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Research Report

Improving the Effectiveness of OSCE Missions:: The Case of Uzbekistan

David Lewis
Copyright Date: Aug. 1, 2002
Published by: Clingendael Institute
Pages: 34

Table of Contents

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  1. (pp. [i]-[ii])
  2. (pp. 41-42)
  3. (pp. 43-44)
  4. (pp. 45-48)
  5. (pp. 49-54)

    Since independence in 1991 Uzbekistan’s leadership has attempted to promote political stability above political or economic reform. However, this outward stability has been undermined by a radicalised Islamic opposition, which staged a series of terrorist attacks and small-scale armed incursions from outside the country in 1999-2001. The roots of this violence lie mainly in the difficult economic and social situation brought about by poor government policy, and by the increasing repressions of the government.

    Although there is little prospect of mass civil unrest overthrowing the regime, or of radical religious groups gaining widespread support, the combination of social discontent, radicalisation...

  6. (pp. 55-70)

    The first OSCE presence in Uzbekistan was the Central Asian Liaison Office (CALO) set up in 1995, with the aim of linking the five Central Asian countries of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan more closely to the OSCE. A Mission to Tajikistan had already been deployed in 1993, and therefore CALO activities with that country were relatively limited.

    The office began work in June 1995, and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Secretary General and the GoU on 12 July 1995. In 1998, the OSCE also established Centres in Almaty, Ashgabat and Bishkek. As a result of...

  7. (pp. 71-71)

    The Centre in Tashkent has operated in a difficult political environment and made considerable impact in reporting and monitoring on human rights abuses and other aspects of government policy. However, despite its successes, the Centre needs a thorough overhaul in terms of strategy, impact, and visibility.

    At present there is no clear strategy either from the mission, or from Vienna for the Centre. International staff have no clear guidelines on the nature of their work, and are largely left to their own devices in developing activities and programs. There is a clear need for the CiO to intervene and ensure...

  8. (pp. 73-73)