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Research Report

Indian Responses to Israel’s Gaza Operations

S. Samuel
C. Rajiv
Copyright Date: May. 1, 2016
Pages: 81
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04727

Table of Contents

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  1. (pp. 1-4)
  2. (pp. 5-6)
  3. (pp. 7-8)
    S. Samuel and C. Rajiv
  4. (pp. 9-11)
    S. Samuel and C. Rajiv

    In the aftermath of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in August 2005, Hamas won legislative elections in January 2006. In June 2007, it took full control over the territory after engaging in a bloody fight with Fatah. Since then, there have been three major military interventions by Israel in the Gaza Strip. These were ‘Operation Cast Lead’ (December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009), ‘Operation Pillar of Defense’ (November 14-21, 2012) and ‘Operation Protective Edge’ (July 8-August 26, 2014).

    Israel undertook these initiatives in order to stop constant enemy rocket barrages that had compromised its sense of security. The Israel Defense Force (IDF)...

  5. (pp. 11-24)

    The burgeoning strategic partnership between India and Israel in the aftermath of the establishment of full-scale relations in January 1992 is one of the most significant aspects of India’s post-Cold War foreign policy. The two countries were brought together by several critical elements: international structural factors (the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, India’s most important strategic ally); positive developments in Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians; and significant domestic policy course corrections, particularly economic reforms. Overlapping interests (Israel’s export-oriented defense industry and India’s need to upgrade its Soviet-era equipment in an increasingly challenging security...

  6. (pp. 25-28)

    India and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) have maintained a constant stream of high-level visits. PNA President Mahmoud Abbas has been a frequent guest in India: he visited in May 2005, October 2008, February 2010 and September 2012. The 2008 and 2012 visits were state visits.

    India has a long history of support for the Palestinian cause. India was the first non-Arab state to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975. It granted full diplomatic recognition to the PLO in 1980 and recognized the State of Palestine in the aftermath of its proclamation by the Palestine National Council in...

  7. (pp. 29-48)

    Violent exchanges between Israel and its antagonists in the Gaza Strip always attract wide international attention and elicit international activism of both the governmental and non-governmental variety. India has a strategic linkage with Israel that is significant to the point of dependency; but at the same time, it has a long history of supporting the Palestinian cause. Indian responses to Israel-Gaza clashes—by governments in power, by political party representatives, and by civil society—therefore serve as a unique case study into how such conflicts are viewed abroad.

    Even before Israel’s disengagement in 2005 and Hamas’s electoral success in January...

  8. (pp. 48-51)

    The unprecedented discussion in both the Lok Sabha (July 15) and the Rajya Sabha (July 21), as well as the intervening period of contention resulting in the government’s agreeing to the discussion, was one of the very few instances when the Indian Parliament devoted a substantial amount of time to the Israel-Palestine issue. The only previous instance of a full-fledged discussion in the Lok Sabha on Indo-Israel ties was on August 18, 2000—also a period during which the BJP-led NDA government was in power.179 The discussion was in the aftermath of the path-breaking visits to Israel by Foreign Minister...

  9. (pp. 51-57)

    After the Modi government came to power in June 2014, a concerted effort was made to correct the anomaly of India’s limited high-level political interactions with the Middle East. In August 2015, Prime Minister Modi went to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the first such visit in 34 years.190 The India-UAE relationship was elevated to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, with agreements and common understandings on a range of issues ranging from economic matters to the security sphere. The sides agreed, for instance, to establish the UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, with a target of $75 billion. They also committed themselves...

  10. (pp. 58-60)

    The BJP has always advocated stronger ties between India and Israel, and its leaders have time and again (especially while in the opposition) expressed appreciation for the Israeli government’s muscular antiterrorism and national security policies. The Modi government came to office professing to take a more vigorous stance on national security issues. Among Modi’s first acts after being sworn in as Prime Minister was to board the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Admiral Gorshkov of the Russian Navy) on June 13, 2014 and dedicate it to the nation, thereby emphasizing the centrality of national security issues.

    The government has...

  11. (pp. 61-80)