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Research Report

Designing an Integrated Strategy For Peace, Security and Development In Post-Agreement Sudan

Emeric Rogier
Copyright Date: Apr. 1, 2005
Published by: Clingendael Institute
Pages: 102
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05479
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Table of Contents

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  1. (pp. 1-1)

    On January, 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) met in Nairobi, Kenya, to sign the last pieces of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA, also known as the Naivasha Agreement, had negotiated under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) for more than two years. The CPA nominally ends a conflict, which started in 1983 and is known as the “oldest running war in Africa”. Yet, Western Sudan is currently the theatre of a violent conflict in which the government is accused of establishing and unleashing ethnic militias to...

  2. Part One. Problems and Parameters

    • (pp. 3-18)

      The trend analysis of peace and conflict indicators executed by the Fund for Peace shows that, over the 15 years after 1989, the Sudan’s only improving indicator related to economic performance was oil income.⁴ Despite expanding oil revenues, the underlying problems in the Sudan have worsened over time. Six indicators in particular have deteriorated: demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees and IDPs; vengeance-seeking group grievances; suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law, and widespread violation of human rights; the predominance of the security apparatus within state structures; and the rise of factionalized elites. These worsening conditions indicate the...

    • (pp. 18-32)

      The Naivasha agreement (or Comprehensive Peace Agreement [CPA]) addresses changes in the South and in Khartoum, but does not adequately address the conflicts in the Three Areas, and completely overlooks the situations in Darfur and the East. Furthermore, the CPA confirms the National Congress Party’s (NCP) domination over all Northern states until elections are held in 2009.

      As a result, unresolved conflicts in the North may persist and, in a worst-case scenario, link with each other across the Sudan’s central belt from Western Darfur to Red Sea state. Various rebel group statements suggest that connections are already made between East-based...

    • (pp. 32-44)

      The Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world (it was ranked 138th out of 162 countries by the UNDP in 2001). Development in the Sudan has been hampered by civil wars, which are themselves fuelled by disputes over resources and power, as well as by regional and ethnic marginalization. Long-standing structural inequalities, therefore, lie at the roots of the Sudan’s conflicts.

      Sudanese poverty is higher in the South than in the North: 90% of Southerners in SPLM/A-held areas live on less than US$1 per day, compared to 60-75% of those living in Northern states. Other disparities also...

  3. Part Two. Policy Response

    • (pp. 45-57)

      From the previous analysis of key problems and parameters, it is clear that restoring peace in the Sudan is a task of a magnitude proportional to the size of the country. In part because of the signatory parties’ doubtful commitment to the peace process, the international community must show its determination through sustained political engagement, strong security guarantees, and significant economic assistance. These requirements are elaborated below.

      It should be stressed that wars in the Sudan have evolved from North- South opposition into conflicts between the center and the periphery. Donors should, therefore, incorporate the center-periphery paradigm fully into their...

    • (pp. 57-73)

      The previous sections have outlined a number of challenging tasks that the international/donor community will have to perform (or facilitate) in order to consolidate peace and foster reconstruction in post-settlement Sudan. Yet, even more is needed. In the past, the IGAD Partners Forum was criticized for following a largely peripheral agenda, centred on funding and support activities instead of placing political pressure on the Sudanese parties.61 The lesson remains all the more valid for the interim period. Peacebuilding requires more than elaborating “to do” lists and identifying funding niches. Peacebuilding necessarily entails addressing the political dynamics that shaped the conflict...

  4. (pp. 75-75)

    This paper attempts to outline an integrated strategy for post-settlement Sudan that is comprehensive in scope and coherent in means. It seeks to reconcile two usually differing approaches in conflict and post-conflict settings, namely the political approach and the development perspective. These two policy lines converge to the extent that development aid can serve as a tool for inducing national leaders to improve governance, implement structural reforms and, in this case, implement a peace agreement. Aid may contribute to reducing conflict in the Sudan if, and only if, it is linked to a specific political objective: promoting peaceful change throughout...