The limited conflicts in which the US military has been involved since World War II have pitted the United States against smaller, less sophisticated opponents with far less capable air forces. Though often politically constrained, the United States Air Force, in most cases, has achieved air superiority and has directed its firepower against key enemy targets. But the USAF has faced its greatest challenge in targeting by turning the advantage won in the air into military and political victory on the ground. Particularly frustrating for the USAF has been the nature of its opponents. Underdeveloped, authoritarian states with power—based...

Since the days of biplanes, one of airpower’s most sought-after applications has been its potential to engage enemy ground forces. Today, such counterland operations are classified into two missions: CAS and AI.¹ Whereas CAS deals specifically with air operations in the close proximity of friendly ground troops and requires detailed coordination, AI engages the enemy before it reaches the battlefield. According to USAF doctrine, AI is employed “to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.”² History is replete with battles decided by forces that did not arrive in...

Misty FACs were born out of the necessity of combat. Facing a rising flow of supplies from North Vietnam to the Vietcong in the South and increasing surface-to-air threats, the USAF was forced to rethink its interdiction campaign. Politically restrained from air attacks on lucrative targets in the North, the US military was further restricted from inserting ground forces into North Vietnam. The United States was forced to rely on airborne FACs to interdict supplies in southern North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. However, the slow-moving O-1 and O-2 FACs, initially well suited for reconnaissance...

From World War I to Vietnam, the definition of interdiction remained consistent. Based on Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, the definition of the term interdictioninvolved the destruction, disruption, diversion, or delaying of an enemy’s surface military potential before it could be employed effectively against friendly forces.¹ While the 1997 edition is the latest version of Air Force Basic Doctrineas of this writing, an amended definition of AI has evolved in USAF due to the combat experience of Operation Allied Force over Kosovo in 1999. The latest edition of AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland,...

The decision to use A-10 FACs as mission commanders for daytimestrike missions over Kosovo was based on the need to locate and attack the Serbian Third Army without the aid of a friendly ground force. Along with more than 40,000 troops, the Serbians deployed a sophisticated IADS, which included a squadron of MiG 21s, mobile SA-6 radar-guided missiles, hundreds of shoulder-launched MANPADS, and AAA.¹ In response, NATO manned continuous air-to-air combat air patrol to keep the MiGs in their underground bunkers, while SEAD fighters carrying high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) and Marine and Navy EA-6B radar jammers kept the SA-6s silent.²...

Since World War II, the United States has been involved in several limited conflicts against smaller, far less militarily capable opponents. Unlimited war with the Soviet Union, for which the USAF prepared over 40 years never materialized. Instead, US airpower has been directed against underdeveloped, authoritarian states. Such regimes tend to rely upon their armies as their primary source of power. Yet the USAF, born out of the aerial combat experience of World War II, has firmly held to airpower as the means of bypassing military forces and striking directly at the vital center of the enemy. Thus, American airmen...