Eliminating the Rhetoric
Research Report
Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the Halt-Phase Strategy
Mark C. Nowland
Copyright Date: Feb. 1, 2001
Published by: Air University Press
Pages: 83
OPEN ACCESS
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13831
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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. i-ii)
  2. Disclaimer
    Disclaimer (pp. ii-ii)
  3. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. iii-iv)
  4. Abstract
    Abstract (pp. v-vi)
  5. About the Author
    About the Author (pp. vii-viii)
  6. Acknowledgments
    Acknowledgments (pp. ix-ix)
  7. Chapter 1 Introduction
    Chapter 1 Introduction (pp. 1-3)

    On 3 March 1943, Fifth Air Force aircraft engaged, sank, and halted a critical reinforcement convoy en route to Lae, New Guinea, in the Battle of Bismarck Sea.¹ In October 1973, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) acting in conjunction with defensive efforts of the Israeli army halted a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights.² At the end of February 1991, the United States Air Force (USAF) and the US Army (USA) failed to halt the escape of several Iraqi Republican Guard (RG) divisions from the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO). This study examines these three efforts by airpower to halt...

  8. Chapter 2 Explanation of the Halt-Phase Strategy
    Chapter 2 Explanation of the Halt-Phase Strategy (pp. 5-14)

    Because it is in essence a particular form of interdiction, the halt phase has deep historical roots. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines interdiction as “an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.”¹ History is replete with examples of airpower being used directly or indirectly to interdict an army’s ability to concentrate and maneuver. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower highlighted this capability: “Our powerful air force ranged far and wide and attacked important targets en masse, almost paralyzing the...

  9. Chapter 3 Critiques of the Halt-Phase Strategy
    Chapter 3 Critiques of the Halt-Phase Strategy (pp. 15-23)

    The sister-service critiques of the halt-phase strategy are varied and very rarely direct. Most of the direct critiques come from a series of debates between Army Maj Gen Robert H. Scales, Marine Corps Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, and Air Force Maj Gen Charles Link. Dr. Earl H. Tilford Jr.’s monograph Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in Old Skins . . . with Power-Point also criticizes the strategy. This chapter compiles these criticisms into two categories: critiques based on the nature of war and critiques based on scenario-specific contingencies. Within the nature of war critique subissues of friction, technological determinism...

  10. Chapter 4 The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
    Chapter 4 The Battle of the Bismarck Sea (pp. 25-35)

    The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was part of a larger strategy to halt the Japanese advance in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). The results of the actions taken on 1–4 March 1943 owe a great deal to the actions taken in the previous seven months. Those actions would result in what Gen Douglas MacArthur would later call “the decisive aerial engagement” in his theater of the war.¹

    In the months prior to and including March 1943, the Allied forces in the Pacific were battling to wrest control of the Solomon Islands and Guadalcanal from the Japanese naval forces....

  11. Chapter 5 1973 Yom Kippur War, Golan Heights Action
    Chapter 5 1973 Yom Kippur War, Golan Heights Action (pp. 37-48)

    The Yom Kippur War was the fourth modern Arab–Israeli war. Despite its having started differently from the three previous wars, it ended with Israeli victory. On 6 October 1973, the Egyptians and Syrians launched surprise offensive operations on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. This two-front effort caught the Israelis unprepared. The Israeli ground forces were outnumbered but fought bravely, putting up a stiff defense. Nevertheless, they needed immediate help. Israel Defense Force (IDF) chief of staff, Lt Gen David Elazar had given clear orders around midnight on 6 October. “Try and block, stifle and stop with everything...

  12. Chapter 6 The Iraqi Republican Guard Basra Escape
    Chapter 6 The Iraqi Republican Guard Basra Escape (pp. 49-64)

    By most accounts, the Gulf War was a tremendous success for the coalition forces. Upon their return to the United States, US troops were treated as heroes and enjoyed a welcome home celebration that appeared to exorcise memories of Vietnam from the American psyche. Recent analysis of the Gulf War has been more critical of the conflict’s ending, particularly of the apparent partial escape of the RG from the KTO. Critics cite this escape of the RG as a coalition failure, faulting both the USA and the USAF for failing to destroy the RG. Michael Gordon, appearing on the CBS...

  13. Chapter 7 Conclusions
    Chapter 7 Conclusions (pp. 65-72)

    The preceding chapters evaluated three very different air operations. Each case study’s reasons for success or failure varied. Table 1 synthesizes the data. The criteria for each case study is judged as: +, positively affecting the ability to halt enemy forces; 0, neutral in influencing the halting of enemy forces; -, negatively affecting the ability to halt enemy forces. From the table, the dominant criteria in halting an enemy force are organization and training. Doctrine, technology, and C² are also determinant factors.

    The most important similarity in the three case studies regarding organization was having a single airman in charge...

  14. Back Matter
    Back Matter (pp. 73-77)