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Research Report

Comparative assessment of forest revenue redistribution mechanisms in Cameroon: Lessons for REDD+ benefit sharing

Samuel Assembe-Mvondo
Grace Wong
Lasse Loft
Januarti Sinarra Tjajadi
Copyright Date: Jan. 1, 2015
Pages: 37
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02390
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Table of Contents

  1. (pp. ix-x)

    Most tropical forests in developing countries are owned and administered by government bodies. Timber from these forests is sold to concessionaires – companies granted harvesting rights – at charges established by government agencies rather than by markets (Gillis 1980; Amacher et al. 2001). The most common charges are royalties, which are typically paid at an uniform rate (or rent) calculated according to the number of logs extracted from the forest, and not on the number of standing trees (Vincent 1990). Many studies have called attention to the negative impacts of the mispricing of royalties (Repetto and Gillis 1988) and how...

  2. (pp. 1-3)

    Environmental management policies have social consequences, especially on equity (Bagnoli et al. 2008; Dietz and Atkinson 2010). Policy implementation costs are often felt locally where the population is least capable of covering them. Such costs are typically borne by those whose access to biodiversity resources is constrained due to direct regulations (e.g. protected area establishment) or whose assets are affected by biodiversity enhancement. In addition, many people who are not directly dependent on the biodiversity resources or protected area often benefit indirectly from such policies. Thus, both direct and indirect gains from environmental policy can influence how equitable the redistribution...

  3. (pp. 4-6)

    There are many factors that impact individuals’ motivation toward sustainable forest management and conservation, including procedural and distributive fairness (Vatn 2010). REDD+ and payments for ecosystem services are economic incentives that are expected to increase motivation by providing additional benefits to or compensation for the costs of sustainable forest management and conservation. However, perceptions of unfairness can undermine the effectiveness of these incentives even if they provide a net benefit (Pascual et al. 2010). Powerful interests tend to influence the design of benefit-sharing mechanisms to reinforce prevailing structures, even if flawed (Brockhaus et al. 2014a). Consequently, individuals’ perception of fairness...

  4. (pp. 7-12)

    Tables 3 and 4 show the socioeconomic data from the sample villages. The villages located in Yokadouma Council were characterized by high population density and moderate ethnic heterogeneity (see Table 3). Though the villages visited in the municipal councils in Ocean Division were fairly homogeneous and less densely populated (see Table 4), the socioeconomic activities and practices of the local population were similar to that in Yokodouma Council.

    According to PSRF statistics, Yokadouma Council received over CFAF 7.3 billion (about EUR 11 million) in annual forestry fees from 2001 to 2009, or about CFAF 818 million (EUR 1.2 million) per...

  5. (pp. 13-18)

    The redistribution of forest and wildlife revenue in Cameroon has already been the subject of numerous studies, which highlight the weaknesses that characterize the present system, particularly in terms of governance and impact on local development (Bigombé 2003; Oyono et al. 2006; Lescuyer et al. 2008; Oyono et al. 2009; Bigombé 2010; Cerutti et al. 2010; Assembe-Mvondo et al. 2013). This study adds to the literature in that it uses analytical parameters defined by Lindhjem et al. (2010) to assess the system’s performance. According to Lindhjem et al. (2010), a REDD+ benefit-sharing system has two main dimensions, namely: (i) vertical...

  6. (pp. 19-20)

    In conclusion, none of the existing forest and wildlife revenue-sharing mechanisms evaluated in this study fully meet the three criteria of being effective, efficient and equitable, each necessary for REDD+ (Stern 2006; Angelsen 2009). In particular, the study results show that Cameroon’s forest policy objectives of reducing rural poverty and promoting local development have not been achieved through the institutionalization of forest and wildlife revenue redistribution models (effectiveness criterion). This is illustrated by the low levels of development of local communities in the Yokadouma, Lokoundje, Nieté and Akom 2 council areas. There is also a clear indication that these types...