As commander in chief of the armed forces, the president of the United States bears great responsibility in determining when and how to use military force. To make such decisions, the president requires a clear understanding of the risks, costs, and likely outcome of a military intervention. Because many presidents and senior civilian appointees lack deep operational military experience, they rely on senior military advisors to provide viable, realistic, and timely advice to inform these critical decisions. Unfortunately, what the military leadership provides is often not what presidents are looking for.

Whereas civilians expect a collaborative dialogue in which multiple...

Although the president wields ultimate authority over the use of military force, a series of complex institutions determines which, and how many, options the president receives. These institutions are the product of bureaucratic horse-trading, stubbornness, and chance. The modern national security system owes its structure to two pieces of legislation. The first, the National Security Act of 1947, sought to align the United States’ range of military capabilities and authorities with its superpower-sized responsibilities. Following years of contentious debate between the Departments of the Army and the Navy, the act created the Department of the Air Force, as well as...

The U.S. military operates under a system of civilian control. This belief in civilian authority, deeply ingrained in the philosophies of the Founding Fathers, has stood virtually unchallenged for 240 years. But the definition of civilian control can be the subject of heated debate.

The cause of such divergent expectations can be traced to fundamental differences in civilian and institutional military cultures. Although the United States was founded in a tradition of part-time militiamen and citizen soldiers, the military had developed a professional core by the start of World War I and was wholly professionalized with the introduction of the...

It is 3 a.m., and the president receives a phone call about a crisis—a sudden provocation in the South China Sea or a Middle East nation sliding into chaos. According to both Hollywood movies and established military doctrine, the president will huddle in the Situation Room with senior civilian and military advisors before emerging, clear-eyed and filled with resolve, to announce a response and issue guidance to waiting military commanders. Military planners translate this strategic guidance into concrete action. The president and NSC are left to watch as the U.S. military machine grinds to life, carriers shifting course and...

Friction is an inevitable and important part of the policymaking process. However, too much or too little of it can sabotage civil-military dialogue.

The presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower were characterized by the growing powers of the NSC and the secretary of defense at the expense of a previously all-powerful JCS. Each dealt with highly visible military dissension over issues of spending cuts, bureaucratic centralization, strategy, and nuclear control. Although this military disapproval was often vocal, it did not represent an unhealthy civil-military dialogue so much as a dialogue that did not go the military’s way. Here, the exception that...

Few terms are more popular in Washington policy circles than “iterative.” In an ideal world, interagency partners gather to have iterative discussions. Each contribution builds atop the last, producing policies that are greater than the sum of their parts. The results are smart, novel, and iterated.

But even when the system works, this is not really what happens. The president will rarely begin deliberations equipped with the knowledge to build toward an agreed-upon objective, absent an understanding of the costs that each possible action might carry. Actual iteration can only begin once civilian policymakers and military advisors have had a...

Improving the civil-military dialogue requires changes to processes within and across the White House and the Pentagon, along with a focus on team-building and individual education and training. Thanks to different cultural and institutional drivers, civil-military relations will never lack friction; the trick is to promote healthy friction. Dynamism and respectful debate among diverse civilian and military team members—not groupthink—will produce better military options and advice.

Recommended changes include revising military planning doctrine, establishing standing interagency working groups, creating new options planning processes across both the Pentagon and the national security system, and introducing technology improvements that will...

Today, the civil-military dialogue—split by institutional and cultural differences—is being outpaced by the speed of global events. In considering the use of military force for complex, emerging crises, presidents can no longer wait upon the slow-moving gears of the traditional military planning process, nor can civilians remain ignorant of questions of human resources or logistics that lie at the heart of modern national security debates. Through improved education, strong executive leadership, and changes to procedure and doctrine, the civil-military dialogue in support of presidential decision-making can be improved. The recommendations here, if implemented together, can promote shared understanding,...