Learning by Doing
Research Report
Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experience with Counterinsurgency
Shuja Nawaz
Copyright Date: Feb. 1, 2011
Published by: Atlantic Council
Pages: 44
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep03561
Table of Contents
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. [i]-[iii])
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. [iv]-[iv])
  3. [Map]
    [Map] (pp. [v]-[v])
  4. Executive Summary
    Executive Summary (pp. 1-2)
  5. Main Report
    Main Report (pp. 3-26)

    Pakistan has had very limited experience in counterinsurgency, and not all of it has been very successful. In 1971, the Pakistan Army was used in East Pakistan to quell a domestic insurgency in support of the Bengalis of East Pakistan gaining independence from West Pakistan. Indian support and sanctuary allowed the insurgents to grow and become very sophisticated. Many of them were former Pakistan Army officers and men of the East Bengal Regiment or paramilitary forces. Pakistan’s army used military force against civilians in a population that was largely against them. It lost that war, largely because of massive Indian...

  6. Appendices
    • Appendix 1: “Durand Line” Agreement, 1893
      Appendix 1: “Durand Line” Agreement, 1893 (pp. 27-28)
    • Appendix 2: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)
      Appendix 2: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) (pp. 29-32)
    • Appendix 3: IED Activity in Pakistan
      Appendix 3: IED Activity in Pakistan (pp. 33-36)
  7. Back Matter
    Back Matter (pp. 37-38)