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Research Report

Secret Stockpiles: Arms Caches and Disarmament Efforts in Mozambique

Gary Littlejohn
Copyright Date: Sep. 1, 2015
Published by: Small Arms Survey
Pages: 55

Table of Contents

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  1. (pp. 1-4)
  2. (pp. 5-6)
  3. (pp. 10-10)
  4. (pp. 11-11)
  5. (pp. 12-12)
  6. (pp. 13-14)

    More than 20 years have passed since the peace process in Mozambique concluded in late 1994. The process was overseen by a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which was carried out during the peace agreement between the Government of Mozambique and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO)¹ in October 1992 and which lasted until 9 December 1994.² The governing party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO), had been conducting lengthy, complex negotiations with RENAMO rebel forces for some time—negotiations which resulted in a ceasefire for the country on 4 October 1992 (Vines, 2013 p.178)....

  7. (pp. 15-21)

    From 1987 to 1988 President Joaquim Chissano instituted a ‘review of FRELIMO’s economic, foreign and civil rights policies’ (Rupiya, 1998, p. 14). In 1989, FRELIMO consequently renounced its ideology of Marxism– Leninism, announcing this decision at its party congress in July, thereby also facilitating an agreement that the West might be willing to support. Simultaneously, in 1988–89 a military stalemate was at play (Vines, 2013, p. 377). Following communication between the Mozambican government and the Catholic Church, in September 1988 Pope John Paul II embarked on a tour of southern Africa, including a visit to Mozambique. Prior to the...

  8. (pp. 22-37)

    When the GPA was signed in 1992, peace was tenuous and considerable mistrust persisted between the signatories. Neither the government nor the opposition wished to surrender all their firearms (Rupiya, 1998, p. 16) and the ONUMOZ disarmament process proved problematic.13 Problems included the disputes over the selection and location of the AAs, the reluctance of both sides to send their troops to be quartered in the AAs as defined by ONUMOZ, the handing in of old weapons, and the hiding of arms caches. Poor conditions in the camps led to mutinies and riots in the first half of 1994 (Vines,...

  9. (pp. 38-45)

    In May 2009, Dhlakama moved to the northern city of Nampula, effectively demonstrating his disconnection from parliamentary politics, yet claiming he would thus be closer to the electorate (Vines, 2013, p. 386). His move north was prior to the national elections of October 2009 and may have stemmed from the establishing of two breakaway parties, the Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Party for Peace, Democracy and Development, PDD) in 2004 and the MDM in March 2009. The MDM held a strong base in Beira, the second-largest city in Mozambique, which might otherwise be suitable political territory for RENAMO....

  10. (pp. 46-49)

    ONUMOZ missed a vital opportunity to disarm RENAMO completely—a stance supported by data in the Tables of this Working Paper, as well as the statements of former head of ONUMOZ, Aldo Ajello, and former President Chissano. This failure is much graver than perceived at the time of the mission, as RENAMO has ultimately retained much larger caches of arms than was previously thought. Because of the events in Angola, which had resulted in a return to war, ONUMOZ and FRELIMO both felt that insisting on full disarmament would jeopardize the entire peace process. The matter since resurfaced, bearing adverse...

  11. (pp. 50-52)
  12. (pp. 53-55)