As a result of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., American eyes have been opened to a new and deadly kind of nonstate enemy who will stop at nothing to accomplish their political aims. Recognizing this threat, the Bush administration recently published the National Security Strategy (NSS) that argues the case for preemptive strikes against those who seek to blackmail America, alter our foreign policies, and potentially even destroy our way of life.¹ Consequently, as our nation scans the horizon with this new perspective, the propagation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) weighs...

Why do countries find mobile ballistic missiles attractive? One answer is that these weapons introduce a profound amount of uncertainty to enemy planners. To fight against a nation armed with mobile missiles (especially if they could be armed with WMD) means the costs of war might be prohibitive. In 1991 Saddam Hussein’s Iraq changed the tempo of the coalition air campaign by firing relatively obsolete Scud missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. More importantly, America’s haphazard and unsuccessful efforts to locate and destroy this mobile threat did not go unnoticed. According to Mark Kipphut, who conducted an in-depth study of...

Prolific science fact-and-fiction author G. Harry Stine anticipated the end of the threat from ballistic missiles in an ambitious prediction from his history of the ICBM. Yet as we contemplate such a naively hopeful prediction, it is arguable that Americans sometimes fall into a “technological trap.” That is, Americans place so much reliance on the ability to develop new technological wonders that frequently the nontechnical aspects of the solution elude us. However, while mindful of this admonition, some detailed attention must be given to the topic of technology’s role in responding to the threat from mobile ballistic missiles.

Technological advances...

Throughout the Cold War, mobile ballistic missiles provided a highly survivable deterrent force for each superpower. Each side understood that these weapons were intended to provide an insurance policy against a first-strike nuclear attack. In theory, mobile ICBMs would survive such a first strike in large enough numbers to destroy the society of the nation that initiated the attack. A balance and understanding had been reached that would govern the Cold War period. The anxiety of having the mobile missile “Sword of Damocles” hanging over each nation’s head was somewhat balanced by the fact that the rules of deterrence were...

Two key aspects of the threat posed by proliferation of mobile ballistic missiles stand out. First, by examining the history of these weapons, it should be clear why countries at a comparative technological disadvantage would want to equip their forces with ground-mobile ballistic missiles. The threat posed by even one such elusive weapon armed with a nuclear warhead is enough to give any opposing nation pause. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the necessary technology and support are readily available to even the weakest of nations (or most shadowy of organizations). Money is all that is required to obtain...