Research Report

CHINA’S GROWING MILITARY POWER:: PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY, BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

Andrew Scobell
Larry M. Wortzel
Copyright Date: Sep. 1, 2002
Pages: 314
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11959
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Table of Contents

  1. (pp. v-vii)
    JAMES R. LILLEY

    The tenor of U.S.-China relations for much of the first year of the administration of President George W. Bush was set by a crisis that need not have occurred. How the situation was handled and eventually resolved is instructive. It tells us about a beleaguered communist leadership in the buildup to major generational transition (scheduled for late 2002 and early 2003) and the mettle of a democratically elected U.S. government tested early in its tenure by a series of foreign policy crises and a carefully coordinated set of devastating terrorist strikes against the continental United States.

    The way the April...

  2. (pp. 1-15)
    Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel

    President George W. Bush made it clear as a candidate for office that U.S. policy toward China “will require tough realism.” Presidential Candidate Bush’s speech on September 23, 1999, at the Citadel, the military college of South Carolina, foreshadowed his firm approach to Beijing.¹ In that speech, Candidate Bush recalled for the American people that “in 1996, after some tension over Taiwan, a Chinese general reminded America that China possesses the means to incinerate Los Angeles with nuclear missiles.”² Bush followed up in a speech in Simi Valley, California, with the warning to China that it is a “competitor, not...

  3. PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA’S SECURITY AND MILITARY POWER
    • (pp. 19-62)
      David M. Finkelstein

      On October 19, 2001, Presidents George W. Bush of the United States and Jiang Zemin of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had their first face-to-face meeting on the fringes of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (APEC) meeting in Shanghai after almost a year of increasingly strained bilateral relations. What was originally scheduled to be a full-blown summit meeting, to include a visit by Bush to Beijing, was curtailed to a half-day of talks due to the unforeseen and tragic terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11.¹

      By all accounts, the meetings went well enough. The official Chinese press...

    • (pp. 63-80)
      Hideaki Kaneda

      China has pursued a national strategy of consistent and active advancement toward peripheral waters. China’s activity patterns, as they did in the 1970s to the South China Sea and in the 1980s to the East China Sea, have been to advance to such areas using force, while ignoring the sovereign rights and jurisdiction rights of neighboring nations. Finding little or weak resistance from these countries, China strengthened presence there by creating a fait accompli, ultimately leading to the practical control of these areas. What is the objective of China’s maritime advance? The answer is the key to designing Japan’s deterrent...

    • (pp. 81-104)
      Anatoly V. Bolyatko

      China’s military doctrine is an outgrowth of Beijing’s strategic concept of national security, their perception of external threats, and their estimation of the likelihood of war. This military doctrine includes positions not only on the training of the armed forces, but their composition and role. The leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) sees national security as a process of eliminating internal and external threats, and as a way to achieve regional and global objectives by escalating what China’s strategists call “the comprehensive power of a state.” A well-developed economy, a high level of science and engineering achievement, internal...

  4. PART II: CHINA’S BALLISTIC MISSILES AND EAST ASIA REACTION TO U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES
    • (pp. 107-167)
      Mark A. Stokes

      Since the days of Sunzi and beyond, nations have pursued defenses against offensive weapons. Naturally, sparked by the advent of the first ballistic missiles in World War II, interest in defending against ballistic missiles over the past several decades has increased significantly. Today, strategic and conventional ballistic missiles pose challenges to the United States and to its national interests around the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery place significant portions of the U.S. population at risk. These systems, in the hands of governments that are hostile to U.S. national interests, challenge the security of allies...

    • (pp. 168-196)
      Eric A. McVadon

      The author of this chapter describes and analyzes Chinese views of U.S. Missile defense initiatives, based largely on interviews, meetings, lectures, and conversations with various Chinese officials, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers, think tankers, academics, and other strategic studies and security specialists in China.¹ The core research was done during 3 weeks on the mainland in July and October 2001, plus other meetings held and materials obtained in the weeks before and after those visits. In general, it was not necessary to raise the missile issue with Chinese interlocutors; there was eagerness among these Chinese contacts to address the topic,...

    • (pp. 199-220)
      Taeho Kim

      In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States homeland, it is increasingly certain that the George W. Bush administration’s initial policy priorities and future visions will go through a reappraisal, readjustment, and reconfirmation. It is also true that war in Afghanistan, together with the broader international antiterrorist efforts, has significantly altered the administration’s working definition of its friends and foes around the world—at least for the time being. There is also little doubt that antiterrorism will remain a priority agenda in future U.S. foreign policy.

      It is equally likely, however, that given its recent...

  5. PART III: IMPROVEMENTS IN PLA CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES:: FORCE PROJECTION AND AIR FORCE LOGISTICS
    • (pp. 223-250)
      Susan M. Puska

      Over the last 3 years,¹ the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has significantly advanced its near-periphery power projection capability through concerted experimentation and adaptation of modern warfighting capabilities during threat-based training and exercises among targeted army, navy, air, and missile forces.² This experience base now reaches into all seven of its military Regions (MRs),³ and includes a growing number of younger, innovative military thinkers and fighters who are versed in modern operational art.

      Against a potential threat that closely resembles the advanced capabilities of the U.S. military, the PLA has shown a determination, particularly since Kosovo, to enhance its confidence...

    • (pp. 251-306)
      Kenneth W. Allen

      The purpose of this chapter is to examine what the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is doing to reform its logistics systems in order to fight and win high technology wars under modern conditions, employing all five of its branches. Many of these reforms have come about as a direct result of contingency planning for a possible war with the United States over Taiwan, but there forms are applicable to the PLAAF as a whole.

      In the 1990s, the PLAAF began the process of transforming itself from a force capable of employing single branches (aviation, surface-to-air missiles [SAMs], antiaircraft...