Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision-makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies?
This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders.
Of central importance to this assessment is the Army’s December 2006 Field Manual...
Soldiers praise FM 3-24 as “brilliantly” created,60 a proposition with which Airmen would agree. Airmen, however, would also find that its defining provisions espouse rather standard ground-force philosophies. In fact, what is paradoxical61—given the publicity surrounding FM 3-24—is its surprisingly conventional approach to unconventional war. In particular, it reverts to much the same solution Soldiers typically fall back upon when confounded by a difficult operational situation, COIN or otherwise: employ ever larger numbers of Soldiers and have them engage in “close” contact with the “target,” however defined.
At its core, FM 3-24 enthusiastically reflects the Army’s hallowed concept...
FM 3-24 is an exquisite illustration of the differing paths Airmen and Soldiers can take in addressing war-fighting matters. Considered more broadly, the contrasting philosophical perspectives underlay the fact that airpower is “inherently a strategic force.”82 Thus, Airmen tend to reason in strategicterms.
Soldiers, however, are intellectually disposed to favor close combat and tend to think tactically. These tendencies are certainly not exclusive focuses of either component—many Soldiers are extraordinary strategic theorists, and many Airmen have enormous tactical expertise. Rather, they are cultural propensities that, when recognized, are helpful in analyzing FM 3-24’s manpower-intensive approach.
The strategic inclination of...
Institutional infatuation with the individual soldier, an affinity for the close fight, skepticism toward new technology, and over-reliance on historical case studies add up to FM 3-24’s troop-centric and technology “light”—if not outright anti-airpower—theme. Airmen may find, however, that the most pernicious—and flawed—aspect of FM 3-24 is its treatment of the strike capability of airpower. Specifically, it admonishes ground commanders to
exercise exceptional care when using airpower in the strike role. Bombing, even with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civilian casualties. Effective leaders weigh the benefits of every air strike against its risks. An...
What would joint counterinsurgency doctrine that includes airmindedness187 look like? It is well beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full-blown draft doctrine. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some considerations, in addition to those already mentioned, that an Airman might bring to the development of joint COIN doctrine.
To reiterate, “airminded” does not mean “air-centric” or even dominated by airpower. At a minimum, however, it does mean applying airmindedness to the problem of insurgency. Doing so provides many opportunities to create what COIN experts Steven Metz and Raymond Millen say is needed to win: an “effects-based approach...
Notwithstanding the critiques of FM 3-24 in this essay, it remains a stellar work of scholarship and military theory that skillfully presents the ground force perspective. What is more is that it is plainly appropriate and fully workable in certain situations—especially for armies in COIN fights where the United States is not involved and modern airpower capabilities are not available.
Of immediate concern, however, is whether the media’s designation of FM 3-24 as The Book for Iraq is the right characterization.417 As valuable as FM 3-24 may be in other circumstances, a doctrine that calls for enormous numbers of...
