Research Report

The Army War College Review

Larry D. Miller Editor
Copyright Date: Apr. 1, 2017
Pages: 50
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11943
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Table of Contents

  1. Research
    • (pp. 1-10)
      Geoffrey William Wright

      The return of serious tensions in Eastern Europe has led to significant efforts to deter Russia and reassure Eastern European Allies. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO Allies have engaged in a combination of reassurance measures in the Baltic States and Poland and deterrence activities aimed at improving a credible collective deterrent capability to respond to further aggression.² The challenge of deterring “limited aim” attack, however, requires better coordination of security cooperation activities, reassurance measures, and training in Eastern Europe. By working together to improve coordination and response options, NATO allies can more effectively produce a deterrent...

    • (pp. 11-24)
      Carter L. Price

      As a strategic advisor, was Fox Conner an indispensable man? In an interview with Stephen Ambrose for his book, Supreme Commander, President Eisenhower would say that “Fox Conner was the ablest man I ever knew.” Staggered by this statement, Ambrose responded, “General Eisenhower, you have dealt with Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, MacArthur, Stalin and you say that Fox Conner was the ablest man you ever knew. My God!”² Retired General of the Armies John J. Pershing remarked, “I could have spared any other man in the A.E.F better than” Fox Conner.³

      Despite praise from arguably the most famous if not most...

    • (pp. 25-35)
      Darren D. Huxley

      The Australian Army officially adopted Maneuver Theory as its underpinning war fighting philosophy in the late 1990’s and each successive version of the Army’s capstone doctrine has supported Maneuver Theory as the official Australian Army approach to war fighting.¹ As a concept for the prosecution of military operations, Maneuver Theory offers the rationale that a more agile force can fight and win against a more numerous adversary. This agility comes from a close understanding of the strategic outcomes being pursued by tactical actions and an opportunistic approach to the inevitable chaos of war. In essence, Maneuver Theory is a high...

  2. Insights
    • (pp. 36-40)
      David Christopher Menser

      The big question after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, was “how did the U.S. lose China?” Although the situation was certainly beyond U.S. control, cooperating with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than the Nationalists once the tide turned fostered a post-World War II order in which mainland China, one of Roosevelt’s four policemen, could have helped ensure peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. Fortunately for those who perceived a lost opportunity, the U.S. got a second chance and since 1979 has been backing the “the other side:” the CCP.¹

      The rationale to...

    • (pp. 41-44)
      Jaren Keith Price

      Japan is developing a Marine Corps in everything but name. In December 2013 the Ministry of Defense of Japan published two documents, the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond” and the “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018).” These documents reiterated the longstanding mission of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to “intercept and defeat any invasion” of the homeland while expanding this mission to include “remote islands.” Significantly, the new mission states: “should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them.”¹ These documents also charged the JSDF with developing rapid deployment and amphibious capabilities sufficient to pursue this...