The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction (BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. These targets were beyond the capability and immediate tactical concern of the ground commander, beyond the area that required detailed coordination of each individual CAS mission, but were close enough to have a near-term effect upon surface operation and required a general...

The term battlefield air interdiction (BAI) was born in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); first published as United States Air Force doctrine in the 1979 version of Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force; and eliminated as a doctrinal mission in the 1992 revision of the same manual. The 1979 version of AFMAN 1-1 stated, “That portion of the air interdiction mission which may have a direct or near-term effect upon surface operations— referred to by the term ‘battlefield air interdiction’—requires the air and surface commanders to coordinate their respective...

Since the inception of military aviation, aircraft have supported ground operations. Airpower’s utility quickly expanded from its early support missions of observation and artillery spotting. It did not take long for ground commanders to recognize that the airplane could be instrumental in warfare, especially when they found defending themselves from attack by enemy airpower was difficult. As airpower continued to evolve under fire, the three core missions of tactical airpower emerged. They included air superiority—a mission needed to ensure friendly survival and freedom of operation on the battlefield; AI—a mission to destroy enemy strongholds and lines of communication...

By mid-1990, the USAF and the USA were closer doctrinally than they had been since 1947. They had the shared vision of BAI codified in both services’ doctrine, coauthored more than 14 different memoranda of understanding or agreement signed by their chiefs of staff, completed several joint exercises, and had developed a common perspective on the next CAS-BAI aircraft.¹ The two services had come a long way since 1973 when Generals Abrams and Brown had directed them to work together. “It takes a long time to move a bureaucracy.”² In October 1985, Gen John A. Wickham, chief of staff of...

The mood in the services at the end of Operation Desert Storm was one of jubilation. All four services performed credibly on the battlefield and won a convincing victory in short order with low casualties. Desert Storm was not the only war won by the beginning of the new decade. The Cold War victory was just as sweet. Immediately preceding the Gulf War, President Bush declared that the world was entering a new era—an era of peace and prosperity. The armed forces that would face this new era had grown up during the Cold War. The victories won by...

Uncertainty seemed to be the dominant feeling in the mid-1990s. After several years of trying to discover a new paradigm, most still referred to the mid-1990s as a post–Cold War era. Such reference was caused by the gradual shifting of power in the wake of the former Soviet Union’s collapse. The world was still changing. The United States was adjusting to a new reality. As a result, many small-scale contingencies emerged in the 1990s including operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Even though the United States was fairly well prepared for these contingencies, it did not expect any of...

This CADRE Paper embarked on a journey to determine why battlefield air interdiction disappeared from the military lexicon following the Persian Gulf War. To accomplish this task, the study demonstrated that BAI was present in both USA and USAF doctrine before the war and that it was removed after the war. The burden was to investigate three possible explanations for this occurrence. First, it considered whether BAI was eliminated because it no longer served a useful purpose. Second, the study contemplated whether service self-interest was instrumental in removing BAI from the doctrine. Third, the study examined each service’s doctrine process...