Beyond the Battle Line
Research Report
Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 1919–1941
GARY C. COX
Copyright Date: Apr. 1, 1996
Published by: Air University Press
Pages: 54
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13792
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-i)
  2. Disclaimer
    Disclaimer (pp. ii-ii)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. iii-iv)
  4. Abstract
    Abstract (pp. v-v)
  5. About the Author
    About the Author (pp. vii-vii)
  6. Acknowledgments
    Acknowledgments (pp. ix-ix)
  7. Chapter 1 Introduction
    Chapter 1 Introduction (pp. 1-3)

    This study examines the evolution of US air attack theory and doctrine in the interwar period, 1919–1941, and provides insight to future military planners. This period is particularly important since early thinking about attack aviation, and aviation in general, set the stage for development during World War II. This study also examines the relationship between attack theory and doctrine, and the practical application of doctrine by the Air Corps in preparing for war. Therefore, the central research question is, Was US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine adequately developed during the interwar years to be useful at the start...

  8. Chapter 2 Attack Theory and Doctrine of the Air Service, 1919–1926
    Chapter 2 Attack Theory and Doctrine of the Air Service, 1919–1926 (pp. 5-14)

    By the end of WWI, attack aviation came to be recognized as a needed and separate branch of aviation. Brig Gen Mason M. Patrick, chief of the Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), stated, “It will be well to specialize in this branch of aviation and to provide squadrons or groups with machine guns and small bombs for just such work against ground objectives …”¹ As a result, one of the Air Services’ first significant acts was to establish an attack aviation group in 1921—the 3d Attack Group.² The US created the new attack group in spite of post-WWI...

  9. Chapter 3 Attack Theory and Doctrine in the Air Corps, 1926–1935
    Chapter 3 Attack Theory and Doctrine in the Air Corps, 1926–1935 (pp. 15-25)

    The Air Corps Act of 1926 changed the name of the Air Service to “Air Corps” and solidified the Air Corps’ position as a combat arm within the Army but did very little to change the relationship between the War Department and Air Corps. Organizational plans during the mid-1920s assigned attack, pursuit, and observation aviation to armies and observation units to Army Corps and divisions for direct support of ground forces.¹ With some observation, bombardment aviation would be held in a general headquarters (GHQ) Reserve. The independent minded Air Corps was pushing for a GHQ Air Force to be the...

  10. Chapter 4 Attack Theory and Doctrine before World War II, 1935–1941
    Chapter 4 Attack Theory and Doctrine before World War II, 1935–1941 (pp. 27-36)

    After years of debate and struggle, the Air Corps’ fight to become an independent air organization was again answered by reorganization without independence. On 1 March 1935, the War Department established the GHQ Air Force, primarily “as a new tactical unit of the Army.”¹ The organization of the GHQ Air Force followed the recommendations of the secretary of war’s special committee examining Air Corps operations, the Baker Board, and established the GHQ at Langley Field, Virginia. The new GHQ commander, Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews, reported to the chief of staff in time of peace and to the theater commander...

  11. Chapter 5 Conclusion
    Chapter 5 Conclusion (pp. 37-41)

    Attack aviation development during the Air Service, 1919–26, can best be understood given three important findings. First, attack theory and doctrine was significantly influenced by the lessons of WWI. Airmen believed that aircraft vulnerability over the immediate battlefield caused such high attrition so as not to warrant the risks of close support. On the other hand, objectives in the rear areas, beyond artillery range, were highly susceptible to attack and were generally less heavily defended. Second, Air Service attack theory was in its infancy and represented a fragmented body of knowledge. Early theorists like Mitchell and Sherman believed the...

  12. Appendix A Analysis of Attack Operations in Air Service and Air Corps Maneuvers, 1925–1931
    Appendix A Analysis of Attack Operations in Air Service and Air Corps Maneuvers, 1925–1931 (pp. 43-43)
  13. Appendix B Navy-Marine Corps Close Air Support Prior to WWII
    Appendix B Navy-Marine Corps Close Air Support Prior to WWII (pp. 45-46)
  14. Bibliography
    Bibliography (pp. 47-51)