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Research Report

THE NEW GREAT GAME: Changing Global Energy Markets, The Re-Emergent Strategic Triangle, And U.S. Policy

Elizabeth Rosenberg
David Gordon
Ellie Maruyama
Alexander Sullivan
Copyright Date: Jun. 1, 2016
Pages: 67
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06363

Table of Contents

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  1. (pp. None)
  2. (pp. 1-1)
  3. (pp. 2-4)
  4. (pp. 5-7)

    China’s President Xi has bade farewell to his predecessors’ rhetoric that China is merely a developing country and has embraced its rise as a major power. Russian President Putin, at the same time, has embarked on a series of assertive moves to directly challenge U.S. and Western aims in both Eurasia and the Middle East. As a result, the United States/Russia/China “strategic triangle” that dominated the final decades of the Cold War is making a comeback. Geopolitics is again in vogue.

    But the dynamics of the latest round of great power contestation are different from the 1970s and 1980s. Then...

  5. (pp. 8-22)

    As recently as 2012 and 2013, energy markets were dominated by assumptions of continued rapid demand growth, driven especially by China’s extraordinary pace of urbanization and economic growth, and doubts about the security of supply tied to limited opportunities for new geographic areas to produce oil and gas and the continuation of political uncertainty in producing regions – especially the Middle East. These factors reinforced one another in placing continued upward pressure on energy prices. The “peak oil hypothesis” – the notion that the world was soon to reach the maximum point of production as the depletion of existing sources...

  6. (pp. 23-30)

    The new economics of global energy should be a major strategic and political opportunity for the United States; but the country is not yet well positioned to take advantage of the circumstances. Unlike China and Russia, for example, which have reacted fairly quickly to the new energy market and are pursuing policies to mitigate or counteract their energy and geopolitical vulnerabilities and expand resilience, the United States has done relatively little to adapt energy and foreign policy to the new market. “Energy independence” rhetoric from the 1970s and a protectionist and misleading view that the United States can be secure...

  7. (pp. 31-39)

    The new economics of global energy should be a major strategic and political opportunity for the United States; but the country is not yet well positioned to take advantage of the circumstances. Unlike China and Russia, for example, which have reacted fairly quickly to the new energy market and are pursuing policies to mitigate or counteract their energy and geopolitical vulnerabilities and expand resilience, the United States has done relatively little to adapt energy and foreign policy to the new market. “Energy independence” rhetoric from the 1970s and a protectionist and misleading view that the United States can be secure...

  8. (pp. 40-51)

    As previously discussed, U.S. energy policy and foreign policy have lagged in their adaptation to new energy market circumstances. They have not taken advantage of new opportunities to leverage domestic high-tech energy productive capacity and the ability to export oil and gas abroad to advance U.S. political goals, particularly with respect to key competitors and partners in the Asia-Pacific region. And when the United States has acted, it has been largely for punitive ends to isolate Iran or Russia through sanctions. U.S. policymakers correctly perceive important strategic opportunities they now have to undermine the manipulative energy pricing power of Moscow...

  9. (pp. 52-53)

    Recent energy market changes create new opportunities for the United States, both commercially and in the realm of foreign and strategic policy. The United States is more central to global energy geopolitics, as a bigger producer, the host to energy trading activities highly influential in energy pricing globally, and as a leader on global trade policy and norms. With the growth of economic activity and security competition in the Pacific, the new key geopolitical energy counterparts for the United States are China, first and foremost, as well as Russia. For its large role as an energy producer, Saudi Arabia cannot...

  10. (pp. 54-63)
  11. (pp. 64-65)