In examining any military strategy, it is impossible not to discuss military doctrine. Discussing doctrine, specifically its definition and application, leads to passionate debates. Among military professionals of various services and learned academicians of many institutions, even the definition of doctrine differs by degrees in both its fundamental purpose and application of the military instrument of national policy. Since this is a study largely about competing airpower strategies during World War II, I present my own view of this 50-year-old debate.

My definition of airpower doctrine comes in two divisions of the classic “who, what, where, when, why, and how.”...

Before World War II, many enthusiasts promulgated aerial bombing as a war-winning weapon.¹ The Italian general Douhet believed an independent air force could break the morale of an enemy by destroying its cities through aerial bombardment.² British Air Marshal Hugh M. Trenchard “viewed the disruption of enemy industry as a legitimate means for bringing about the collapse of enemy morale.”³ Many early air leaders in the United States at the ACTS were convinced that attacking an enemy’s vital centers would cripple any industrial nation’s ability to produce war material, thus forcing capitulation.⁴ The notion that airpower could win wars and...

The first contribution of airpower to the collapse of Italy was its effect on Allied grand strategy.¹ Many of the grand strategy deliberations revolved around the appropriate military strategy for defeating the Axis powers in Europe, competing British and American strategic bombing doctrines, and the efficacy of airpower to eliminate Germany and Italy through strategic bombing

After the successful invasion of North Africa in Operation Torch on 11 November 1942, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill first suggested a post-Tunisian strategy that would be the British position for much of the next 12 months. In a cable to President Franklin...

In July 1943, Mussolini had two tigers by the tail. Militarily, following the terrible defeats in the USSR and Africa, he could expect the overwhelming might of the impending Allied invasion or, alternatively, a vengeful German occupation following any attempt to withdraw from the war.¹ Moreover, Allied airpower from both the North African Air Force (NAAF) and Bomber Command subjected Italy to increasingly larger air raids or on the other hand “it would be the Luftwaffe instead of the Allied air forces that would be bombing Italian cities.”² Politically, he faced growing domestic dissent on many fronts or the gestapo...

As a result of the decisions made at the Algiers Conference, on 15 June the CCS authorized bombing raids on Rome.¹ Two weeks later Spaatz and Tedder, perhaps under the influence of Zuckerman, while planning support operations for the upcoming Sicilian assault decided to interdict rail yards in both Naples and Rome as part of the overall campaign to disrupt supply and communications in Italy.² In his biography of Spaatz, Richard A. Davis writes “Spaatz suggested that Naples should receive not only bombs but surrender leaflets as well. He did not make clear [in his command dairy] whether he thought...