After Germany’s defeat in World War II, many historians and military leaders studied the German command system in an attempt to explain its stunning early campaign successes. One of these analysts, Col Trevor N. Dupuy, US Army, Retired, argued that most German units outperformed their allied foes in several measures of combat effectiveness.¹ Dupuy concluded that the secret of the German army’s operational and tactical prowess lay in its long general staff tradition which “institutionalized military excellence” in the German officer corps through careful selection and years of military education and training.² A key component of the general staff tradition...

In Command in War, Martin van Creveld traces the evolution of military command from the days of Alexander the Great to the present. He defines command as a function that has to be exercised, more or less continuously, if a military force is to operate effectively.¹ This function, he argues, consists of six basic subtasks that have remained relatively constant over the years: (1) the timely collection of accurate information; (2) the distinguishing of the relevant information; (3) the translation of the information into an estimate of the situation; (4) the establishment of objectives and the selection of an appropriate...

As an example of air auftragstaktik, no air campaign stands out like Gen George C. Kenney’s in the Southwest Pacific during World War II. A master innovator, Kenney was given free rein to employ airpower as he saw fit by his joint force commander Gen Douglas MacArthur.¹ Kenney exercised centralized control of his forces to focus the main airpower effort as required by the evolving situation. At the same time, he delegated authority and responsibility for detailed planning and execution to his subordinate commanders, sometimes down to the group level, to provide them

The war in the Southwest Pacific consisted...

In 1990 when Coalition forces deployed to the Persian Gulf in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief (CINC) of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) designated Lt Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, commander of Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), as the theater joint forces air component commander (JFACC). Horner’s initial mission was simple: defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi invasion. Soon, however, Col John A. Warden III and his Air Staff planners in the basement of the Pentagon began developing a strategic air offensive designed to neutralize Iraq’s leadership and war-making capability. Warden’s plan...

What then were the common enabling conditions that allowed Kenney and the 7440th Composite Wing to operate effectively under mission-type orders? As the Germans asserted in their 1933 troop leading regulations, an essential condition for mission order command is mutual trust between the senior commander and his subordinates. MacArthur’s trust of Kenney was shared by the other major commanders, such as General Eichelberger, who were familiar with Kenney and resolved not to interfere with his control of airpower beyond the realm of close air support. Likewise, Kenney trusted Whitehead and his air task force (wing) commanders, whom he knew well...

Is centralized control via a cumbersome air tasking order (ATO) the approved campaign solution; or is it a vulnerability that a smart opponent can attack to temporarily paralyze American air operations?

Former Air Force chief of staff General Larry Welch said,

I believe we overcontrolled in Desert Storm. We did focus on the CINC’s intent . . . but it took us 5000 pages and 72 hours to produce an ATO. We need to adjust our control to what is necessary . . . we could do a lot more stuff over the phone—kill these targets—and do it...