The price of U.S. and EU inaction in the western Balkans was amply illustrated in the 1990s, as opportunities for preventive action were squandered and the former Yugoslavia descended into brutal and devastating ethnic conflict, first in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and later on in Kosovo. As is always the case, military intervention and the need for post-conflict reconstruction consumed significant U.S. resources—far more than the cost of thoughtful and decisive preventive action. A decade and a half later, the United States has another opportunity for preventive action, this time to avert a renewed crisis in Kosovo and...
In 2002, the Center for Preventive Action published Balkans 2010, a Task Force report that laid out a vision for a stable, peaceful western Balkans (comprising Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Albania) and identified the requisite objectives and milestones to achieve that vision.¹ Many of the report’s recommendations remain valid today, particularly the need to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, dismantle politico-criminal syndicates, and promote economic reform and development.
Since 2002, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia have all seen encouraging progress in many areas; elsewhere and in other respects, the situation has stagnated...
The increasing movement of the western Balkans toward integration into the EU reflects improvements over the past two and a half years. However, this encouraging progress in economic and political reforms, security, and regional cooperation is offset by a number of less favorable indicators. The ethno-nationalist politics and tensions that dominated the 1990s have lessened but not disappeared. Civil society remains weak and democracy is taking time to consolidate, making it easier for extremists to manipulate the political discourse. Though economic growth rates have generally improved, economic development and prosperity remain elusive. Unemployment is uniformly high, and economies suffer as...
Kosovo is the highest priority and biggest challenge for 2005–2006. It continues to be the most troubled area in the region. The March 2004 riots involving Kosovo’s Albanian community illustrated the volatile situation there. Despite widespread concerns over rising tensions, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) were ill-prepared to deal with the violence, damaging UNMIK’s already shaken credibility and undermining confidence in the international community’s presence in Kosovo and the region. The riots further escalated tensions between Kosovo’s Albanians, who understandably demand independence, and Kosovo’s Serb community, which rightfully seeks protection of...
In important respects, Bosnia has made more progress in the past two years than many thought possible. Significant advances have been made in military and intelligence reform. In late 2003, the separate armies of Bosnia’s two Serb and Bosniak-Croat entities were unified to form a single state army. In 2004, their intelligence services were also unified, and a single police force is planned for 2005.¹¹ Security is improved: only 7,000 peacekeeping troops remain (compared with 60,000 in 1996), and the December 2004 handover of the peacekeeping mandate from NATO to the EU was successful. Although economic recovery continues to be...
If Bosnia’s progress has exceeded expectations, Serbia’s performance in the past two years has been disappointing. When Balkans 2010 was published, Serbia was in the midst of a series of far-reaching reforms. Many of these have stalled since the March 2003 assassination of Zoran Djindjic by elements linked to organized crime and official security structures. While public shock briefly galvanized support for bringing the responsible parties to justice, many of Djindjic’s reforms have been reversed. His successor, Vojislav Kostunica, once heralded as an ally of the West, has made it clear he is not a reformer. His government has made...
