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Research Report

United Nations Sanctions on Iran and North Korea:: An Implementation Manual

ENRICO CARISCH
LORAINE RICKARD-MARTIN
Copyright Date: Mar. 1, 2014
Pages: 42
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09648

Table of Contents

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  1. (pp. None)
  2. (pp. i-ii)
  3. (pp. iii-iv)
  4. (pp. v-vi)
  5. (pp. vii-viii)
  6. (pp. 1-2)

    Throughout history, sanctions have been used as a political tool to coerce, constrain (or contain), and deter, most often by states instituting general blockades or limiting the trade privileges of others. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945—with its primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security—introduced under Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter, the use of “measures other than the use of force,” (e.g., sanctions). It was not until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, that the UN Security Council, the UN body directly responsible for responding to threats...

  7. (pp. 2-4)

    WMD fall under one of three categories: nuclear weapons, biological/toxins, and chemical weapons; and ballistic missiles are the most frequently used form of delivery of these weapons:

    Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that deliver high intensity heat, blast, radiation, and radioactive fallout, either through fission reactions (splitting of the nucleus of a particle) and/or fusion reactions (joining of two nuclei).

    Biological weapons use pathogens (i.e., an agent that causes disease) to attack the cells and organs of humans, animals, or plants (e.g., crops), while toxic weapons use poisons to kill living organisms. Commonly known biological weapons include Agent Orange, anthrax,...

  8. (pp. 4-6)

    Both, the 1718 and the 1737 sanctions regimes comprise wide-ranging measures, including bans on conventional and non-conventional weapons, a travel ban, an asset freeze, and other financial sanctions. Initial resolutions (1737 for Iran; and 1718 for the DPRK) set the stage for increasingly refined measures and language in subsequent resolutions to clarify issues that had not been sufficiently specified.

    These are the first regimes where the Security Council has authorized states to seize cargo if they have reason to believe that prohibited items are involved and report when they do not receive cooperation. The two regimes also provide guidance on...

  9. (pp. 6-8)

    The DPRK and Iran are subject to much more refined sanctions measures compared to other UN sanctions regimes. The remainder of this manual will be devoted to assisting member states, international organizations, entities, companies and individuals in understanding the specificities of the UN measures.

    The following explains the restrictive measures as provided by the relevant Security Council resolutions on the DPRK and Iran. While many of the measures are identical or similar, it is recommended that decisions regarding sanctions implementation be verified on the basis of the actual language of the relevant resolutions (see Annexes I and II).

    Any sale,...

  10. (pp. 9-11)

    UN sanctions against the proliferation of WMD benefit from national and international export control efforts. With the end of World War II, states began systematically to develop rules and lists of restricted items for their national export control legislation. Referring to themselves as like-minded states, some of these states initiated international export control instruments and mechanisms, now called export control regimes. Most UN member states are either participants or accept the regimes as standard-setting mechanisms.

    An intractable challenge to effective WMD non-proliferation efforts are the many items or components of lower-level technology that may have dual-use application but are not...

  11. (pp. 11-15)

    Violators of the Iran and DPRK sanctions regimes are extraordinarily resourceful and versatile in exploiting any gaps in the international community’s implementation strategies. For example, a bilateral scientific and technological assistance memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the DPRK and Iran appears to advance both countries’ nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation. According to the UN Panel of Experts most recent report released in June 2013, one third of the DRPK’s foreign sales of WMD technologies appear to end up in the Syrian Arab Republic.17 The Panel disclosed in 2010 that the DPRK provided assistance for a nuclear program in the Syrian...

  12. (pp. 16-17)

    According to the UN Panel of Experts on the DPRK, the North Korean leadership has decided that the acquisition of computer numerically controlled (CNC) technology for the country’s atomic energy industry is a top priority. It is assumed that this order extends also to the nuclear weapons proliferation effort as CNC technology has applications in shaping solid propellant motor nozzles or re-entry vehicle nose tips.

    The panel’s report provides information regarding how the DPRK successfully solicited CNC machine tools and related equipment from companies based in the Taiwan Province of China.25 This includes reports about deliveries of industrial computers, exported...

  13. (pp. 18-27)

    Compliance with UN sanctions requires the coordination and guidance of state authorities either by issuing regulations or adopting laws. As such, best practices for the implementation of UN sanctions are always related to national mechanisms and instruments, state regulations, and law enforcement agencies. However, international organizations play an important harmonizing function in global standardization. For these reasons, the following section first explains the enabling international regulatory and legal context, and secondly, the actual best practices. These best practices are directed to:

    government regulators as priorities for their guidance to and oversight of their private sector partners;

    private sector compliance officers...

  14. (pp. 28-31)
  15. (pp. 32-32)