Fighting with a Conscience
Research Report
Fighting with a Conscience: The Effects of an American Sense of Morality on the Evolution of Strategic Bombing Campaigns
EDWARD C. HOLLAND
Copyright Date: May. 1, 1992
Published by: Air University Press
Pages: 44
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13780
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-i)
  2. Disclaimer
    Disclaimer (pp. ii-ii)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. iii-iv)
  4. Abstract
    Abstract (pp. v-vi)
  5. About the Author
    About the Author (pp. vii-vii)
  6. Chapter 1 Introduction
    Chapter 1 Introduction (pp. 1-3)

    As midnight approached on 16 January 1991, the roar of jet aircraft suddenly broke the stillness of the Saudi Arabian desert. Wave after wave of aircraft followed, until hundreds were heading north into Iraq in search of their targets. Operation Desert Shield had ended; Operation Desert Storm had begun. During the next 43 days and nights, coalition air forces adhered to an American air campaign plan as they pounded targets in Iraq and Kuwait with more that 88,000 tons of bomb and caused a miraculously small number of civilian casualties.¹ The three thousand civilian deaths in Baghdad, while regrettable, were...

  7. Chapter 2 The Early Years and World War I
    Chapter 2 The Early Years and World War I (pp. 5-7)

    Shortly after the Wright brothers proved that heavier than air flight was possible, men began discovering innovative uses for their new flying machines. Many of the new ideas conceived during the decade following the Kitty Hawk experiments had military applications, but their value was unknown until they were tested in the crucible of combat. The notion of strategic bombing was untested, and the assertion that aircraft could be used to wreck a nation’s morale and shorten a war was unproven. The conviction remained unsubstantiated after World War I. Although many American air leaders adopted this belief, they never had an...

  8. Chapter 3 The Interwar Years
    Chapter 3 The Interwar Years (pp. 9-14)

    The two decades following World War I were critical to the development of the American strategic bombing doctrine for World War II. A powerful influence on air commanders was the horror of the First World War, which caused great revulsion in civilian as well as military leaders. Bombing seemingly offered a means to end conflicts quickly and avoid the stalemate of trench warfare. Air Service leaders found that prospect difficult to resist. They were convinced that a few more months of fighting would have proven airpower decisive in World War I.¹ They also felt it had the potential to be...

  9. Chapter 4 World War II: The European Theater
    Chapter 4 World War II: The European Theater (pp. 15-21)

    The American strategic bombing offensive against Axis Europe began on 17 August 1942, when 12 B-17s conducted a daytime raid against the French railroad marshalling yards at Rouen-Sotteville. Personally leading the mission was the Eighth Air Force commander, Maj Gen Ira C. Eaker, who characterized the raid as a success.¹ The B-17s accurately bombed the target and all aircraft returned to England. The doctrine of daylight, precision bombing had begun its trial by fire and the first results looked good. But the initial impression was premature, and future raids would challenge American confidence in the theory. Inaccurate bombing, prohibitive losses...

  10. Chapter 5 World War II: The Pacific Theater
    Chapter 5 World War II: The Pacific Theater (pp. 23-29)

    Japan’s extensive territorial conquests kept their home islands safe from aerial attack in World War II until the late spring of 1944. On 15 June 1944, 47 B-29s flying from China struck the Yawata iron and steel works on the island of Kyushu. This first mission typified the initial bombing raids against the home islands. It adhered to Army Air Forces doctrine, attacking the industrial web in daylight from high altitude, using both radar and visual precision bombing techniques.¹ But unique problems soon affected the air campaign against Japan, and the problems required unique solutions. One constant that remained, however...

  11. Chapter 6 Limited Warfare
    Chapter 6 Limited Warfare (pp. 31-38)

    The combat experience of World War II was a harsh test of America’s strategic bombing doctrine. Four years of conflict transformed what was untested theory into battle-hardened practice. In the process, targeting began to shift from precision attacks to area bombing, but the characteristic sense of morality remained as a cornerstone of air doctrine that continued to influence the conduct of the air war until the fighting stopped. Although the campaigns against Germany and Japan were conducted in different areas of the world under unique circumstances, the American code of ethics had similar effects on the two campaigns. In both...

  12. Chapter 7 The Future
    Chapter 7 The Future (pp. 39-41)

    According to former Air Force chief of staff, General Dugan, and General Schwarzkopf, commander in chief, US Central Command, the air attack directed against Iraq was one of the most overwhelming, decisive, yet humane strategic bombing campaigns in the history of airpower.¹ The campaign adhered to the basic tenets of American strategic bombing doctrine in targeting Iraq’s capability and will to fight and in avoiding direct attacks on Iraqi civilians. The creation of that doctrine began in the 1930s at the Air Corps Tactical School, where air officers argued that strategic bombing should be aimed at an enemy’s war-making potential...