In recent years the phrase “since the end of the Cold War” has constituted the prologue for scenarios based on the assumption that we have entered a somehow less dangerous phase of world affairs. That is far from self-evident. To mention that but two elements bring this supposition into question:

1. Proliferation has confronted us with regimes compared with which the late Soviet Union appeared “rational,” or at least predictable, certainly if viewed within its own context. Consequently, even a highly questionable supposition like “mutually assured destruction” could act as a stabilizer, at least for a short period. Now, however, one...

Since the World War II terror bombings of London by German V-1 and V-2 rockets, nations have desired a means to protect their homeland, populace, and fielded forces from missile attack. The addition of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to ballistic missiles further increases the motivation for defense. However, ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a difficult challenge, and the massive buildup of missiles in the Cold War reflected the dominance of strategic offense over the limited ability to defend.

The end of the Cold War reduced nuclear tension between the United States, Europe, and Russia; but conversely, the threat...

The United States has pursued BMD at varying levels of intensity since early in the Cold War as alluded to by Senator Warner’s quote. Early incarnations of missile defense were focused against the Soviet Union; however, the prospects for adequately defending against a massive attack were slim resulting in the acceptance of the mutually assured destruction (MAD) doctrine. This conclusion was codified in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which severely curtailed ABM deployments.

The ballistic missile debate reemerged in the 1980s with President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. The technical and political realities of the 1990s reduced the SDI vision...

The current missile-defense effort is the most comprehensive attempt by the United States to field a national BMD system. The US missile-defense program is managed by the MDA with specific guidance from the president and secretary of defense. The MDA translated the strategic objectives into a portfolio of systems and technology programs designed to field an effective missile-defense system. The following sections discuss the overall strategy, the MDA’s suite of programs, and an analysis of how well the effort is proceeding.

National Security Presidential Directive 23 lays out the US commitment to fielding a limited defense as well as provides...

Asia is the continent most impacted by the political and strategic implications of US missile-defense policies for the next decade. As illustrated in chapter 2, Russia is traditionally a focus of US missile-defense policy since the end of World War II and will continue to be a key player. China is viewed as the emerging peer competitor to the United States and has voiced definite opinions on US missile-defense policy. Beyond these two nations, WMD proliferation, rogue states and actors, and nuclear tensions are also concentrated in Asia. Globally the trend has been for non-Asian nations to renounce WMD and...

The US missile-defense program is an essential element for assuring allies and successfully dissuading, deterring, and defeating asymmetric threats to US interests worldwide and especially in Asia. US missile-defense policy was buffeted by international and domestic politics during the Cold War leading to a lack of consensus on the utility, cost, and technical capability. Consequently, missile defense was marginalized and yielded to the strategic doctrine of MAD. However, the post–Cold War world is quite different, and strategies which worked in a bipolar world of peer competitors are no longer sufficient to handle the broad range of threats now in...