On 16 January 1991, President George W. Bush addressed the nation to announce the initiation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf. “This military action,” he stated, “taken in accord with United Nations resolutions and with the consent of the United States Congress, follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity.”¹ The military action he then described departed from the characteristic wartime application of United States (US) military might. Rather than depending on a land strategy to dislodge the Iraqi army from Kuwait, the president relied on what the world’s premier airpower theorist, Giulio Douhet, had called independent aviation.² Airpower...

Great Britain created the Royal Air Force on 1 April 1918,¹ granting it legitimacy “as an independent means of war operations.”² Although the RAF achieved service autonomy on the eve of the armistice, its leaders would still have to struggle to assure their institutional survival during the interwar era.³ A key issue for the new service became the role of the RAF: Was it primarily an auxiliary air force, supporting ground or sea forces; or, was it primarily an autonomous one, working apart from ground or sea forces? With this question looming, the RAF entered the interwar years.

World War...

The totality of World War II led American political and military leaders to reexamine the military’s role in formulating grand strategy.¹ At Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, the nucleus of creative thinking for the new USAF, strategists examined the RAF’s interwar experience in light of both World War II and the atomic bomb to determine the applicability of air control in the nuclear age. Prompted by the State Department Policy Planning Staff’s reaction to a 1948 USAF presentation on nuclear war plans,² Air University gathered an impressive array of distinguished individuals to examine political, military, and economic policy...

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi army units, supported by heavy armor and air forces, invaded Kuwait. Within 24 hours the United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution #660, condemning Iraq’s invasion and demanding an immediate withdrawal.¹ Similarly, the United States responded by invoking the Carter doctrine.²

To counter the Iraqi invasion, President Bush initially dispatched two carrier battle groups, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing.³ Although he originally emphasized political and economic actions to reverse Iraqi aggression, with this deployment of military might President Bush signaled his willingness to use force, if diplomacy failed, to remove Iraqi...

After the Persian Gulf conflict, USAF leaders have debated the proper size, shape, and role of their force.¹ Included in those debates has been a discussion of the appropriate strategy to guide the service. Both air control and Project Control offer interesting possibilities. These control strategies had provided Great Britain and the United States with tangible frame-works for applying airpower; however, there were flaws. This examination of the British and American models that highlights both prospects and pitfalls of a control strategy may prove useful for the generals who develop the USAF’s future strategy, the staff officers who may plan...

Airmen must not consider a control scheme a panacea strategy, nor should they dismiss its advantages out of hand, regardless of how air-power is applied. Future military conflicts will likely contain auxiliary and autonomous applications of airpower. In some instances, the air campaign should take priority over surface campaigns. In other cases, air-power should be subordinate to surface actions. The Palestine incident, however, shows that political and military leaders must resist the urge to consider airpower as the answer for soundly developed military strategy.

Although air control was the first airpower strategy packaged, adopted, and applied by a nation, it...