah or Pemda) to allocate Hak Pemungutan Hasil Hutan (HPHH, or Rights to the Harvesting of Forest Products) in areas classified as ‘Permanent Forest Estate’ (Kawasan Budidaya Kehutanan, or KBK). The implementation of regulations relating to HPHHs was detailed in a series of decrees from the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops in May 1999 (Barr et al. 2001). Specifically, Ministerial Decision No. 310/1999 gave the...

  3. (pp. 4-4)

    This process, as observed in many parts of East Kalimantan⁷, typically follows a number of steps with the involvement of a number of different actors⁸, perhaps most importantly the ‘entrepreneur’ or ‘businessman’ (pengusaha⁹).

    1. An entrepreneur who, on behalf of a company (usually a CV10), approaches the district government and the community to propose an IPPK for the community’s adat forest. This individual usually comes from the locality (sometimes even the same community) and would have some connections to the timber industry. His main role is to act as liaison among community representatives or village managers (usually the village head and...

  4. (pp. 5-6)

    Before the political changes in 1998 and 1999, the old district of Bulungan consisted of three distinct areas that are now independent districts: Malinau, Nunukan and Bulungan. In ‘new’ Bulungan, there are five administrative subdistricts, or Kecematan: Tanjung Palas, Peso, Sesayap, Bunyu and Sekatak. Government data show that together the five areas consist of 85 villages and cover nearly 2 million hectares, with a total population of nearly 100,000 in 2000 (CDK15 Bulungan Tengah 2000). The area that is the focus of this case study is the subdistrict of Sekatak.

    Sekatak claims an area of approximately 8,800 km², with territorial...

  5. (pp. 7-8)

    Buji claims a territory of approximately 100,000 hectares in Sekatak, half of which was logged by HPH and IPK17 concessionaires before 1999. PT Intracawood, operating on behalf of state-owned PT Inhutani I, has been the main HPH concession holder18 since 1976 with a concession of 250,000 hectares that covers forest in Sekatak and Bengalun (CDK Bulungan Tengah unpublished data). As of June 2003, it was the sole remaining HPH operator in Sekatak.

    For all communities in Sekatak, previous experience with HPHs for the last 30 years have generally been quite bitter. Problems and conflict with HPH companies is a recurring...

  6. (pp. 9-13)

    In late 2000, intervillage conflict eased when Buji asserted its leadership over neighbouring villages to attempt to deal with contradictory adat forest claims and the problems associated with movements of people to claim logging benefits. Village heads met in Buji to discuss forest borders and allocate areas of adat forest. A system of identity cards was devised by the subdistrict government and Buji village elders to monitor the movements of people who relocated only to access the logging benefits negotiated by other villages. Furthermore, a system of checking on agreements was agreed upon to avoid future conflict (see next section)....

  7. (pp. 14-16)

    Decentralisation appears to have inadvertently given a large element of control and autonomy over forests to local governments with resulting benefits to communities in Sekatak. However, from the start of company–community negotiations in 1999 until the ‘IPPK boom’ in late 2000 and the resolution of IPPK–HPH conflicts in 2001, there were many problems with forest land claims and participation in logging deals among villages. There was a high level of tension among communities in Sekatak resulting from villageto- village conflicts arising from overlapping land claims, as well as tensions within villages stemming from movements of people from village...

  8. (pp. 17-17)

    At this point in time, decentralization changes have undoubtedly led to a higher capture of logging rents by communities in Sekatak and hence significantly altered the distribution of financial benefits from logging since 1998. These changes have resulted in variation among villages of benefits from logging agreements made with companies. This variation seems to be dependent on the processes of negotiation, company contract compliance and community enforcement. In Sekatak from 1999 until 2000, a number of communities were negotiating with companies independently with varying contractual and actual outcomes. Overall, these negotiations led to variations in social benefits and fees, as...