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Research Report

WHAT STATUS FOR KOSOVO?

Dana H. Allin
Franz-Lothar Altmann
Marta Dassù
Tim Judah
Jacques Rupnik
Thanos Veremis
Edited by Dimitrios Triantaphyllou
Copyright Date: Oct. 1, 2001
Pages: 120
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07039
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Table of Contents

  1. (pp. 1-6)
    Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

    The Kosovo exception, with all its legal and political ramifications, continues to preoccupy the wider Balkan region¹ and the international community. After having intervened, on an uncertain legal basis, to ensure that a genocide of Kosovo Albanians would be prevented, the international community, particularly the West, finds itself struggling to deal with the Kosovo exception. The 22,000-man strong operation, which was the biggest wartime deployment in Europe since the Second World War, represents the only case in modern history of the reversal of a systematic removal of ethnic groups. The implications and stakes are many. These can be perceived in...

  2. (pp. 7-18)
    Dana H. Allin

    Kosovo’s irrevocable separation from Serbia was probably determined in the early spring of 1999. Well before then, it had become difficult to imagine a viable political solution in which the province remained part of Yugoslavia. By 1996, seven years of intensified Serb repression, and the inability of Western powers to do much about it, had significantly discredited Ibrahim Rugova’s strategy of non-violent resistance. Yet there were still serious Kosovo Albanian leaders who were willing to contemplate some form of compromise, such as a ‘Third Republic’ solution by which Kosovo would achieve equal status in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro.¹ The...

  3. (pp. 19-34)
    Franz-Lothar Altmann

    Any reflections on the future status of Kosovo have to start from the existing legal framework established by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on 10 June 1999, the day the air strikes against Yugoslavia ended. Of particular importance are those parts of the Resolution which either determine the general framework of the future status of Kosovo or on the contrary leave it open. In fact, Resolution 1244 confirms in very general terms two issues: firstly, all member states of the United Nations reaffirm their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (and...

  4. (pp. 35-54)
    Marta Dassù

    The problem of the final status of Kosovo might be considered, almost by definition, a ‘hostage issue’. This is the case for three basic reasons: first, the internal situation is not ripe for a decision on the matter (the advocates of independence, as a political decision to be made a priori, ought to accept that statehood needs to be built, before thinking of how to have it recognised); second, the regional situation is not sufficiently stable, especially on two fronts – relations between Serbia and Montenegro, and the crisis in Macedonia – which will have the greatest impact on the...

  5. (pp. 55-68)
    Tim Judah

    Until now it has been easy to speculate, pontificate and prescribe solutions for Kosovo because, apart from UN Security Council Resolution 1244, there has been no road map for the future. On 14 May 2001 that changed. Hans Haekkerup, the head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) announced that elections were to be held on 17 November and he described what shape the protectorate’s future government would take. The next day, in the face of a barrage of complaints from both Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs, he signed into law the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government. Although details...

  6. (pp. 69-84)
    Jacques Rupnik

    The post-Milosevic Balkan landscape is one of contrasts. On the one hand, with the disappearance from the political scene of one of those chiefly responsible for a decade of war, one can look forward to peace and democratic changes that will promote stability and cooperation in the region. However, at the very moment that Milosevic was put in prison in Belgrade at the beginning of April 2001, an armed uprising in Macedonia on the border with Kosovo and Serbia gave rise to fears that such hopes may be premature. Hence also the differences of interpretation of the situation in the...

  7. (pp. 85-98)
    Thanos Veremis

    drawing from their Bosnian experience. They believed that a limited bombardment of Serb military targets would freeze the crisis and disentangle Milosevic’s forces from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rebels. With the two adversaries back to their benches, NATO could then begin to supervise an agreement modelled on the Dayton Accord precedent. The bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), however, altered the situation on the ground. The KLA was established in the Albanian political scene as a new powerful variable while an old one, the Serb presence in Kosovo, was being hounded out of the equation. The West...

  8. (pp. 99-108)
    Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

    The issue of the future status of Kosovo boils down to a basic equation – it needs to be resolved in a framework which abets, rather that deters, regional stability and co-operation. The contributions to this Chaillot Paper demonstrate that the yardsticks for measuring stability vary substantially with some contributors being worried by the destabilising effects of Kosovo’s independence while others are concerned by the opposite; i.e., the reaction of the Albanian population.

    In many ways, the euphoria of 2000, with the democratic revolution in Serbia, has given way to a number of regional security threats which are not attributable...